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ABSTRACT
Doubt, Certainty, and the Cartesian Circle
(February 1983)
Robert S. Welch, A.B., Brown University
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph-D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
Ever since Arnauld and others first pointed it out in
their objections to Descartes
' Meditations
,
philosophers
have concerned themselves with what appears to be a vicious
circle: that the principle of clarity and distinctness
which is employed to validate God's existence is itself in
need of a guarantee which only God's existence can provide.
In general, contemporary commentators proposing solutions
to this problem can be divided into three camps: first,
there are those who see reason as autonomous for Descartes
and the principle of clarity and distinctness as needing no
guarantee. By 'autonomy of reason' I mean that the faculty
by which the Cogito and other of Descartes' first
principles are perceived is not in need of any verification
of its inability to err. Second, there are those who see
reason as only partially autonomous for Descartes with that
part validating the proof of God's existence which in turn
vi
validates that aspect of reason which is not autonomous.
Third, there are those who see reason as non-autonomous
and who argue for distinctions in the concepts of certainty
and doubt in order to avoid the circle.
In this dissertation I present the problem by drawing
directly from the Meditations and the Objections and
Replies and I outline the strategy I will employ in dealing
with the problem. I proceed to discuss in turn each of the
aforementioned three positions, the arguments offered by
proponents of each, and the criticism of each, both my own
and those found in the literature of the problem. Taking
the third position, the non-autonomy of reason, as my
starting point, I then present my own interpretation of
Descartes' strategy which, I argue, succeeds in circum-
venting the problem of circular reasoning and in over-
coming the objections raised against others.
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INTRODUCTION
In Meditation I Descartes sets forth reasons which will
allow him to "doubt about all things. . . 1,1 and having
systematically attempted to do this, turns in Meditation II
to seek that which is indubitable and discovers that he,
Descartes, exists as a thinking being. Using this
discovery as a basis for further investigation Descartes
concludes at the beginning of Meditation III that:
I am certain that I am a thing which
thinks; but do I not then likewise know
what is requisite to render me certain
of a truth? Certainly in this first
knowledge there is nothing that assures
me of its truth, excepting the clear
and distinct perception of that which
I state, which would not indeed suffice
to assure me that what I say is true,
if it could ever happen that a thing
which I conceived so clearly and
distinctly could be false; and
accordingly it seems to me that already
I can establish as a general rule that
all things which I perceive very
^
clearly and very distinctly are true.
Having asserted the doctrine of clarity and distinct-
ness Descartes immediately appears to cast doubt upon it.
X
The Philosophical Works of Descartes , transl. Elizabeth
S. Haldane and G. T. R. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1931), Volumes I and II (hereafter abbreviated
as HR I and HR II). HR I, p. 140.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 158
.
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But when I took anything very simple and easy
in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry into
consideration, e.g. that two and three together
made five, and other things of the sort, were
not these present to my mind so clearly as to
enable me to affirm that they were true? Cer-
tainly if I judged that since such matters
could be doubted, this would not have been so
for any other reason than that it came into my
mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me
with such a nature that 1 may have been deceived
even concerning things which seemed to me most
manifest. But every time that this precon-
ceived opinion of the sovereign power of a
God presents itself to my thought, I am con-
strained to confess that it is easy to Him, if
He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in
matters in which I believe myself to have the
best evidence. And, on the other hand, always
when I direct my attention to things which I
believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am
so persuaded of their truth that I let myself
break out into words such as these: Let who
will deceive me, He can never cause me to be
nothing while I think that I am, or some day
cause it to be true to say that I have never
been, it being true now to say that I am, or
that two and three make more or less than five,
or any such thing in which I see a manifest con-
tradiction. And, certainly, since I have no
reason to believe that there is a God who is
a deceiver, and as I have not yet satisfied
myself that there is a God at all, the reason
for doubt which depends on this opinion alone
is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical.
But in order to be able altogether to remove
it, I must inquire whether there is a God as
soon as the occasion presents itself; and if
I find that there is a God, I must also inquire
whether He may be a deceiver; for without a
knowledge of these two truths I do not see
^that I can ever be certain of anything.
^Ibid.
,
pp. 158-159.
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I shall hereafter refer to this passage as the Circle
Passage
.
Descartes then proceeds to argue for the existence of
a non-deceiving God. Although he never explicitly employs
the doctrine of clarity and distinctness to support the
premises of his argument, its use is implicit in the
following
:
And we cannot say that this idea of God
is perhaps materially false and that
consequently I can derive it from naught
(i.e. that possibly it exists in me
because I am imperfect)
,
as I have just
said is the case with ideas of heat, cold
and other such things; for, on the con-
trary, as this idea is very clear and
distinct and contains within it more
objective reality than any other, there
can be none which is of itself more true,
nor any in which there can be less suspi-
cion of falsehood. 4
Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that a
non-deceiving God exists, Descartes, in Meditation IV
,
appears to use this demonstration to guarantee the veracity
of clear and distinct perceptions.
. . . for as often as I so restrain my
will within the limits of my knowledge
that it forms no judgment except on
matters which are clearly and distinctly
represented to it by the understanding,
I can never be deceived; for every clear
and distinct conception is without doubt
something, and hence cannot derive its
origin from what is naught, but must of
Ibid 166 (Italics mine)
xi
necessity have God as its author - God,
I say, who is supremely perfect, cannot
the cause of any error ; and consequently
we must conclude that such a conception
(or such a judgment) is true. ^
This guarantee is stated explicitly in Meditation V .
But after I have recognized that there is
a God - because at the same time I have
also recognized that all things depend
upon Him, and that He is not a deceiver,
an(3 from all that have inferred that what
f. perceive clearly and distinctly cannot
fail to be true . . . 6
Ever since Arnauld and others first pointed it out in
their objections to Descartes' Meditations
,
philosophers
have concerned themselves with what appears to be a vicious
circle: that the principle of clarity and distinctness
which is employed to demonstrate the certainty of God's
existence is itself in need of a guarantee which only the
certainty of God's existence can provide.
In the second set of objections the following point is
made
:
Thirdly, since you are not yet certain
of the aforesaid existence of God, and
yet according to your statement, cannot
be certain of anything or know anything
clearly and distinctly unless previously
you know certainly and clearly that God
~> Ibid.
, P- 178 .
^Ibid.
,
P* 184. (Italics mine)
7HR II, pp. 79-95.
^Ibid. pp. 24-29.
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exists, it follows that you cannot clearly
and distinctly know that you are a think-
ing thing, since, according to you, that
knowledge depends on the clear knowledge
of the existence of God, the proof of
which you have not yet reached at that
point where you draw the conclusion that
you have a clear knowledge of what you Q
are . 9
While the accusation of circular reasoning is not explicit-
ly stated in the foregoing passage, it is there to be drawn
out. Had Descartes' critics directed their attention to
questioning the clarity and distinctness of God's existence
rather than that of the Cogito
,
the question of circularity
would have been more apparent. Descartes' reply is un-
promising .
Thirdly, when I said that we could know
nothing with certainty unless we were
first aware that God existed
,
I announced
in expressed terms that I referred only
to the science apprehending such conclu-
sions <as can recur in memory without
attending further to the proofs which
led me to make them .
This leads us to believe that the principle of clarity and
distinctness does not need the guarantee provided by the
certainty of an existent non-deceiving God. But further
in the same replies Descartes also asserts:
. . . in the case of our clearest and most
accurate judgments which, if false,
^ Ibid
.
,
p . 26
.
~*~ Q Ibid
. , p . 38 .
xiii
could not be corrected by any that are
clearer, or by any other natural faculty,
I clearly affirm that we cannot be
deceived. For, since God is the highestbeing He cannot be otherwise than the
highest good and highest truth, and hence
it is contradictory that anything should
proceed from Him that positively tends
toward falsity. But yet since there is
nothing real in us that is not given by
God (as was proved along with His exis-
tence) and we have, as well, a real
faculty of recognizing truth, and dis-
tinguishing it from falsehood (as the mere
existence in us of true and false makes
manifest)
,
unless this faculty tended
toward truth, at least when properly
employed (i.e. when we give assent to
none but clear and distinct perceptions,
for no other correct use of this faculty
can be imagined)
,
God, who has given it
to us, must justly be held to be a
deceiver
.
Thus you see that, after becoming
aware of the existence of God, it is
incumbent on us to imagine that he is a
deceiver if we wish to cast doubt upon
our clear and distinct perceptions; and
since we cannot imagine that He is a
deceiver, we must admit them all as true
and certain. 11
This passage appears to place the principle of clarity and
distinctness again in need of support.
Descartes' vacillation does not end here. Later in
the same replies he reasserts the position which he main-
• 1
2
tamed in his initial reply to his critics.
^ Ibid
.
, pp. 40-41.
~^ Ibid
.
,
p . 42
.
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In the fourth set of objections M. Arnauld makes a
similar point.
The only remaining scruple I have is an
uncertainty a£ to how a circular reason-ing
_is to be avoided in saying ; the only
secure reason we have for believing that
we clearly and distinctly perceive
is true, is the fact that God exists.
But we can be sure that God exists,
-
onlY because we clearly and evidently
perceive that ; therefore prior to being
certain that God exists, we should be
certain that whatever we clearly and~
n
evidently perceive is true . 13
Descartes response is again unenlightening.
Finally, to prove that I have not
argued in a circle in saying, that the
only secure reason we have for believing
that what we clearly and distinctly per-
ceive i_s true
,
is the fact that God
oxi s t
s
; but that clear ly we can be sure
that God exists only because we perceive
that, I may cite the explanations that I
have already given at sufficient length
in my reply to the second set of Objec-
tions, numbers 3 and 4. There I distin-
guished those matters that in actual
truth we clearly perceive from those we
remember to have formerly perceived. For
first, we are sure that God exists because
we have attended to the proofs that estab-
lished this fact; but afterwards it is
enough for us to remember that we have
perceived something clearly, in order to
be sure that it is true; but this would
not suffice, unless we knew that God
existed and that He did not deceive us. 4
4 ^ Ibid
.
,
p . 92
.
14 Ibid
.
,
pp. 114-115.
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Given the unsatisfactory nature of Descartes' replies
to his critics, a number of contemporary Cartesian scholars
have attempted to provide interpretations of Descartes'
enterprise that would enable him to avoid the accusations
of circular reasoning. in general, these Cartesian commen-
tators can be divided into three camps. First, there are
those who see reason as autonomous for Descartes and the
principle of clarity and distinctness as needing no guaran-
tee. By 'autonomy of reason' I mean that the faculty by
which the Cogito and other of Descartes' first principles
are perceived is not in need of any verification of its
inability to err. Second, there are those who see reason
as only partially autonomous for Descartes with that part
validating the proof of God's existence which in turn
validates that aspect of reason which is not autonomous.
Third, there are those who see reason as non-autonomous
for Descartes and who argue for distinctions in the
concepts of certainty and doubt in order to avoid the
Cartesian Circle.
In the chapters that follow I present the strategies
of selected representatives from each of the three camps.
For each account including my own I pose questions related
to five topics treated in the Meditations . The first con-
cerns the range of doubt raised in Meditation I. For
xvi
example, what kind of beliefs and/or what faculties does
the doubt affect? is there a distinction in degree or
kind between categories of beliefs, e.g., between doubts
about empirical beliefs and non-empirical ones? The second
concerns the achievement of the Cogito in Meditation II .
For example, what does that achievement provide us with?
What is the relationship, if any, between the Cogito and
other first principles? Between the Cogito and the princi-
ple of clarity and distinctness? What kind or level of
certainty is achieved with the Cogito ? The third concerns
the role of the principle of clarity and distinctness in
Meditation II and III
. For example, what is its relation-
ship to the Cogito and other first principles? To the
certainty which Descartes is attempting to achieve? To the
demonstration of God's existence and non-deceiving nature?
The fourth concerns the doubt raised in the Circle Passage
in Meditation III . For example, what beliefs and/or
faculties are called into doubt? What is the relationship
between this doubt and that raised in Meditation I ? The
fifth topic concerns the arguments for the existence and
non-deceiving nature of God in Meditation III and IV
respectively. For example, what does Descartes achieve
with these arguments? How does he achieve it? What role
XVII
does the Coaito and other first principles play in these
arguments?
In the first chapter I discuss the strategies offered
by the proponents of the autonomy of reason in Descartes'
enterprise. For example, A. K. Stout and Willis Doney each
argue that God's existence is needed by Descartes to verify
only the memory of clear and distinct perceptions. Merrill
Ring argues that the scope of doubt in the Meditations
extends only to empirical knowledge claims. I cite Harry
Frankfurt's substantive objections to the memory thesis and
Peter Schouls' objections, particularly ones derived from
textual evidence, against the empirical interpretation. I
also offer my own criticisms of Ring's interpretation.
In the second chapter I discuss the strategies offered
by the proponents of the partial autonomy of reason. For
example, George Nakhnikian argues that circular reasoning
is unavoidable only if one fails to distinguish between
Descartes' considered doctrine and an aberrant view which
Descartes sometimes appears to hold. John Morris distin-
guishes between certain technical terms which he contends
Descartes used with comparative precision and consistency.
These distinctions provide Morris with a basis for arguing
that only certain aspects of reason are ever called into
doubt. Peter Schouls' strategy is similar to that of
xviii
Morris although the distinctions which he draws from
Descartes' writings differ from those which Morris draws.
I cite Schools' criticism of Morris' interpretation and
offer my own criticisms of each of the three accounts.
In the third chapter I discuss the strategies of two
proponents of the non-autonomy of reason in Descartes'
enterprise. Harry Frankfurt distinguishes between doubt-
ing the truth of a proposition and doubting the relation-
ship between a proposition's indubitability and its truth.
Alan Gewirth distinguishes between two types of certainty
and argues that the Cogito allows Descartes to achieve the
first type which Descartes uses in turn to achieve the
second. I offer criticisms of each interpretation and
point out certain features which show some promise of
pointing to a solution to the problem of the circle.
In the fourth chapter I discuss the strategies of
two additional proponents of the non-autonomy of reason in
Descartes' enterprise. Anthony Kenny distinguishes between
two types of doubt and certainty and employs the distinc-
tions to develop a strategy quite similar to that proposed
by Gewirth. Fred Feldman also distinguishes between two
types of doubt and certainty although the distinctions
are based on much different concepts than those of either
Gewirth or Kenny. I suggest difficulties which each
xix
interpretation encounters and also point to certain
features, particularly from Feldman's account, which will
prove helpful in developing my own interpretation.
In the fifth chapter I draw upon certain features from
Gewirth's, Kenny's, and Feldman's accounts to develop a
strategy of my own. I distinguish between three types of
doubt and certainty and argue that such a distinction
allows my account to avoid the difficulties which I have
raised for other proponents of the non-autonomy of reason
in Descartes' enterprise.
xx
CHAPTER I
Among the first contemporary defenders of Descartes is
A. K. Stout. In "The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes" 1
Stout defends the autonomy of reason for Descartes and
argues that the doubt raised in the Circle Passage early in
Meditation III concerns only the accuracy of one's memory
of clear and distinct perceptions. Demonstrating the exis-
tence of a non-deceiving God removes cause for that doubt
and validates that accuracy.
Stout does not explicitly consider question (1) but
his response would presumably be that the doubt raised in
Meditation I ranges over all beliefs, both empirical ones,
e.g., beliefs of physics, astronomy and medicine, and non-
empirical ones, e.g.
,
beliefs of mathematics and geometry.
The former are doubtful because they rely on sense percep-
tion, the latter because they presuppose that extension
exists. ".
.
. if a corporeal world did not exist mathe-
matics would simply be an elaborate deception.
.
." The
A. K. Stout, "The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes," Mind
Vol. 38 (1929), pp . 330-342, 458-472 . (Reprinted in
Descartes ; A Collection of Critical Essays
,
ed. Willis
Doney, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, (1967)
,
pp. 169-194. References will be to the Doney text.)
2
Ibid
.
,
p. 176 .
1
2spectre of an all powerful demon is raised precisely to
cast doubt on the corporeal world in general and extension
in particular.
While there appears to be no apparent distinction in
kind between the doubt raised against empirical beliefs and
that leveled against non-empirical ones for Stout, he does
point to a difference in degree. "... the former are
doubtful compared with the latter.
.
."
3 Which faculties
are open to doubt on Stout's view is unclear. Obviously
the faculties of the senses are untrustworthy. But beyond
that Stout does not address the issue of whether any of the
mind's reasoning faculties, e.g., intuition, deduction,
etc., are being questioned in Meditation I .
Stout's response to question (2) would be that one
truth can be established in the face of the powerful demon
hypothesis. The one truth that cannot be doubted is that
of one's own existence, for in order to be deceived one
must exist; indeed the very fact that one is deceived
4demonstrates one's existence. What role then does Cogito
ergo sum play in the rest of Descartes' schema for Stout?
To answer that and demonstrate what, in Stout's view,
Ibid.
,
P- 177.
Ibid. P- 172.
3Descartes achieves in Meditation II we must first look at
what Stout's response would be to question (3)
A straightforward interpretation such as I suggested
in the Introduction would point to the principle of clarity
and distinctness as a universal test of truth being derived
from Cogi to ergo sum
,
the general rule being reached, as
it were, from the examination of a single instance. Stout
admits that Descartes ' words imply this sort of an inter-
pretation, one which in Stout's view leads inevitably to a
circular argument. It is not, however, what Descartes
intended. Stout argues:
. . . he [Descartes] holds that what
I perceive is self-evident and while I
am perceiving it I cannot doubt its
truth. I may expect to find the same
general conditions present in all truths
that appear to me self-evident, and,
having found them, I may give them the
names "clearness and distinctness"; and
they may then serve me as a guide in
trying to discover self-evident proposi-
tions. But these conditions can never
be the guarantees of the truth of the
^
self-evident propositions they condition.
Stout points to passages in Meditation V to support his
claim that Descartes did not consistently maintain that
when one clearly and distinctly perceives a proposition he
argues from its clearness and distinctness to its truth.
And even although I had not demonstrated
this [that all I know clearly is true],
~*
Ibid .
, p . 171.
4the nature of my mind is such that I
could not prevent myself from holding
them to be true so long as I conceive
them clearly ... 6
For the rest, whatever proof or
argument I avail myself of, we must
always return to the point that it is
only those things which we conceive
clearly and distinctly that have the
power of persuading me entirely. 7
On Stout's view then it would appear that the clarity and
distinctness passage early in Meditation III represents
only a stage in Descartes' thought, to be superseded by a
more adequate explanation.
What then is Stout's response to question (3)?
According to Stout the general principle of clarity and
distinctness "
. . . must be established to overcome a doubt
to which every clear and distinct perception is liable, not
when we are attending to it, but when we reflect upon the
ggeneral conditions of our knowledge." The principle is
not, in Stout's view, either derivable from specific
instances of clear and distinct perceptions such as the
Cogito or the test of truth of those perceptions.
What is called into doubt in the Circle Passage is
not then the truth of specific clear and distinct percep-
g
HR I, p. 180. Stout's translation differs slightly from
that of Haldane and Ross, but not in any significant
way
.
^ Ibid
.
,
p . 183
.
g Stout, ojd. cit
.
,
p. 172.
5tions
,
i . e
. ,
the Cogito and other first principles.
Rather it is the truth of an argument's conclusion that one
remembers deriving clearly and distinctly but to which one
is no longer attending. "while I was attending to the
proof I was incapable of doubting; now I can doubt, and my
doubt cannot be overthrown unless I can prove that if there
be an all-powerful Being He cannot deceive me." 9 Rather
than the principle of clarity and distinctness being
employed to demonstrate God's existence, it is the reverse.
It is from the demonstration of God's existence and nature
alone that the principle can be derived.
Does this mean that without that demonstration
specific clear and distinct perceptions may be false even
though one may be unable to doubt them while attending to
them? Stout admits that this is a possible interpretation,
one that Descartes may have held at times; but it is one
that still leads to circularity. 10 Any demonstration of
God's existence is no more certain than any other clear
and distinct perception; whatever doubt may infect the
latter even in only an indirect way also impugns the
former
.
This consequence, on Stout's view, forced Descartes,
at least at times, to reject the hypothesis that an all-
9
Ibid
.
,
p. 173.
1Q
Ibid
.
,
pp. 174-175.
6powerful deceiver could undermine the certainty of clear
and distinct perceptions and to maintain that the only
doubt raised by that hypothesis is directed toward the
accuracy of one's memory of clear and distinct perceptions.
Under this interpretation the doubt raised in the Circle
Passage is not doubt about the truth of correctly
remembered clear and distinct perceptions no longer being
attended to, it is doubt about whether the perceptions one
recalls attending to were actually clear and distinct.
The demonstration of God's existence is needed to
overcome that doubt. And in contrast to the previous
interpretation this does not involve circular reasoning.
The certainty of the demonstration of God's existence is
not open to doubt even when one is no longer clearly and
distinctly perceiving it.
But, one may ask, does not the demonstration of God's
existence fall prey to the doubt raised in the Circle
Passage? Stout attempts to respond to this possibility by
distinguishing three orders of memory in Descartes'
epistemology
:
(a) That which is so certain as not to
depend upon the authority of God - as,
for instance, when ... an atheist may
know the equality of the angles of a
triangle to two right angles (the proof
of which involves memory in the sense
of retentiveness)
.
(b) That which does
not mislead, but without reference to
God would be open to speculative doubt.
7(c) That which is actually misleading
and therefore cannot depend on God's
veracity ... H
In an argument in which each premise is understood
separately, and the conclusion reached with only the last
step directly being attended to, the memory of previous
steps in the argument is that of reminiscence (type (b)
)
the entire process is deduction. in a situation in
which one is directly attending to an entire argument, the
act of perceiving the entire process from premise to
conclusion is one of intuition and it involves the memory
of retentiveness (type (a)
)
.
But does the argument demonstrating God's existence
in Meditation III involve memory of type (a) or type (b)
?
If the latter, then Descartes is back in a circle. If
type (a), then the circle is avoided. Stout's point is:
It is true that the first or causal
proof seems to occupy the whole of the
third Meditation, and the ontological
argument the greater part of the fifth.
But the "proofs" themselves are in each
case brief and clear, if we separate
them from the preliminary matter which
^
clears the ground for them.
We are now in a position to return to question (2).
Stout's interpretation of Descartes places the Cogito in
a much less important position than it is traditionally
^ Ibid
.
,
pp. 183-184 .
^Ibid
.
, p . 188 .
8placed in Descartes' epistemology. The principle of
clarity and distinctness cannot be derived from it with-
out falling prey to circular reasoning. It is true that
the Cogito is the initial principle to overcome the doubt
raised by the evil demon hypothesis in Meditation I
. but
beyond that it appears to have no status for Stout above
other first principles that are also perceived clearly and
distinctly. All achieve equal certainty. None fall prey
to the doubt raised in the Circle Passage in Meditation in
The principle of clarity and distinctness also has a
^^-^i^ished role in Stout's interpretation. The principle
is not needed to guarantee the truth of other specific
clear and distinct perceptions or the demonstration of
God's existence. That demonstration as well as first
principles like the Cogito are in no need of such a
13guarantee. In Stout's view reason, for Descartes, must
be held as autonomous and in no need of any such guarantee.
Willis Doney also presents a well reasoned case for
the autonomy of reason in Descartes. In "The Cartesian
13
In fact, as Stout points out (p. 174) , the doubt raised
in the Circle Passage is better met by a direct appeal
to God's veracity than by an appeal to a rule derived
from God's veracity. This leaves the rule without any
epistemic function in the Meditations . Its presence
under Stout's interpretation becomes superfluous.
9lrcle " Doney distinguishes between what one might, at
the present time, clearly and distinctly perceive to be
true and what one might recall having perceived clearly and
distinctly to be true. The former is in no need of the
assurance provided by the demonstration of an existent,
non-deceiving God on Doney
' s view. But the latter, since
memory is involved, requires precisely that assurance.
This distinction allows one to clearly and distinctly
perceive that just such a God does exist which in turn
vindicates one's memory of clear and distinct perceptions.
Unlike Stout, Doney addresses question (1) directly.
In Meditation I Descartes asserts:
. . . as I sometimes imagine that others
deceive themselves in the things which
they think they know best, how do I know
that I am not deceived every time that
I add two and three, or count the sides
of a square, or judge of things yet
simpler, if anything simpler can be
imagined? 15
Doney acknowledges the temptation to interpret "things yet
simpler" as referring to those beliefs which rely on
intuition. But both examples cited refer to operations
that could take some time, e.g., adding numbers and count-
ing sides. Doney ' s point is that each involves movement of
14Willis Doney, "The Cartesian Circle," Journal of the
History of Ideas Vol. 16 (1955), pp. 324-338.
15
HR I, p. 147.
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thought during which a mistake of memory could occur.
In neither case is it clear that
he [Descartes] was questioning a beliefbased on intuition. it seems more
likely that these beliefs were the
result of reasoning of some sort. No
doubt they could be known by intui-
tion. But from the references to
adding, counting, and judging it
appears that he had in mind situations
in which, as a matter of fact, these
beliefs were not based on intuitions. 16
^ • Descartes' remarks could mean that nothing requiring
more than intuition could be known without knowledge of
God; and this in turn could still involve circular reason-
ing if a demonstration of God's existence required more
than intuition. Doney ' s claim is that even this weaker
position is not one which Descartes held.
Doney 's argument against this weaker position is some-
what more complicated. In arguing for the doubtfulness of
beliefs based on sense perception Descartes employed the
following principle:
If some beliefs resting on evidence of
a certain sort turned out to be mis-
taken, then any belief resting on
evidence of the same sort was doubtful.
Now this principle works quite well with any beliefs only
if one cannot distinguish those instances in which one is
mistaken from those in which one is not mistaken. And it
1
6
Doney, ojp. cit
.
,
p. 330 .
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is the dream argument in Meditation I which provides this
condition. If I can never ascertain with certainty whether
I am presently perceiving that p (where p is some belief
based on my senses) or asleep and dreaming that I am
perceiving that p, then every belief based on sense percep-
tion is open to doubt.
However, this condition cannot be fulfilled, according
to Doney, when it comes to beliefs based on reason.
If at times he [Descartes] had erred,
his error could have been prevented
had he attended carefully enough to
what was going on in his mind at the
time. He could have seen that his
conclusion was not based on a clear
and distinct perception of the demon-
stration, but depended, at least in
part, on memory. Knowing that conclu-
sions of this sort were often mistaken,
he could have withheld his consent.
The mistakes which had evoked his
doubts were of a detectable kind.
There had been no mistakes when he had
clearly and distinctly perceived the
reasons for his conclusions. So he
could not argue, as he had about
perceptual beliefs: sometimes mis-
taken, therefore always possibly
mistaken
.
And Doney concludes:
Thus the problem raised in the
first meditation was not one of
justifying reason, although Descartes
sometimes suggested that it was in
order to impress upon those who were
precipitous and undiscriminating in
18
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p . 332
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their judgments that their certainty
was precarious.
We now have a complete response to question (1) . The
doubt raised in Meditation I ranges over all beliefs based
on sense perception and on those beliefs which are the con-
clusions of arguments whose steps involve memory. Beliefs
which rely on intuition and/or deduction alone are not
subject to that doubt.
What then of question (2)? Unlike Stout, Doney has
very little to say about the Cogito
. As a last question in
his article Doney asks, ".
. . why did Descartes think of
the Meditations as an argument proceeding from knowledge
of his own existence to knowledge of God's existence and
finally to absolute certainty in mathematics and natural
20philosophy?" Why was the Cogito prerequisite to
Descartes' knowledge of God's existence when the latter was
obvious, in Doney ' s view, on inspection of his idea of an
infinitely perfect being? Doney ' s response is:
The priority of the cogito can
be easily explained. The first proof
of God's existence was a posteriori
from the existence of the idea of an
infinite and perfect Being. Descartes
would have to know that the effect
existed in order to infer the cause.
The second [proof] was an inference
19
Ibid
.
,
p. 333.
20
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, p . 336
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from the existence of res cogitans toGod as the cause. 21
In Med j- tation II then we have, on Doney ' s view, the cer-
tainty of reason (at least qua the faculty of intuition)
affirmed and the Cogito established to provide a necessary
premise in the argument for God's existence in Meditation
ill (and later in Meditation V as well). Presumably for
Doney the Cogito has no epistemic status distinct from that
of other first principles. Its only unique feature is its
role in Descartes' methodology.
Doney' s position on question (3) is similar to Stout's.
The principle of clarity and distinctness is both pro-
visional and uncertain prior to the demonstration of God's
existence. But Doney arrives at this position by means of
a different route. Whereas Stout points to textual evi-
dence to demonstrate that Descartes did not intend for the
Principle to be derived from the Cogito and other first
principles (and hence to be used as a general test of
truth)
,
Doney provides a different reason for rejecting
such a notion:
The answer cannot be, simply, that the
rule was an induction universal in scope
and that God's veracity was the justi-
fication of such an induction. For
Descartes believed that other universal
propositions could be known without
this guarantee: e.g., the principle of
causation used in the first two proofs
^ ~*~
Ibid
.
, p . 338 .
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of God's existence. The answer lies
in another direction. On Descartes'
view, although all clear and distinct
ideas were true, not all true statements
could be clearly and distinctly per-
ceived to be so. Some of them could notbe so perceived within the compass of a
single intuition. The rule about all
clear and distinct ideas was just such
a statement. To know that any idea was
true, this idea had to be present to his
mind. To know that all were true, all
of them would have had to be present at
once. This was humanly impossible.
Therefore, an assertion about the truth
of all clear and distinct ideas was
dependent on knowledge of God's veracity. 22
With respect to question (4) Doney ' s treatment of the
Circle Passage also differs from Stout's. When Descartes
states
:
But in order to be able altogether to
remove it [doubt]
,
I must inquire whether
there is a God. . . and if I find that
there is a God, I must also inquire
whether He may be a deceiver; for without
knowledge of these two truths I do not
see that I can ever be certain of anything. 23
Doney maintains that Descartes was using 'certain' in a
different sense here than he was using in the preceding
Meditations . The certainty achieved in Meditation II with
the Cogito and other first principles involves the impossi-
bility of doubt at the time one's perceptions are being
attended to. The sense of 'certain' in the above passage
22
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p. 33 5 .
23HR I, p. 159.
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involves the impossibility of doubt at any time,
truth could be doubted when not being attended to
Any
While Doney does not expand upon this distinction
between two senses of certainty except to note that in his
reply to the second set of objections Descartes admitted
that even an atheist could be certain (presumably in the
sense used in jteditation I I) of some things, it is of some
passing interest since it foreshadows a distinction
expanded upon later by certain Cartesian commentators
discussed in Chapters III and IV.
Although Doney does not discuss any of the arguments
for God s existence, it seems clear from his account of
Descartes that his response to question (5) would be that
the certainty achieved in Meditation II with the Cogito
,
the principle of causation, and other first principles
provides Descartes with sufficient grounds for establishing
God's existence. Either the arguments can be based upon
intuitions present to the mind or they require proofs. if
it is the former and they are perceived clearly and dis-
tinctly, then Descartes is certain that God exists and is
no deceiver. If it is the latter and the steps in the
arguments can eventually be encompassed in one intuition,
avoiding any reliance on memory, then Descartes is equally
certain. Once God's existence and nature are established,
memory of clear and distinct perceptions is validated.
16
While Doney and Stout differ in the arguments and
textual evidence they offer in support of their respective
interpretations, it is clear from their positions on the
five questions I raise that their accounts of Descartes do
not differ appreciably. Each maintains that the problem
raised by Descartes in the Meditations was not one of jus-
tifying reason. Rather, it was one of justifying the
memory of clear and distinct perceptions. And there are a
number of difficulties with this kind of an account, which
for brevity s sake I will refer to as the memory thesis.
From both Doney ' s and Stout's presentations it is clear
that some textual evidence exists for which interpretations
can be made consistent with the memory thesis. Descartes'
responses to his critics' charges of circular reasoning
indicate that he believed memory to be involved in some
way. But a fair amount of textual evidence exists which
indicates that the involvement of memory was, for
Descartes, something other than that which the memory
thesis suggests. This textual evidence is pointed out by
Harry Frankfurt in "Memory and the Cartesian Circle.
If we look carefully at one of Descartes' replies to
the second set of objections, we find him saying:
24
Harry Frankfurt, "Memory and the Cartesian Circle,
Philosophical Review Vol. 71 (1962), pp . 504-511.
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There are other matters that areindeed perceived very clearly by ourintellect, when we attend sufficiently
closely to the reasons on which our
knowledge of them depends, and hence
we cannot then be in doubt about them;but since we can forget those reasons,
and yet remember the conclusions
deduced from them, the question is
raised whether we can entertain the
same firm and immutable certainty as
to these conclusions, during the time
that we recollect that they have been
deduced from first principles that are
evident; for this remembrance must be
assumed in order that they may be
called conclusions. ^5
Frankfurt's point is:
The accuracy of the recollection is
taken for granted, as Descartes himself
points out; if it were not taken for
granted, there would be no occasion to
doubt at all. Descartes's problem is
not whether memory is reliable, but
whether what is recollected.
. . is
sufficient to establish the truth of
the conclusion in question. What he
doubts is whether the remembered fact
that something was once proven entitles
one to be certain now of the truth of
what was then proven. God is not, then,
invoked to guarantee the reliability of
memory. In fact, the reliability of
memory must be accepted in order to
generate the doubt God is called upon
to dispel.
In his Conversation with Burman there is further
evidence that Descartes assumed, rather than questioned,
the reliability of memory in overcoming metaphysical doubt.
25
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Burman states:
But someone will declare; after I have
demonstrated the existence of God, and
of a God who is no deceiver, I can say,
not that my intellect deceives me, with
the rectitude God has given it, but that
my memory deceives me, because I believe
that I remember something which in
reality I do not remember; memory itself
has failings. 27
Descartes replies:
Concerning memory I can say nothing:
it is up to each man to determine, by
his personal experience, whether or
not he has a good memory. And if
he has doubts about it, he ought to
make use of notes or of some such aid. 28
And Frankfurt argues:
If Descartes had intended his proof
of the existence of a veracious God
to establish the reliability of memory,
he would surely not have responded in •
this way to Burman ' s remarks. He would
have pointed out that the doubts about
memory expressed by Burman had been
rendered unnecessary by the demonstra-
tion that a veracious God exists.
Burman clearly mentioned the doubt
about memory as something that had not
been dealt with by the proof of the
veracious God's existence, as if he were
calling attention to a new difficulty
not disposed of by the proof. Descartes
implicitly agrees to this when he fails
to deny it and, instead, offers a rather
commonsensical bit of advice about the
27Oeuvres de Descartes
,
ed. Charles Adams and Paul Tannery
(Paris, 1957) VIII, 21 (Latin), Vol. IXB, p. 43 (French).
The translation is taken directly from Frankfurt, op .
cit
.
,
p
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use of memory.
. . These are hardly
the
. comments of a man who regards the
reliability of memory as a basic
metaphysical problem, much less as one
which he had recently solved. They
suggest vividly that Descartes
' atten-
tion was directed to quite different
matters
,
in which the problem of the
reliability of memory was one of only
incidental concern. 29
Finally, Frankfurt points out:
Indeed, it is easy to show that
after Descartes had proven God's exis-
tence and veracity he still did not take
the reports of memory as guaranteed.
In the Principles of Philosophy
, for
instance, God's existence and veracity
are demonstrated in principles XIV,
XVIII, and XXI of Part I. in principle
XLIV of Part I, Descartes says that "it
is frequently our memory that deceives
us by leading us to believe that cer-
tain things had been satisfactorily
established by us. "30 Thus he
reaffirms the very doubt that Doney
claims had been removed by the proof
of God's existence. Nowhere, in this
passage or in subsequent ones, does
Descartes retract or qualify this
warning about memory. 31
There are two additional objections that I would like
to raise against the memory thesis, both of which are also
mentioned by Frankfurt. First, the memory thesis relegates
the Meditations to a rather insignificant role in both
Descartes' epistemology and his metaphysics. When
3 ^ Ibid
.
, p . 510 .
30
HR I, p. 236.
31 Frankfurt, ojd. cit
.
,
p. 507.
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Descartes states in the introduction that "in the first
Meditation I set forth the reasons for which we may,
generally speaking, doubt about all things
. .
,"
32
the
impression given is that something more important than the
reliability of memory is at issue.
Second, taken literally the memory thesis commits
Descartes to the infallibility of memory at least where
clear and distinct perceptions are concerned. But consider
a situation in which I recall only very vaguely that I once
clearly and distinctly perceived that jd. if I have
successfully demonstrated God's existence and nature, the
memory thesis makes it impossible for me to err in my
recollection. Particularly in light of the textual evi-
dence offered by Frankfurt, it seems highly unlikely that
Descartes was committed to such an extreme consequence.
The temptation to reduce the scope of doubt in
Descartes' Meditations in order to allow him to avoid the
accusation of circular reasoning is a strong one. Reducing
the scope of doubt to the memory of clear and distinct
perceptions is unsatisfactory for the reasons I have given
above. I would now like to turn to a much different
approach which shares with the memory thesis only the
autonomy of reason for Descartes.
32HR I, p. 140.
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Most Cartesian commentators agree that Descartes'
attempt to establish a foundation for his beliefs which
would not fall prey to even the merest of doubts was
motivated by his opposition to skepticism. One commen-
tator, Merrill Ring in "Descartes' Intentions," 33 offers
a novel interpretation in which the target of Descartes'
arguments, particularly in Meditation I
, is not simply
the skepticism so popular in his time; it is the principle
of empiricism upon which the arguments of both skepticism
and scholasticism were founded. Descartes' aim, in Ring's
view, is not to cast doubt on beliefs based on the faculty
of reason, it is to cast doubt on the empiricist grounds
for claiming such beliefs are either certain or uncertain.
And if the faculty of reason is not being questioned,
then the accusation of circular reasoning need not arise.
Ring's response to question (1) is extensive. In
fact, virtually his entire article is devoted to discussing
the role of Meditation I in Descartes' task. The doubt
raised in Meditation I ranges over all beliefs because,
at the time, all his beliefs are grounded in the senses.
Descartes first proposes, "I shall. . . address myself to
Merrill Ring, "Descartes' Intentions," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy Vol. Ill (1973), pp. 27-49.
22
the general upheaval of all my former opinions." 34 And
rather than examine each and every opinion, Descartes
suggests that, "owing to the fact that the destruction of
the foundations.
. . brings with it the downfall of the
rest of the edifice, I shall only
. . . attack those prin-
ciples upon which all my former opinions rested." 35 And
what, asks Ring, is that foundation or principle upon which
rest all of the opinions Descartes holds? "All that up to
the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I
have learned either from the senses or through the
3 6senses.
.
.
" Ring argues that when Descartes states
first that he means to doubt all, this must be understood
in light of his further comment that everything he has to
doubt was acquired through the senses. Ring's point is
that Descartes is not simply to be taken as providing a
technical device to avoid the otherwise impossible task of
doubting each individual belief. Rather, he is to be
HR I, p. 144. Ring uses the Anscombe and Geach transla-
tion (Descartes : Philosophical Writings, transl. and ed.
Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach, Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc., New York (1954)). I will continue to use the
Haldane and Ross translation in my treatment of Ring's
interpretation. The Anscombe and Geach version is a
much less literal translation. If Ring's analysis is to
have any credence, it should fair equally well with the
Haldane and Ross version.
^ 5
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taken literally. it is not all beliefs that are to be
doubted but all and only beliefs acquired through the
senses
.
Ring suggests that there are additional reasons to
support his contention that something other than the tra-
ditional interpretation of the scope of doubt in Meditation
-
1S takir>9 place. He points to other Cartesian commenta-
tors recognition that something is amiss in Meditation T .
For example, L. J. Beck in The Metaphysics of Descartes 37
transforms "all beliefs" into "most beliefs" and "nearly
all beliefs." Anthony Kenny in Descartes : A Study of His
Philosophy points to a number of instances in which
certain beliefs, those revealed by the light of nature,
seem to fall outside the scope of doubt. Kenny's conclu-
sion is that Descartes failed in the execution of his
doubt. Ring's conclusion is that Descartes never intended
the scope of doubt to be so extensive.
Ring also points to Descartes' responses to the
sixth set of objections as evidence in support of his
thesis. In response to the following objection:
. . . it does not appear altogether
certain that we exist, from the fact
L. J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes ; A Study of the
Meditations
, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1965) pp. 56~6l7~
38Anthony Kenny, Descartes : A Study of His Philosophy,
Random House, New York (1968)
.
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that we think. For in order to be
sure that you think, you ought toknow what to think, or what thinking,is, and what your existence is; but sinceyou do not yet know what these things
are, how can you know that you think
or exist? 39
Descartes replies
It is indeed true that no one
i' .an b®. sure that he knows or that he
exists
,
unless he knows what thought:
and what existence
. . . When,
therefore, anyone perceives that he
thinks and that it thence follows
that he exists, although he chance
never previously to have asked what
thought is, nor what existence, he
cannot nevertheless fail to have a
knowledge of each sufficient to give
him assurance on this score. 40
With the reference to knowledge of things prior to the
Cogito Ring claims further support for his contention that
the evil demon in Meditation I does not cast as large a
shadow of doubt as is often maintained. 4 '*'
Ring's position on question (2) is that the Cogito is
Descartes' first truth dealing with the existence of things.
39
HR II, p. 234.
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Ibid., p. 241. Descartes also makes this point in
Principles of Philosophy : Part I, X (HR I, p. 222).
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Ring's treatment of Meditation I does not end at this
point. He goes on to provide an account of how the evil
demon hypothesis functions on his interpretation. It is
a very interesting account. But it lies outside the
scope of the five questions which I raise for each inter-
pretation. Suffice it to say that, although he provides
some textual evidence consistent with his thesis. Ring
does not offer any which actively supports it.
25
Ring distinguishes all objects of knowledge for Descartes
into two classes: those that deal with things existent
and those that deal with the eternal truths and that have
no existence outside our thought. Meditation I leaves us
with only the latter untainted by doubt. Skepticism with
to the existence of things remains to be defeated
achievement of the Cogito is the first step in the
of that skepticism. When Descartes asserts:
And when I stated that this proposition
L think, therefore I am is the first
and most certain which presents itself
to those who philosophise in orderly
fashion, I did not for all that deny
that we must first of all know what is
knowledge
,
what is existence
, and what
i_s certainty
,
and that in order to think
we must be
,
and such like; but becauie
these are notions of the simplest possi-
ble kind, which of themselves give us
no knowledge of anything that exists,
I do not think them worthy of being put
on record. 42
concludes, It is quite clear here that the primacy of
the cogito is only with respect to existence." 43
On Ring's view the Cogito 1 s primacy is only methodo-
logical (although in a much different way than it was for
either Doney or Stout) . The Cogito has no special epis-
temic status: "... there were, as far as Descartes was
respect
and the
removal
42
HR I, p. 222.
43 .
Ring, op. cit
.
,
p. 48.
concerned, prior certainties which he could legitimately
and did in fact, appeal to."^
With respect to questions (3), (4), and (5), all
Ring has to say can be found in a brief postscript to hi
interpretation
:
My aim in this paper has been to
tell a tale about Descartes' intentions,
about what he attempted to doubt, the
function of the demon and the status
of the cogito
,
which is different than
that usually told. The story does not,
of course, end here. Among the prob-
lems which remain is that of the nature
of the divine guarantee with the asso-
ciated question of circularity. While
the issues that properly arise in con-
nection with these matters are so
numerous that it is manifestly impos-
sible to discuss them here, it seems
desirable to finish with some remarks
on how these problems look from the
perspective of the argument just con-
cluded. The matter of God's guarantee
has always arisen in the context of a
belief that the doubt in the First
Meditation was intended to be universal,
that when the doubt was fully drawn,
all ideas and principles were under a
cloud of suspicion. So the problem has
always seemed to be one of guaranteeing
the adequacy, the truth if you will,
of the principles employed and the con-
cepts involved in proving God's exis-
tence and with that view the question
of circularity inescapably arises. But
my tale points in a different direction.
Descartes might well construe the innate
concepts and principles to be rock-bottom
and think that what needs to be guaranteed
are not those ideas, no suspicion having
been cast upon them and no doubt about
44
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them being possible, but that the
material world will conform to them. 4 ^
Thus, we have no inkling of what Ring's response to ques-
tion (3) might be. As to question (4) what is called into
doubt in the Circle Passage would presumably be beliefs
about the material world. And in response to question (5)
Ring might maintain that the demonstration of God's exis-
tence and benevolent nature removes that 'slightest doubt'
about the existence of material objects.
As attractive as Ring's interpretation of Descartes
might be on first reading, there are a number of problems
with it, some of which are discussed by Peter Schouls in
"The Extent of Doubt in Descartes' Meditations." 4 ^ As we
saw earlier, Ring cites a crucial passage from Meditation I
in which Descartes commits himself to, "attack those
principles upon which all my former opinions rested." 4 ^
Immediately following the quotation Ring asks, "What is
tha t foundation or principle of all the opinions he
45
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Peter Schouls, "The Extent of Doubt in Descartes'
Meditations," Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. Ill,
(1973). Many of Schouls' criticisms are based in part
on his own interpretation of Descartes which will be
presented in Chapter II. Given that I am critical of his
account, however, it would be unfair to employ his
strategy to argue against Ring. Thus, I am limiting any
reliance on Schouls to textual matters only.
47
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o s? As Schouls points out, Ring moves from "those
principles to that principle" without comment. Ring
offers no argument in support of his move; yet it consti-
tutes the very basis upon which he initiates his inter-
pretation
.
Furthermore, there is textual evidence elsewhere which
indicates that such a move might very well be unwarranted.
Earlier in his Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations
Descartes states, "In the first Meditation I set forth the
reasons for which we may, generally speaking, doubt about
all things and especially about material things
. . .
”
49
If doubt about "all things" is to be limited to only "all
things acquired through the senses," it is, at the very
least, odd that Descartes would need the qualifier
"especially about material things."
Schouls suggests that evidence exists elsewhere in
Descartes' writings which makes explicit the need for a
validation of reason. In Principles of Philosophy
,
Part I
Descartes argues that God exists (Principle XIV and XVIII)
and that it is a contradiction to suppose that God could be
a deceiver (Principle XXIX) . Principle XXX then states,
"And consequently all that we perceive clearly is true, and
48 .
Ring, o£. cit
.
,
p. 30. (Italics mine)
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this delivers us from the doubts put forward above." 50
Descartes then says in support of this principle:
. . . the light of nature
.
can never disclose to us any object
which is not true, inasmuch as it
comprehends it, that is, inasmuch as
it apprehends it clearly and distinctly.
Because we should have had reason to
think God a deceiver if He had given
us this faculty perverted, or such
that we should take the false for the
true (when using the faculty aright)
.
51
Schouls point is that the "consequently" in Principle XXX
is there precisely because "all that we perceive clearly is
true" is derived from preceding arguments for God's exis-
tence and non-deceiving nature. And if clear and distinct
perceptions are not immune from doubts until such arguments
have been given, then the possibility of a malevolent
deceiver casts doubt on beliefs acquired through the
faculty of reason.
There are other problems with Ring's account. His
remarks which have a bearing on questions (4) and (5)
suggest that the doubt expressed in the Circle Passage
extends only to beliefs about the material world. Yet it
would seem that there is more to the doubt than that.
Descartes specifically mentions mathematical propositions
involving the addition of two and three and "any such
^°
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thing" as examples of those things for whioh there exists
the slightest ’metaphysical' doubt prior to demonstrating
God's existence. It is difficult to see how such proposi-
tions involve the existence of the material world.
Furthermore, not all of the first principles, all of which
appear to fall prey to this doubt, involve or presuppose
the existence of material objects.
There is also the textual evidence cited by Doney and
Stout m favor of the memory thesis. While the thesis goes
too far in its claims, nevertheless, particularly in his
replies to his critics, Descartes does talk about the doubt
attending to clear and distinct perceptions when one is no
longer attending to them. Unless Ring views the faculty of
memory as a sensing faculty, it is difficult to see how his
account would satisfactorily treat such textual points.
Although part of the attractiveness of Ring's inter-
pretation of Descartes lies in the historical setting that
he provides for it, one still has the impression that much
more is at stake than just attacking both skepticism and
scholasticism by arguing against the empiricist principle
upon which each is based. The alternative provided by
Ring's interpretation is nothing more than dogmatic
rationalism.
In fact, any interpretation of Descartes which takes
as its basic assumption the autonomy of reason will be
31
undesirable for the very same reason. The failure of any
such approach to gain widespread support as both an attrac-
tive interpretation of Descartes in general and one which
successfully allows him an escape from the charges of
circular reasoning, has prompted a number of Cartesian
commentators to consider interpretations in which reason is
only partially autonomous. It is to consideration of such
interpretations that I shall now turn.
CHAPTER II
In an attempt to demonstrate that Descartes need not
Plead guilty to the charge of circular reasoning, George
Nakhnikian, in "The Cartesian Circle Revisited,"
1
distinguishes between what he views as Descartes' considered
doctrine and an aberrant view that Descartes sometimes
appears to hold in the Meditations and elsewhere.
The aberrant view is that even the
most clearly and distinctly intuitedpropositions are not really known tobe true except by those who know thatGod exists and that He cannot be adeceiver. This applies to all propo-
sitions.
. .it does not exempt the
propositions, "I am conscious," "I
exist," "if i am conscious then I
exist, "... 2
Nakhnikian refers to a number of passages 3 including the
Circle Passage as evidence that Descartes says or implies
what amounts to the aberrant view.
George Nakhnikian, "The Cartesian Circle Revisited "American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 4 (1967) pp.
,
251-255.
2
Ibid.
,
p. 251.
3His method of referencing is an odd one. Rather than
referring directly to the text he cites footnotes from
another article. "See Leonard Miller, "Descartes, Mathe-
matics
,
and God, " The Philosophical Review
,
vol
. 66 (1957)
,
pp. 451-465, n. 3-8." The references are as follows: (3)'
Norman Kemp Smith, Descartes' Philosophical Writings(London, 1952; hereafter written K.S.), p. 145”; (4) K.S.
,
32
33
In contrast to the aberrant view is Descartes' con-
sidered doctrine. According to Nakhnikian there is evidence
that Descartes held the sore reasonable view that some clear
and distinct perceptions are not open to doubt, even if the
existence of a deceiving demon is possible. He argues
There are places in Descartes'
Where
.
he say s that we can knowertam propositions incorrigibly even
ofv,
an
tZ
11 demon is deceiving us about
u
For example
,
we can knowincorrigibly that we, ourselves, exist.
or how can the demon deceive me about
anything at all unless I exist. Sothat we can know incorrigibly and with-
out having to know that God exists
such a conditional as this: If I amdeceived at all, then I exist. 4
Nakhnikian elucidates further the contrast between
Descartes' considered doctrine and the aberrant view by
pointing out certain distinctions that Descartes makes in
his use of certain terms:
pp. 214 215, 246, 247; (5) H.R. II, pp. 226, 248, 250-251
•
(6) H.R. I, pp. 220, 231; (7) Letters to Mersenne
• 15April, 1630, 6 May, 1630, 27 May, 1630, 27 May, 1638-
Mesland: 2 MaY, 1644 ; Letter to Arnauld: 29 July1648; (8) Letter to Mesland, 2 May, 1644.
2 ^1. Nakhnikian does not indicate
Presumably they would include
'i
Nakhnikian, op. cit
.
, p
where those places are.
selected passages from the Meditations (e.g., HR I pp.140, 150, 151, 152 (and perhaps 158), 160-161) and’the’
Principles of Philosophy Part I, VII and X (HR I, pp. 221,222 ) •
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Descartes uses "scire" as a technicalterm for knowledge of theorems, i. e .of demonstrated conclusions. in this
application of the word, scientia is
contrasted with notitia or cognoscentia(immediate apprehension of "first prin-
ciples"). Descartes also uses "scientia"
another way in which scient ia is the
opposite of persuasio
.
5
As evidence of the latter distinction Nakhnikian points to
the following assertion by Descartes:
. . . if we lack knowledge of God we
can pretend that they [remembered con-
clusions derived from premises nolonger being attended to] are uncertain
even though we remember that they werededuced from clear principles; because
perhaps our nature is such that we go
wrong even in the most evident matters.
Consequently
,
even at the moment when
we deduced them from those principles,
we did not have scientific knowledge
(scientia) of them, but only a conviction(persuasio) of them. I distinguish the
two as follows: there is conviction
[persuasio] when there remains some
reason which might lead us to doubt, but
scientific knowledge [scientia] is
conviction [persuasio] based on an
argument so strong that it can never be
shaken by any stronger argument. Nobody
can have the latter unless he also has
knowledge of God. 6
In light of these distinctions the aberrant view is
that
:
5
Ibid
. ,
p . 252.
6From a letter to Regius, May 24, 1640 (Anthony Kenny, transl.
and ed.
,
Descartes : Philosophic al Letters, Clarendon Press,
Oxford (1970). p. 74.
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W!„™ SL knOW (ggientia vs. persuasiosense) as a theorem (scientia vs. notiHa '
of llfritv
e
and^d
Se
t
Se> that the Pr“ciPlea y is inctness is true Thiqsuggests that even the "first principles"known by notitia or cggnoscentia are^o
i
I
?
ere £-ersu^sio in the ^hQ0npQ ofknowledge ( sciefea
. aTtha opposite of
an^ii n^nt
13
a
nd persuaslo) that God exists,3 d is o a deceiver. 7
And this view, Nakhnikian argues, gets Descartes in a
vicious circle, for in the Synopsis to the Meditations
Descartes himself admits that:
: h
' '
“ ^hisite that we know [scire]tnat all the things which we conceive
clearly and distinctly are true in the
very way in which we conceive them; andthis could not be proved previously tothe Fourth Meditation. 8
And since the first argument for God's existence occurs
m Me
_
ditation III
, Descartes appears to be saying that he
must know (scientia) that God exists in order to know
(sc ientia ) that the principle of clarity and distinctness
is true. But also according to the aberrant view, no
matter how clearly and distinctly Descartes perceives the
first principles" (and especially the premises of the
argument for God's existence), he cannot know ( scientia )
them to be true unless he knows ( scientia ) that all his
Nakhnikian, op. cit
.
,
p. 252.
HR I, p. 140. Haldane and Ross translate scire as "may be
assured." Nakhnikian
' s point is that such a translationignores the technical distinctions which, he is arguing
Descartes makes.
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clear and distinct perceptions are true.
The alternative to the aberrant view for Nakhnikian
is as follows:
Now suppose that we do not assume the
a
,
e
ff
ani: view * That is, we suppose thatwhether or not we know that God existssome clearly and distinctly perceivedpropositions are, and are known to betrue. God is needed so that we candeduce that all clearly and distinctlyperceived propositions are true. Thenit is open to Descartes to say that thepremises from which he deduces God's
existence and veracity are clear anddistinct propositions that are known
to be true ger se.
.
. The system Ifind in the Meditations becomes circularif, and only if, we add to it the
aberrant view that no clear and distinctintuition is known to be true except bythose who know that God exists and thatHe is not a deceiver. 5
While Nakhnikian does not discuss the extent of doubt
in Meditation I in his article, if we turn to his much more
extensive treatment of Descartes in An Introduction to
Philosophy 10 (from which his article is taken almost
verbatim)
,
we can determine his position with respect to
question (1)
.
Nakhnikian, o£. cit
.
,
pp. 254-255.
George Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy
.
Alfred Knopf, New York (1967) . cf
.
particularly Parts II
and III, pp . 65-241 which deal almost exclusively with
Descartes and the Meditations.
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m his treatment of the dream argument in Meditation T
Nakhnikian employs a number of technical terms, some of
Which must be explained in order to understand his inter-
pretation of Descartes. The first two are "psychological
indubitability" and "logical indubitability .
" m reference
to them he says:
In the Meditations
, one finds at leasttwo distinguishable senses of 'indubi-table'.
.
There is the "psychological"
sense, in which an indubitable oroposi-tion is one from which we are unable to
withhold assent. There is also the
"logical" and profoundly important sensem which a proposition is indubitable
for me only if it is one that I amfully justified, and cannot be mistakenm believing, solely on the basis of
the evidence X have right now.
About "psychological" indubitability Nakhnikian says:
For example, I look in a certain direc-
tion and am unable to withhold assent
from the proposition that there is a
wall in front of me. You may easily
convince me that this proposition might
have been false. But to believe that
the proposition might have been false
is not the same thing as to doubt it
now. I cannot at the same time be
certain that there is a wall in front
of me and doubt that there is one
there. That is a logical impossibility:
doubt and certainty about the same
proposition are mutually exclusive.
Yet I can grant, while still being
certain that there is a wall in front
of me, that there might not have been
one there. What is more, while still
11
Ibid
. ,
p . 67
.
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A3 an example of "logical" indubitability Nakhnikian
suggests
‘ *n ins tance of "logical indubi-tability [is] I am certain that I
exist. I grant that I might nothave existed. if i did not exist,then I would not be believing that
I exist. This is equivalent to
saying that, from my believing that
I exist, it follows that I exist.
In other words, my believing that I
exist is itself the guarantee that
I do exist. 13
The distinction appears to be that while the "psychological
indubitability of a belief does not guarantee that I could
not be mistaken, the "logical" indubitability of a belief
does
.
Nakhnikian proceeds to suggest that Descartes' own
words provide some ground for thinking that by "logical"
indubitability he had in mind the following definitions
that Nakhnikian suggests for the notion of 'incorrigi-
bility ' :
12
Ibid
.
13
Ibid
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(Nl) p is incorrigible for S at t =
^ -*- s possible that at t S
believes attentively that p, and(n) "At t S believes attentively
that p" entails "At t S knows
that p"
.
(N2) at t S believes incorrigibly that
£ =df
(i) At t S believes attentively that
p, and
( 11 ) "At t S believes attentively that
entails "At t S knows that
E"
Each definition employs another of Nakhnikian s technical
terms that he defines as follows:
(N3) at t S believes attentively that p =
(i) At t S is paying attention to matters
that are relevant to the truth or
falsity of p, including attention to
his own sensations, if they are relevant,
(n) among them stands revealed and open to
S evidence for p, and
(iii) at t S occurrently believes that
Finally we have Nakhnikian
’ s use of the term ’perceptual
proposition’. About it he says:
I shall define ’perceptual proposition’
as meaning a proposition that ascribes
to physical objects (e.g., tables and
14
Ibid.
,
p. 77
.
15
Ibid
.
,
p . 75
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chairs) or to physical phenomena (e.qclaps of thunder, flashes of lightning'
tac^a?
3
'
fl
?
m
!
S
' after fma9e s) ?isua??'ctu l, gustatory, auditory, or olfac-tory properties or relations. These in
o^relation^
E1“ as bein9 Propertiedr rel ons whose presence in, or
?o
S
whfh fL°ra ' the °b 3 ects or phenomenat ic they are ascribed, it is logi-cally possible to ascertain at anygiven time by looking, touching, tasting,listening, or smelling. y 16
Turning to the dream argument, Nakhnikian
• s interpre-
tation provides Descartes with three conclusions. The
first is that no perceptual proposition is incorrigible for
anyone. The second is that no one knows incorrigibly that
he himself is not dreaming. And the third is that no one
knows incorrigibly that any given perceptual proposition is
true. Nakhnikian points out that these conclusions,
although derived from premises consistent with the text,
are inconsistent with Descartes’ general aims in the Medi-
tations that follow the first, i.e., they are too strong,
Particularly the second and third conclusions.^
The evil demon argument in Meditation I goes even
further. It is concerned with "whether or not we can know
16 Tl_ . JIbid.
,
pp. 68 - 69 .
17
Nakhnikian suggests that by relaxing the criterion ofknowledge which he suggests for Descartes one could
derive conclusions compatible with Descartes' aims. The
consequence, however, creates problems for Descartes.
Unfortunately, an adequate account of this is beyond the
scope of this dissertation.
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propositions that, if they are known at all, are not known
'from the senses or through the senses,' e.g., mathematical
propositions .'' 18 The conclusion of the evil demon argument,
on Nakhnikian's interpretation, is that while ''There are
mathematical propositions that are incorrigible for anyone,
e.g., 'A square has four sides.' There are, on the other
hand, mathematical propositions that are corrigible for
anyone ." 19 This is, of course, Nakhnikian's interpretation
of Descartes' considered view, while it is clear that the
aberrant view entails that the evil demon casts doubt on
even the most evident mathematical propositions, Nakhnikian
offers no textual evidence from Meditation I that supports
the aberrant view.^
On Nakhnikian's account, then, the only propositions
which escape the doubt raised in Meditation I are those
mathematical propositions which are incorrigible for anyone
Such propositions are necessarily true, but they do not
entail the existence of an external world. 'A square has
four sides' does not entail that any square objects exist
J 8
Ibid
.
,
p. 115
.
19
Ibid
.
,
p. 133.
20
In fact, his analysis of the evil demon argument purports
to demonstrate the impossibility of the aberrant view with
respect to mathematical propositions (cf. pp. 127-129).
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Nakhnikian terms such propositions
'hypothetical' to distin
guish them from propositions that are 'existential', i.e.,
that entail the existence of something.
The achievement of Meditation II on Nakhnikian 1 s
account is the demonstration of incorrigible propositions
which are contingently true and which imply the existence
of something. Among such propositions is the Cogito
. But
aside from demonstrating that at least one incorrigible
contingent proposition implies the existence of something,
what does the achievement of the Cogito provide for
Descartes on Nakhnikian 's account?
One response is that the conclusion of the Cogito
, '
i
exist', is also incorrigible. Descartes asserts in
Meditation II ;
So that after having reflected well
and carefully examined all things, we
must come to the definite conclusion
that this proposition: I am, I exist,
is necessarily true each time that I
pronounce it, or that I mentally
conceive it.
And when criticized about the apparent deductive nature of
the achievement of the Cogito
,
Descartes responds:
He who says, 'l_ think, hence I am, or
exist
,
' does not deduce existence from
thought by a syllogism, but, by a
simple intuition of the mind, recognizes
21
HR I, p. 150.
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per
a
se
lf ^ * thing that is known
22
Nakhnikian argues:
In order for me to know "by a simpleintuition of the mind" that I exist,it is necessary that there be a cer-
tain entailment
,
but an entailment,
and not an inference. "i think"
entails "I exist." But in order to*intuit the fact that I exist I do nothave to infer that I exist from thefact that I think. it is sufficient
that I believe attentively that I
exist. it is impossible for me to
believe attentively that I exist and
not to know it. By our definition
of attentive belief, if i believe
attentively that I exist, then I have
some evidence for the proposition "I
exist. But if I have any evidence
at all for "I exist," then I have
conclusive evidence for it. For unless
I did exist, I could have no evidence
whatever for any proposition. Hence,
if I believe attentively that I exist,
it follows that I am fully justified,
and cannot be mistaken, in believing
that I exist. From that, in turn, it
follows that I know incorrigibly that
I exist. 23
Having demonstrated the incorrigibility of 'I exist',
Nakhnikian argues, Descartes cannot employ the hypothesis
of the evil demon (which is raised again in the Circle
Passage in Meditation III ) to defeat his certainty that he
HR II, p. 38. Nakhnikian's translation "intuition of the
mind" is from the Latin version of the Meditations.
Haldane and Ross, presumably relying on the French ver-
sion, translate the phrase as "act of mental vision."
Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy
,
p. 139.
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exists. Thus, Nakhnikian finds no textual evidence in
«Sii£ation_Il to support the aberrant view and much reason
to reject it. But what about the Cogito 's relationship to
other first principles? About this Nakhnikian says:
• . his [Descartes'] argument forsayxng that "I exist" is "indubitable"
s that, even if there is an evildemon
,
and he is deceiving me aboutany things, he cannot deceive me aboutmy own existence because (and this is
e crux of Descartes' argument) "Theevil demon is deceiving me" entails "I
to
1S±" assumin9 an entaUmlntShow that I exist" is "indubitable."But is there any reason why this en-taiiment is metaphysically ciFEIin, if
rnis is a square" entails "This has
our sides" is not? There is no such
reason. These two entailments stand
or fall together. Either both of themare necessarily true or neither one of
*
*
:
Besides
> it is obviousthat both entailments are necessarily
• • • Descartes is simply mis-taken whenever he proceeds as if he
can explain the special status of "I
exist" or of "I think" without knowingbeforehand that certain other proposi-
tions are necessarily true, self-evident,
and incorrigible for him.
. .
24
Thus, according to Nakhnikian, there are no features of the
—
gitQ that 9ive it an epistemic status distinct from that
of other first principles. But its role is not thereby
insignificant. There is its contingency and the entailment
of one existent thing:
24
Ibid
.
,
pp. 143-144.
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: • \ the £°2ito propositions areexamples of propositions that provideincorrigible knowledge of the exis-tence of a contingent mental entity
tions
U
a S^
e "®Cessiti' for any assump-nsas to the existence of God ormaterial objects. 25
Before turning to Meditation in, however, one cogent
on the role of the principle of clarity and distinctness is
needed. it is obvious that for Nakhnikian the principle is
not demonstrated until Meditation IV
. Therefore it has
no function in either Meditation IT or III. 26
Turning to question (4) we can readily identify what is
called into doubt in the Circle Passage on the aberrant
View. It is the incorrigibility of any and all clear and
distinct perceptions. But what is called into doubt on
Descartes' considered view? Nakhnikian never explicitly
tells us. He does, however, provide us with some clues, in
one place he says:
Descartes has created for himselfthree major technical problems, and hebelieves that they can all be solved
if, and only if, it can be proved thatGod exists. The three problems are:
the justification of memory, the prob-lem of justifying perceptual beliefs,
25
Ibid .
, p. 153.
26
Nakhnikian has a number of interesting things to say about
wh»v
P
f
ln
!;
1
f -
<cf
-.PP- 97-104, 107-109, 115-118, and else-ere)
, but since it has no function on his account ingetting Descartes out of the vicious circle, a discussion
°t its role is beyond our scope.
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the problems posed by the evil
postulate
.
demon
27
Elsewhere Nakhnikian says:
The fairest and most generous inter-pretation of Descartes is that God is
needed to guarantee the truth of some,
not all, of our clear and distinct
perceptions. Specifically, Descartesthinks that God is needed to guarantee
the truth of (1) all our clear anddistinct perceptual judgments, (2) all
our clear and distinct perceptions of
our own states of wakefulness, (3) all
clear and distinct memory impressions,
and (4) all clear and distinct percep-
tions of [corrigible] mathematical ~~
propositions.
. .
28
Assuming that the dream and evil demon arguments in
Meditation I effectively cast doubt about perceptual beliefs
and corrigible mathematical propositions respectively, the
Circle Passage casts doubt, then, on memory and the princi-
ple of clarity and distinctness itself.
The just cited passages from Nakhnikian also point to
what the demonstration of God's existence and benevolent
nature is intended to achieve. We have already seen how
that achievement is to be reached. Assuming the considered
view:
. . . it is open to Descartes to say
that the premises from which he deduces
God's existence and veracity are clear
27 Ibid
.
,
p. 167.
28
Ibid
.
,
p . 175
.
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and distinct propositions, which donot need God's guarantee. 29
Now Nakhnikian is of the opinion that neither the causal
argument in Med itation II I nor the ontological argument in
Meditation V achieves what Descartes intends for it to
achieve. But the failure does not involve circular reason-
ing. "The proofs of God's existence.
. . are riddled with
problems, but circularity need not be one of them." 30
Nakhnikian concludes:
The system that I have attributed toDescartes is not circular. It is
simply incompiete, and perhaps uncom-pletable; but it is certainly notinescapably circular. 31
Nakhnikian 's account is an interesting one. The tech-
nical distinctions that he argues for may prove helpful in
considering interpretations to come, particularly the dis-
tinction he draws between two senses of 'indubitable'.
Although the distinction is not used to any advantage by
Nakhnikian in his interpretation, it foreshadows distinc-
tions made by later Cartesian commentators. But his account
is a difficult one to assess. By developing the thesis of
29
Ibid., pp. 239-240.
Nakhnikian, American Philosophical Quarterly, p. 255
31
Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy
, p. 240.
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two views each of which Descartes held at various ti.es (but
presumably not simultaneously)
, Nakhnikian has put himself
in the position of being able to say with respect to any
textual evidence which is inconsistent with his interpreta-
tion of Descartes' more considered view, "Ah, but that is
the aberrant view being espoused."
There are some critical comments, however, that can be
made about Nakhnikian' s account. The first is that
Nakhnikian does not indicate in which passages Descartes
explicitly expressed his more considered doctrine. 1
suggested a few myself. 32 However, in each instance where
Descartes can be found making an assertion supporting the
considered view, he follows those assertions with ones that
confirm the aberrant view. 33 m fact,
-Nakhnikian points to
no instance in which Descartes appears to hold the con-
sidered view without later contradicting it (with the
aberrant view) within the same work. He as much as admits
this
:
The overall impression is that Descartes
is not wholly consistent. There is
evidence that he is not altociether
comfortable with the aberrant view.
Cf. note 4 above.
33For HR I, p. 140, cf. p. 140; for HR I, pp. 150, 152, cf.
pp. 158-159; for HR I, p. 160-161, cf. p. 178; for
Principles VII and X, cf. XXX.
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but there is also evidence that henevpr Le gave it up.
” lie
34
seen in this light Nakhnikian 's account is not one that
prets Descartes writings in a manner consistent with
the text and succeeds in allowing him out of the circle, as
he leads us to believe when he save: -in +-k kn ys m the beginning of his
article
:
if; we^ssume^hat
* a^ertain'aberrant
^
doctrine^
art ° f
35
The textual evidence would appear to indicate that the
aberrant view is an inescapable part of Descartes' doctrine.
Nakhnikian gives himself away when, prior to arguing for the
considered doctrine, he says, "Descartes ought to have dis-
owned the aberrant view.
.
,"
36
Perhaps he ought tQ have
_
but the evidence indicates that he did not. Whether or not
Descartes' failure to deny what Nakhnikian views as an
aberrant view inevitably leads to a vicious circle remains
to be seen. 37
34
Nakhnikian, American Philosophical Quarterly, d. 25 ?
35_,
. ,Ibid
.
,
p. 251.
36_. . .Ibid
.
,
p. 253.
37
akhnikian does offer one line of reasoning within hislater article (cf. p. 254) to demonstrate that, on theaberrant
. view,
.
a vicious circle is inescapable. He doesso in criticizing an interpretation offered by HarryFrankfurt which I discuss in the next chapter. At that
50
A second criticism is that throughout Nakhnikian
'
s
more extensive treatment of Descartes, the considered
doctrine receives minimal textual support with respect to
matters other than clarity and distinctness. Nakhnikian
does contend frequently that his interpretation is exegeti-
cally accurate. But he develops premises for arguments
without demonstrating what specific textual evidence sup-
ports them. For example, in providing six premises for the
dream argument, he states parenthetically,
"i believe, it is
needless to say, that <l)-<5) can be attributed to Descartes
without qualification." 38
Finally, Nakhnikian admits that the textual evidence
indicates "Descartes was not wholly consistent." m fact,
I argue that given Nakhnikian
' s thesis of two views, the
textual evidence indicates that Descartes was entirely
inconsistent. This could very well be the case. But before
committing myself to this undesirable consequence, I would
like to consider some alternative interpretations.
On Nakhnikian 's interpretation, those instances in
which Descartes appears to doubt certain propositions which
time I will present Nakhnikian
' s argument and explain why
I believe it fails to demonstrate the inescapable
consequence of circular reasoning on the aberrant view.
3 8Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy
,
p. 83.
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he earlier claimed were certain are treated as aberrant.
Other Cartesian commentators also wishing to ascribe a
limited or partial autonomy of reason to Descartes have
devised much different strategies to account for the
apparent inconsistencies. Among them is John Morris. In
"Cartesian Certainty" 39 he argues that the charge of circu-
larity rests on a serious misapprehension of what Descartes
was about.
Like Nakhnikian, Morris draws attention to certain
terms that he claims Descartes uses with comparative pre-
cision and consistency. in Morris' case these technical
terms are: 'eternal truth', 'common notions', and 'natural
light
'
.
The first reference to 'eternal truths' occurs in a
letter to Mersenne in which Descartes first mentions the
extent of God's omnipotence.
The mathematical truths which you call
eternal have been laid down by God and
depend on Him entirely no less than
the rest of his creatures. Indeed to
say that these truths are independent
of God is to talk of Him as if He were
Jupiter or Saturn and to subject Him
to the Styx and the Fates. Please do
not hesitate to assert and proclaim
everywhere that it is God who has laid
down these laws in nature just as a
king lays down laws in his kingdom.
39John Morris, "Cartesian Certainty," Australasian Journal
of Philosophy Vol. 47 (1969) pp. 161-168.
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There is no single one that we cannot
understand if our mind turns to con-
sider it. They are all inborn in ourmmds [mentibus nostris ingenitae ljust as a king would imprint his laws
on the hearts of all his subjects ifhe had enough power to do so . 40
In order to better understand what the term 'eternal truth'
means, Morris suggests that one must understand what 'truth'
means to Descartes. About the latter Descartes says:
• • • it is a notion which is so trans—
cendentally clear that it is impossible
not to know what it means.
. . the
meaning of the word could certainly be
to those who do not under—
stand the language, and they could be
told that this word 'truth', in its
proper signification, denotes the con-
formity of the thought with the
object.
. .
41
From this Morris concludes:
In its 'proper' meaning for
Descartes, then, truth is a binary
relationship between thought and
object, the relationship of conformity.
An 'eternal truth' would then be one
for which this relationship always
holds. It would express a thought to
which objects always conform.
Descartes' 'eternal truths' might also
have been called 'universal' or
40Letter to Mersenne, April 15, 1630 (Kenny, o£. cit., p.
11) . Morris provides his own translation. It does not
differ in any appreciable way from that of Kenny. Morris
also suggests referring to the May 6 and May 27 letters to
Mersenne of the same year.
41 From the Letter to Mersenne, October 16, 1639 (Ibid.,
pp. 65-66). The translation is Morris'. It does not
differ appreciably from Kenny's.
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'absolute', because they are
supposed to hold in all possible
worlds, and because we cannot
conceive of their contraries.
Descartes, however, prefers to callthem 'eternal' and to derive them, inpart, from the unchanging character
of God. 42
Among the examples that Morris suggests are ’eternal truths
for Descartes are:
Each particle preserves its own state until
acted upon by another.
Each particle tends to move in a straight line.
Every collision preserves the same amount of
motion
.
Every mountain must have a valley.
Two and three must equal five.
What does Descartes mean, then, when he says that
eternal truths' were created by God? Morris suggests:
First
,
God has willed that nature
obey certain laws, which operate
eternally and without change. Second,
he has given us the ability to recog-
nize the eternal truths whenever we
conceive them clearly and distinctly.
Third, God has established an exact
conformity between these conceptions
and their objects. It is because of
this conformity that we call them
truths. The conformity is guaranteed
by the proof that God is not a
deceiver. ^3
42
Morris, op. cit
.
,
p. 163.
43
Ibid.
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But what exactly is the nature of this guarantee? Morris
does not state it explicitly, but he does proceed to argue:
If God were a deceiver, then this
conform! ty might not hold. There mightbe a mountain which did not have a
valley. The objects of our mathematicaltheorems might not be true. When two
objects are 'joined with' three objects,the result might not be five objects.A square might not have four sides, atriangle might not have three sides.
Descartes readily admits that we cannotimagine what such a world would be like,but this proves nothing about the real
nature of our world. if God were adeceiver, it would be quite within hispower to make this world which behaved
in ways which violate the laws of mathe-
matics, logic, and Cartesian physics.
We can go even further. in the
extreme case, although we seem to per-
ceive an external world, everything
outside our thought could be an illusion.
Although we seem to remember the past,
God could have created us at the present
moment, complete with all our present
memories of a wholly fictitious past. ^
Although Morris does not discuss the scope of doubt in
Meditation I, I believe we are now in a position to hazard
a guess on what his response to question (1) would be. The
dream argument presumably casts doubt on beliefs based on
sense perception. The evil demon argument casts doubt on
beliefs that are based on reason. This doubt extends to
beliefs about mathematical propositions and may even extend
to beliefs concerning the 'eternal truths'. it is not
44
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clear, however, from Morris’ account whether doubt about
this last class of beliefs occurs in Meditation I or in the
Circle Passage in Meditation III.
Before attempting to determine Morris' position with
respect to question (2), it is necessary to complete our
analysis of the two remaining technical terms that he main-
tains Descartes employed.
There is, Morris claims, a general class of objects of
knowledge which, for Descartes, are known with certainty
prior to knowledge of God's existence and nature. This
class consists of 'common notions'. Morris argues:
In the Rules for the Direction of the
Mind (and later in the Principle?)
~
'common notions' are said to state the
invariable relations between the
objects of knowledge. They are
'common' in that they refer to more
than one idea, and serve to link these
ideas together. ^5
If we look at Rule XII, for example, we find Descartes
saying
:
. . . common notions.
. . are . . .
bonds for connecting together the other
simple natures, and on whose evidence
all the inferences which we obtain by
reasoning depend. The following are
examples: -things that are the same
as a third thing are the same as one
another. So too: -things which do
not bear the same relation to a third
thing, have some diversity from each
45
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other, etc. As a matter of fact
these common notions can be discernedby the understanding.
. . unaided. 46
Morris concludes that in the Rules 'common notions' "are
simply the links between our present thoughts, functioning
somewhat like rules of inference.'' 47 m the Principles a
similar analysis is provided and one very important example
is added. Descartes says:
When we apprehend that it isimpossible that anything can be formed
of
,
n
?
tl
}
ing
f
the Proposition ex nihilo
nihil fit is not to be considered as
an existing thing, or the mode of a
thing, but as a certain eternal truth
which has its seat in our mind, and
is a common notion or axiom. 4 ®
If we look closely at this statement and examine
Principles XLVIII and L as well, the term 'common notion'
seems to be used interchangeably with the term 'eternal
truth'. in a footnote Morris explains that the Latin
edition of the Principles does contain the words "eternal
truths ; but in the later French edition (which Descartes
revised) the word "eternal" has been removed'. He argues
thut the Haldane and Ross translation is in error here. As
further evidence Morris points to the Conversation with
46
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Burman in which Descartes states, when questioned about this
passage m the Principles
, that by 'eternal truths' he means
those which are called 'common notions'. And Morris claims,
It I Eternal truth' is never said to be equivalent to 'common
49notion' in any other place."
Morris concludes from all this that:
•
.
. . the common notions are of rather
a different logical type from the
eternal truths. The eternal truths
refer to entities which are not my
present thoughts. They say something
like There is no mountain without a
valley'. A mountain, whatever it is,
is not a thought. Since God is all-'
powerful
,
he could make a mountain
without a valley, and thus deceive us
about the truth of this principle.
But the common notions are supposed
only to state the relations between
our thoughts or concepts. We cannot
be deceived about them, because there
is no conformity between a thought and
an external object, which could be
falsified by the evil genius. 50
We might ask, however, by what faculty do we come to
know the common notions? Morris' response is this: we
know that the common notions are true because we recognize
the relationships between our own thoughts. Cognoscere
,
which Morris translates as "to know by acquaintance," is
the term used to describe this recognition. The faculty
Morris, op. cit
.
,
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with which we 'know by acquaintance’ is given a technical
name, 'natural light’. Morris' claim is that "Descartes,
uses the expression 'natural light’ in the Meditations and
the Pr inciples with a technical meaning, which he explains
as an instinct, faculty, or disposition to recognize the
truth.
"
51
Morris goes on to argu©
:
We are never deceived about what
the natural light reveals to us,
because there is no point at whichdeception can enter
. No matter how
extreme Descartes makes his doubts
appear
,
there is almost no point
anywhere in his writings where he
even counts it as possible that we
could be deceived about the natural
light. 52
With these last two technical terms, 'common notions'
and natural light', Morris provides an interpretation that
allows Descartes to avoid circular reasoning. As we saw
ear l^-er
'
one example of a common notion provided in the
Principles is the principle, ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing
can come from nothing). it is by means of this principle
that Descartes deduces his own existence from the fact
that he thinks. Morris contends:
Ibid., p. 166. In footnote 14 Morris refers to the
following passages to support his contention: MeditationIH ( HR 1/ PP- 160-161); Principles Part I, XXX (HR I,
p. 231); Letter to Mersenne, October 16, 1639 (Kenny, op
cit.
, pp. 65-67) . -*
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notmng comes from nothing, and
therefore I must exist. 53
Once the Cogito is established, Descartes can move to
demonstrate that God exists. Morris argues
I know directly that my own thought
of God exists. But this idea cannot
t
Per fec t than its source, since
all its infinite perfection must comefrom somewhere, and nothing can comefrom nothing. Therefore, the source
of my idea must be God and must exist. 54
We are now in a position to suggest a response for
demonstrated, the only certainties that Descartes has are
the common notions revealed by the natural light. The
Cogito establishes, for the first time, the existence of
one thing, an entity that thinks. Those thoughts must also
exist. Among them is the thought of God. This suggests
that although the Cogito has an epistemic status that is
more certain than that of the eternal truths, it is not
first among Descartes' knowledge claims. That status must
be reserved for the common notions. The significance of
the Cogito on Morris' account is that it is the very first
Morris to question (2). Until the Cogito is successfully
53 Ibid
.
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step in a series of deductions that culminates in the proof
of an existent, benevolent God.
With respect to question (3), Morris does not have
much to say about the principle of clarity and distinctness.
At one point he says
:
... he [Descartes] wishes to show
that our clear and distinct concep-
tions are all true.
For this, he requires a proof,
which will show that God is not adeceiver
,
and that the world is
not in the hands of some evil genius,
who destroys the conformity between
our clear and distinct conceptions,
an<3 the objects to which they refer.
This suggests that the principle of clarity and distinct-
ness plays no role in achieving certainty prior to the
demonstration of God's existence.
I suggested earlier that it is not clear from Morris'
account whether doubt about eternal truths is established
by the evil demon argument in Meditation I or in the Circle
Passage in Meditation III . The textual evidence would make
either alternative consistent with Morris' thesis. Pre-
sumably the principle of clarity and distinctness is among
those principles toward which doubt is directed in the
Circle Passage.
Morris' response to question (5) would be that, once
it is proven that God exists and is no deceiver, the doubt
5
5
Ibid
. ,
p . 16 4.
61
raised by the evil demon hypothesis in Meditation I and in
the Circle Passage is removed. How God's existence is
proven has already been demonstrated.
I
As we have seen, once the Cogito has been established
Descartes can eventually conclude (using the faculty of
natural light) that his thoughts, particularly that of God
exist. The common notion ex nihilo nihil fit has already
again he can now deduce that God exists. Once His exis-
tence is demonstrated, the same common notion and faculty
can be employed to demonstrate that God is no deceiver.
Morris argues:
Deception is a form of error and
error is not a positive existence but
is simply nothing, a gap or a lack.
But this nothing cannot come from God,
since nothing comes from nothing, and
God is perfect being, without gaps or
lacks. Therefore, God is not the
source of error. 57
Morris' conclusion is:
56
,
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been revealed by that faculty. By using this faculty yet
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The set of principles upon which hisproof of God depends are not at all
the same as the 'eternal truths' of
mathematics, geometry, and physics,
which he is attempting to validate.
His proof thus does not depend on
what he is attempting to prove. 58
Descartes may succeed in avoiding circular reasoning
on Morris' account, but, as Morris points out, he does so
only by making a particular illegitimate move early in the
Meditations. The faculty of 'natural light' is applicable
only to 'common notions' which, in turn, avoid the doubt
imposed by a deceiving demon only because they express
relationships between ideas in the mind and never refer to
something outside the mind. But the principle, ex nihilo
a causal principle which does not merely
express a relationship between ideas in the mind, but
expresses a relationship between things. In the proof of
God's existence the principle expresses a relationship
between my idea of God and God Himself. Now while my idea
of God may be solely within my mind,~^ its cause is outside
my mind. Thus, the 'natural light' cannot provide the
C O
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59Morris does not think this to be the case. "My idea is
not considered merely as a mode of my mind, but as a
thing in its own right, which must have a cause."
(p. 167).
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certainty that we need for this principle, and hence for
this proof. if Descartes gives up the certainty, according
to Morris, he faces circularity. if he maintains that the
certainty is still there, he retreats to dogmatism.
Morris believes Descartes chose the latter move.
One might object to Morris' account on the following
grounds. According to Morris, Descartes cannot be defended
from the charge of circular reasoning by arguing for a
limited or partial autonomy of reason without making him
into a dogmatist. But perhaps what is at fault is not
Descartes* epistemology, but the strategy which attributes
to him the need to exclude at least some of his beliefs or
faculties from doubt. However, there are other reasons
for rejecting Morris' interpretation. in "Cartesian
Certainty and the Natural Light" 60 Peter Schouls suggests
one such reason.
As we have seen, it is essential for Morris to demon-
strate that the infallibility of the faculty of 'natural
light' is never questioned by Descartes. In fact, Morris
asserts at one point, "We are never deceived about what the
natural light reveals to us, because there is no point at
60
Peter Schouls, "Cartesian Certainty and the Natural
Light," Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 48 (1970)
pp. 116-119.
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which deception can enter." 61 if it were otherwise,
Descartes could not escape the vicious circle given Morris'
interpretation. But at another point Morris asserts that
"Descartes never - or almost never - falls into this
vicious circle." 62 This qualification suggests that a
closer look at Morris' account of 'natural light' is in
order. As Schouls points out, Morris has to acknowledge
one passage in which the natural light does not escape
being doubted. Morris says:
No matter how extreme Descartes makes
his doubts appear, there is almost no
point anywhere in his writings where
he even counts it as possible that we
could be deceived about the natural
light. 63
In a footnote Morris acknowledges that "The exception is
at Principles, I, 30. I do not have an explanation for
6 4this passage." in the passage in question Descartes
asserts
:
Whence it follows that the light
of nature, or the faculty of knowledge
which God has given us, can never
disclose to us any object which is
not true, inasmuch as it comprehends
it, that is, inasmuch as it apprehends
Morris, o£. cit
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it clearly and distinctly. Because
we should have had reason to thinkGod a deceiver if He had given us
this faculty perverted, or such that
we should take the false for the true(when using the faculty aright)
.
65
Now this principle follows others which demonstrate God's
existence and non-deceiving nature. Thus, the opening
statement implies that the infallibility of the faculty of
natural light is dependent on, rather than prior to, God's
existence and nature. Furthermore, the phrase "if He had
given us this faculty perverted" strongly suggests the
possibility that a deceiving God could cause us to err in
using this faculty. This passage casts doubt upon Morris'
account
.
There is at least one additional problem as well.
Morris claims that on his account the difficulty that
Descartes faces is employing the principle ex nihilo nihil
_
fit to demonstrate God's existence. The problem is that
the principle does not meet the criteria for something to
be a common notion and thereby immune to doubt. But on
Morris' account the principle is also employed to demon-
strate the Cogito . If it is inappropriate in one applica-
tion, it would presumably be inappropriate in both. If so,
then on Morris' account it seems that Descartes must resort
65HR I, p. 231.
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to dogmatism not only to demonstrate God's existence, but
also to demonstrate his own. And that strikes me as
extremely counter-intuitive.
In the aforementioned critique of Morris' account
Peter Schouls suggests that where Morris went wrong was in
his treatment of the technical term 'natural light'. He
suggests that, whereas 'reason' and 'natural light' are
often used interchangeably by Descartes, 'natural light' is
never equivalent to 'intuition' as Morris would have it.
In his article "Descartes and the Autonomy of Reason" 66
Schouls provides a more extensive analysis of the function
of reason in Descartes' philosophy and he argues for some
important distinctions which, he claims, clarify the role
of God's existence in the Meditations and enable Descartes
to avoid the charge of circular reasoning.
In examining the functions of reason for Descartes,
Schouls points to the role of intuition and deduction.
Early in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind Descartes
states in Rule III:
. . . we shall here take note of all
those mental operations by which we
are able. . . to arrive at the knowledge
Peter Schouls, "Descartes and the Autonomy of Reason,"
Journa l of the History of Philosophy Vol. 10 (1972)
pp. 307-322.
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things. Now I admit only two,
. intuition and deduction.
Again in Rule IV in discussing how "we may arrive at the
knowledge of all things," he states that "no science is
acquired except by mental intuition or deduction." 68
And finally in Rule IX he concludes:
We have now indicated the two
operations of our understanding,
intuition and deduction, on which
al°ne we have said we must rely in
the acquisition of knowledge. 69
Schouls concludes from this that for Descartes neither
intuition nor deduction alone is identical with reason.
But together they "express the essence of reason." 70 it is
also important to note, claims Schouls, that 'deduction'
for Descartes is something other than Aristotelian deduc-
tion. To support this contention he points to Descartes'
rejection of syllogistic reasoning as a method for discover-
ing truth. Descartes states:
. . . the syllogistic forms are of no
aid in perceiving the truth about
objects, it will be for the reader's
profit to reject them altogether and
to conceive that all knowledge whatso-
ever, other than that which consists
in the simple and naked intuition of
67HR I, p. 7.
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single independent objects
matter of the comparison of
or more, with each other.
is a
two things
71
The distinction between intuition and deduction is
also well documented in Descartes' writings. In the Rules
he asserts:
is more certain• • • intuition . .than deduction
.
• 0
H®£ce now we are in a position toaise the question as to why we have,besides intuition, given this supple-
mentary method of knowing, viz. knowing
y eduction.
. . we distinguish this
mental intuition from deduction by thefact that into the conception of thelatter there enters a certain movement
or succession, into that of the formerthere does not.
. . But the first
principles themselves are given byintuition alone, while, on the contrarythe remote conclusions are furnished
only by deduction. 72
Thus, intuition and deduction can be distinguished by
three criteria: certainty (one is more certain), time
(one is immediate, the other involves duration and move-
ment)
,
and their objects (one gives first principles, the
other remote conclusions)
.
Up to this point Schouls has provided a rather tradi-
tional interpretation of Cartesian reason. He goes on,
however, to argue that a distinction can be made for
Descartes between two kinds of intuition.
71 HR I, p. 55.
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The kind of intuition described
so far I will call intuition,
. Thereis another kind of intuition which IW1
i
1
-f
a11 intuiti°n 2 - Intuition-i andintuition^ have in common that the act
° f
^
1
^
tU:Lt;LOn occurs instantaneously
and hence excludes successive movement
and memory. They differ in that where-
as the object of intuitioni is simple
and hence not subject to division or
analysis, the object of intuition? is
compound and can be divided or analysed.Intuition 2 therefore is more closely
related to deduction than is intuition-,
.In fact, whereas intuition-, is in no
way dependent on deduction, intuition-,
can occur only after deduction has
taken place. 73
Schouls cites certain passages in which he claims Descartes
refers to mtuition
2 . Descartes says at one point:
. . . those propositions.
. . which
are immediately deduced from first
principles are known now by intuition,
now by deduction, i.e. in a way that
differs according to our point of view.
But the first principles are given by
intuition alone.
. .
74
And Schouls argues:
Since the first principles cannot be
derived through deduction, that is,
are simple, the intuition through
which we know them is intuitioni.
Propositions which are in any way
deduced from what is simple cannot
themselves be simple. They will vary
in complexity, depending on how far
they are removed from the simples
from which they are ultimately
^Schouls
,
74
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derived. it is possible, especially
deducti°ns, to come to seethe different steps involved in thedeductive process in a single glance.When propositions are "immediatelyderived from first principles" thedeductive process involves one step
only. Hence in such an instance it
will not be difficult to grasp the
entire deductive process in a singleintuition. Intuition then has as
object something compound, that isit is intuition
2 *
' 75
Descartes says in Rule VII:
• . . deduction frequently involves
such a long series of transitions fromground to consequent that when we cometo the conclusion we have difficultyin recalling the whole of the route by
which we arrived at it.
. . To remedy
this I would run them over from time
to time, keeping the imagination moving
continuously in such a way that while
it is intuitively perceiving each factit simultaneously passes on to the
next; and this I would do until I had
learned to pass from the first to thelast so quickly
,
that no stage in the
process was left to the care of the
memory
,
but I seemed to have the whole
in intuition before me at the same time. 7 ^
And Schouls contends, "'The whole' thus held in a single
intuitive grasp is, again, compound, and intuition is
.
. 77
mtuition2
.
"
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The distinction, Schouls contends, is not brought into
sharp focus in the Rules because Descartes is not concerned
here with metaphysical doubt. Throughout the Rules
Descartes considers both kinds of intuition infallible. But
In the Meditations
, when metaphysical doubt is introduced,
there is no indication that it affects intuition^, and many
indications that it does not. Therefore, let us now turn to
Schouls' treatment of the Meditations
, particularly his
account of the alleged circle.
In response to question (1) Schouls maintains that
Descartes has no difficulty rejecting sense experience for
he realizes (presumably through the dream argument) that the
senses sometimes deceive him and, therefore, that what is
derived from the senses is dubitable. The main reason for
the rejection of the physical sciences by Descartes is
traditionally thought to be that they involve observation
and experimentation. This, claims Schouls, is not the
major reason that the sciences fail to withstand the meta-
physical doubt to which they are subjected in Meditation I
(presumably through the evil genius hypothesis). He argues:
. . . Descartes' position is that
observation and experimentation play
no role in the construction of any of
the sciences. Moreover, if man's
understanding were more powerful,
better trained, less beset with
prejudices, man would be able to
deduce all of the sciences from his
72
irs-t principles. The point is,
rather, that deduction is necessaryto gain scientific knowledge and that,
even though for a well-trained
scientist much of a particular science
may eventually fall within a singleintuitive grasp, the object of suchintuition will always be composite. 78
I take Schouls to be referring here to intuition;, which, on
his account, will require the demonstration that God exists
m order for certainty to be achieved.
But what about mathematical propositions? At one
point Schouls contends that mathematics "differs from the
other sciences in that its subject matter is simple." 79
This suggests that mathematical propositions are known by
intuition^ and ought to be immune to doubt. However,
Schouls also maintains that when the evil genius is intro-
duced in Meditation I:
. . . the doubt is possible because
mathematics is the science which manipu-
lates^ [the objects of mathematics] by
relating them and drawing inferences
from them. Deduction, composition, or
demonstration is as essential to mathe-
matics as it is to any other science. 89
On Schouls' view, then, when I add two and three or count
the sides of a square, I am involved in a process from which
7 8
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I either deduce or intuit the propositions 'two and three
are five’ or 'a square has four sides’. If i deduce them,
they are not immune to doubt. But even if I intuit them,
the object of my intuition is not simple. Thus, my intui-
tion is intuition., and subject to doubt. In Meditation T
doubt arises about beliefs based on reason as well as about
beliefs based on sense perception, but for reasons that are
very different from those traditionally attributed to
Descartes
.
What then of the Cogito? Schouls' position is similar
to that of Morris. While the Cogito has no epistemic status
prior to that of other first principles perceived by means
of intuition^, its significance lies in the fact that it
provides Descartes with an example of an entity whose exis-
tence is demonstrated solely by means of intuition^. And
this result provides Descartes with a starting point from
which he can proceed to validate intuition
2
and deduction.
Schouls says:
It would be a mistake to conclude
at this point that, since none of the
objects of intuition^ are susceptible
to metaphysical doubt, the Cogito is
not in some sense unique.
. .
Descartes places all objects of intui-
tioni beyond the grasp of the evil
genius but, because the reductio ad
absurdum of universal skepticism
necessarily involves making one of
them, the Cogito
,
explicit, the Cogito
alone becomes the natural point of
departure for the validation of deduc-
tion and intuition 2 • Of all objects
ih
tU
i
t
iK
ni ' ifc is the Co<? ito al»ne
tSJ 5 there 1S no distinction betweenidea and what it is an idea of. Hencethe Cogito is the first certainty involv-„,mg existence.
. .
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Before turning to an examination of just how the
achievement of the Cogito provides Descartes with a basis
for successfully demonstrating God’s existence, some comment
on how the principle of clarity and distinctness fits into
Schouls
' schema is called for. Schouls' position with
respect to question (3) should be fairly clear, although he
makes little mention of the principle in his article. in
passing he says at one point:
. . . God [becomes] the guarantor of
the truth of a certain class of complex
ideas, namely of those that are clear
and distinct. 82
Given his distinction between two kinds of intuition, I
take Schouls to be suggesting that the principle of clarity
and distinctness ranges over both intuition
1
and intuition
2
(and perhaps deduction as well). with the former no doubt
arises, but not so with the latter. A guarantee of their
truth is required. Knowledge of an existent, benevolent
God provides this guarantee. Thus, for Schouls, the
principle itself plays no role in Meditation II or III in
8
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demonstrating God's existent or- ,• „ u-stence or m achieving metaphysical
certainty
.
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With respect to question (4), oddly enough Schouls does
not discuss the Circle Passage, since he states quite
explicitly that metaphysical doubt is raised in Meditation I
by the evil genius hypothesis, it is not clear on Schouls'
account why the doubt is resurrected again in Meditation
— • 0ne Possibility might be that Descartes was warning
the reader that the achievement of the Cogito in Meditation
—
Was lnsuff icient to achieve metaphysical certainty with
respect to complex clear and distinct perceptions. if so,
the Circle Passage becomes a stylistic device serving a
methodological purpose only.
We now come to question (5). How do we get from the
Cogito to the existence of God? Schouls argues:
In a sense, it can be said that
in the Cogito we are conscious of God
rather than of ourselves for, as
Descartes puts it, "I have in me the
notion of the infinite earlier than
the finite-to wit, the notion of God
before that of myself" (HR 1, 166).
The important point to note, however,
is that nothing follows from the idea
the infinite unless we introduce
the causal principle, unless we agree
that "it is manifest by the natural
light that there must at least be as
much reality in the efficient and
total cause as in its effect" (HR 1,
162). And the causal principle is one
of the propositions which is intelli-
gible per se (HR 2, 54)
,
which cannot
be derived and hence is an object of
intuition . Thus we cannot get to
76
God-the-guarantor-of
-reason unless
we presuppose the validity of intui-tion^ 83
And what does the demonstration of God's existence provide?
For Schouls we gain the certainty of intuition
2
and deduc-
tion and all the beliefs gained by means of each which were
cast into doubt back in Meditation I .
Schouls concludes:
Our way of gaining knowledge of what
is complex stands in need of validation.
This validation introduces the talk
about God. But I have argued that such
validation is possible only if intuition-i
is autonomous. x
. . . I have argued that there is much
evidence in Descartes' writings that he
held reason to be [partially] autonomous.
If reason is autonomous, the "Circle"
does not exist. 84
While I find the distinction between two kinds of
intuition both interesting and plausible, its use in
getting Descartes out of the circle I find questionable.
There are also two additional problems that I find with
Schouls' account. For example, I find Schouls' treatment of
mathematics in Meditation I dubious. There are instances in
the Meditations where Descartes gives at least the appear-
ance of placing mathematical propositions on the same level
83
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a S the coaito and other first principles. For example, in
the Circle Passage Descartes states:
Let who will deceive me. He can nevercause me to be nothing while I thinkthat I am, or some day cause it to betrue to say that I have never been, itbeing true now to say that I am, orthat two and three make more or lessthan five.
. .
SS
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In this passage Descartes seems to be putting at least one
mathematical proposition on the same epistemic basis as the
Co^ito. Now, if the Cogito does not fall prey to the doubt
of the evil genius, then neither should the mathematical
proposition. And if the latter does, then so should the
former. Quite frankly I do not find Schouls' argument for
placing mathematical propositionswithin the class of objects
of intuition^ convincing.
The problem just discussed points to a second objection
which I have to Schouls' presentation. I find the absence
of any discussion or treatment of the Circle Passage dis-
appointing. Here is one place where Descartes at least
appears to be casting doubt on even the most evident
propositions, including the Cogi to . At the very least it
would have been helpful in assessing Schouls' account to see
a careful explanation of how Descartes' assertions in that
passage can be interpreted in a manner consistent with
85
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Schouls
' schema.
Neither of the two objections just given poses insur-
mountable problems for Schouls. I believe the following one
does. The most telling problem has to do with the move
which Schouls has Descartes making from the Cogito to the
demonstration of God's existence. The only way in which the
conclusion that God exists can be certain is if it is
achieved through intuitio^
. Yet the objects of intuition
are supposed to be simple on Schouls' account. Schouls has
failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
mtuition
1
can be used to conclude that a non-deceiving God
exists. And I don't believe he can consistently do so.
While Descartes steadfastly maintains that the Cogito is
not a deduction, 86 he does state explicitly in various
places that the existence of God is something which he has
proven by means of an argument or proof:
In the third Meditation it seems
to me that I have explained at suffi-
cient length the principle argument of
which I make use in order to prove the
existence of God. 87
Schouls may be correct in arguing that the causal principle
which Descartes employs to prove that God exists is known
Per se, that is, through intuition^ It remains to be
86
HR II, p. 38.
87HR I, p. 141.
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demonstrated that the application
not involve a need for intuition^
of that principle does
In fact, the textual
evidence indicates that Descartes considered the demonstra-
tion of God's existence in Meditation III to be in the form
Of an argument. Arguments have premises and conclusions.
Even if Descartes is able to attend to the entire argument
m a single perception, on Schouls' interpretation
Descartes- intuition is intuition,,, not intuition^
Circular reasoning does not appear to have been circumvented
by Descartes on Schouls' interpretation.
I have presented three distinct attempts to interpret
Descartes, all of which share a common perspective. Each
sees Descartes' only escape from circular reasoning lying in
the direction of a partial autonomy of reason. I have
attempted to demonstrate that none of the three proves
satisfactory. in the next two chapters I will consider
certain Cartesian commentators who argue for the non-
autonomy of reason in Descartes' philosophy.
CHAPTER in
Among the first contemporary Cartesian commentators to
suggest that Descartes' primary goal in the Meditations is
the defense of reason, that is, that no aspect of reason is
autonomous, is Harry Frankfurt. in "Descartes' Validation
of Reason"
1
Frankfurt distinguishes between doubting the
truth of a proposition and doubting the relationship
between a proposition's indubitability and its truth. His
contention is that many Cartesian commentators equate the
two in Descartes' writings and some are thereby led to con-
clude that Descartes was guilty of circular reasoning.
Since his article is concerned solely with matters relating
to questions (4) and (5), in order to determine his posi-
tion on questions (1), (2), and (3) we must turn to his
more extensive treatment of Descartes in Demons
, Dreamers
and Madmen : The Defense of Reason in Descartes's Medita-
.
. 2
.
.
—
ons ln which he also develops his position with respect
to Meditations I and II.
1Harry Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,"
American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 2 (1965) pp. 149-
156
.
2Harry Frankfurt, Demons
,
Dreame r s and Madmen; The Defense
of Reason in Descartes
' s Meditations
, Bobbs-MerrTTl Co.
Inc. New York (1970).
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Frankfurt argues that from the very start Descartes
appears to be making a distinction between doubting those
beliefs that may be false and doubting those beliefs that
are uncertain. Descartes states near the beginning of
Meditation I
:
1
*
- reason already persuades me that
I ought no less carefully to withhold
my assent from matters which are not
entirely certain and indubitable thanfrom those which appear to me manifestlyto be false, if i am able to find in
each one some reason to doubt, this will
suffice to justify my rejecting the
whole. 3
On the basis of this Frankfurt suggests:
As the First Meditation gets under
way, then, Descartes's concern apparently
shifts from considerations of truth andfalsity to those of certainty anddoubt
. . .
• • • in [the early passages of theFirst Meditation] Descartes is concerned
mainly with the distinction between the
certain and the doubtful. it is in terms
of this distinction, rather than in terms
of the distinction between true and false,
that he undertakes to decide what to
believe. 4
Frankfurt's position on question (1) is this:
HR I, p. 145. Kenny provides his own translation. I will
refer to his only in the event any difference between his
and that of Haldane and Ross point to something fundamen-
tal in Kenny's interpretation.
Frankfurt, Demons
,
Dreamers and Madmen
, pp. 25, 26.
82
Hnnhf
06803
^
63 ends the First Meditationdoubting all propositions concerningperceptuai objects and, indeed, skeptical
world?
SX1Stence of the material
The dream argument accomplishes some of this for Descartes
Frankfurt argues:
Tlle °f the dream argumentis that even if Descartes makes the
most generous assumptions and supposesthat he is a normal perceiver who ob-tains sensory data under conditions
favorable in every respect discoverable
—Y- the sense
s
, he cannot be certain
that the sensory data he obtains willbe veridical. Even when it is attempted
under the most suitable conditions thathhe senses can select
, discrimination
between veridical and non-veridical data
y.ith the senses alone remains uncertain. ^
The dream argument by itself, however, gives us neither
doubt about all propositions concerning perceptual objects
nor doubt about the existence of the material world. That
uncertainty remains to be demonstrated by the evil demon
argument. Frankfurt claims:
. . . his [Descartes’] observation that
the distinction between wakefulness
and dreaming is uncertain did not affect
beliefs in the reality of various simple
and universal things- "corporeal nature
in general and its extension, the shape
of extended things, ..." and so on.
. . . The dream argument also left intact
the supposition that there is a material
Ibid
.
,
P- 15.
Ibid
. , P- 42.
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frn^h-
hS conclusion Descartes drewom his consideration of dreams wasmerely that we cannot distinguish withcertainty between real material objectsand those that are dreamed 7
The hypothesis of an evil demon is introduced to cast doubt
on those very beliefs that escaped the doubt raised by the
dream argument. Descartes states:
Nevertheless I have long had fixedin my mind the belief that an all power-ful God existed by whom I have been
t
UCh aS 1 am * But how do 1 knowthat He has not brought it to pass thathere is no earth, no heaven, no extendedbody, no magnitude, no place, and that
nevertheiess (I possess the perceptions
of all these things and that) they seemto me to exist just exactly as I now see 0them? 8
And Frankfurt concludes that "[This] passage about an omni-
potent deity.
. . raises for the first time the possibility
that there are no material objects at all." 9
But what about the truths of mathematics? On the one
hand Descartes states:
. . . whether I am awake or asleep, two
nnd three together always form five,
and the square can never have more than
four sides, and it does not seem possi-
ble that truths ^o clear and apparen t
7
Ibid.
,
p . 69
.
8HR I, p. 147.
9Frankfurt, Demons
,
Dreamers and Madmen
, p. 69.
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can be suspected of any falsity (or
uncertainty)
.
10
Thxs passage seems to place clear and distinct perceptions
at least beyond the doubts raised by the dream argument.
On the other hand, Descartes concludes his introduction of
the omnipotent deceiver (quoted on the previous page) by
asserting:
And, besides, as I sometimes imagine
that others deceive themselves in thethings which they think they know besthow do I know that I am not deceived
'
every time that I add two and three,
or count the sides of a square, or judge
of things yet simpler, if anything
simpler can be imagined? 11
In this passage it appears that Descartes is suggesting
that the omnipotent deceiver hypothesis casts doubt on
those mathematical propositions that escaped the doubt of
the dream argument by being perceived clearly and
distinctly
.
Frankfurt s contention is that the appearances are
very misleading. First, with respect to the passage that
appears to place clearly and distinctly perceived mathe-
matical propositions beyond the doubt raised by the dream
argument, Frankfurt argues that the phrase which Haldane
and Ross translate as "clear and apparent" does not
1
°HR I, p. 147.
11 Ibid
.
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indicate that Descartes was referring to clear and dis-
tinct perceptions. The Latin phrase is perspicuae
veritates
, which Frankfurt suggests may be translated as
'clear truths'. Frankfurt contends that Descartes generally
uses the adjective clarus when speaking of clear and dis-
tinct perception. The French translation uses apparent
rather than clair. Frankfurt hypothesizes that Haldane
and Ross attempt to play it safe by offering a translation
that combines both the Latin adjective and the French. The
result is a most misleading translation.
Frankfurt also points to two passages that support his
interpretation. The first is in the Conversation with
Burman in which Descartes contends that in Meditation I he
is considering someone who is only beginning to philoso-
phize and who attends only to those things with which he is
acquainted
,
that is, through the senses. 12 The second is
from Descartes' replies to the seventh set of objections
in which he states
:
I said at the end of Meditation I
that everything which I had not yet com-
prehended with sufficient clearness could
be doubted by us . . . 13
Conversat ion with Burman (cf. translation by Frankfurt.
Demons
,
Dreamers and Madmen
,
p. 62.)
HR II, p. 266.
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Frankfurt concludes that the passage "hardly leaves any
room for doubt that nothing discussed in the First Medita-
tion is taken to be clearly and distinctly perceived." 14
But if it is not the self-evident nature of mathe-
matical propositions that is being doubted, precisely what
is being doubted with respect to such propositions? Frank-
furt's response is similar to that of Merrill Ring whose
account was discussed in Chapter I. it is that Descartes
conducts his discussion of mathematical propositions from
the point of view of naive empiricism, inadequacies of
which he is attempting to expose.
Thus / although Descartes ends Meditation I doubting
all propositions concerning perceptual objects and the
existence of the external world and mathematical proposi-
tions based on am empiricist principle, this accomplishment
should not be construed as establishing that no sensory
beliefs or mathematical propositions can be certain. On
Frankfurt's account it is that:
The critique is designed to show, at
the most, that no such beliefs can
reasonably be regarded as certain by
someone who has no resources other
than those provided by common sense.
But even if the senses cannot them-
selves provide a foundation for the
sciences, it is another question
entirely whether certainty in sensory
14
Frankfurt, Demons
,
Dreamers and Madmen
,
p. 64.
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[anci mathemat ical ] matters can reasonablybe attained once a sound philosophicalfoundation for knowledge has been con-
structed. 15
Turning to question (2), Frankfurt claims that among
the achievements of the Cpgito is the establishment of
his existence as something which is inferred rather than
self-evident to him. This is consistent with two of Frank-
furt's general claims: one, that Descartes is attempting
to validate reason rather than assuming that some aspect of
it, and therefore some propositions, are beyond the need of
any justification; and two, that Descartes is concerned at
this point in his enterprise with demonstrating, not the
truth of certain propositions, but the indubitability of
those propositions. Thus, the purpose of the inference in
the case of the Cogito is not to prove that sum is true,
but to establish that his existence is certain or indubi-
table in a rather unusual sense. And Frankfurt proceeds to
distinguish between certain senses of indubitability.
Although [Descartes] does not assert
that sum is indubitable in the descrip-
tive sense of the term- according to
which what is indubitable is what can-
not in fact be doubted by anyone-
there are other senses of indubitability
as well. In particular there are norma-
tive senses, according to which what is
indubitable is what there is no reason
to doubt or what there can be no reason
15
Ibid
.
, pp . 48-49
.
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to doubt. Descartes's intention.is, as a matter of fact, to assert thatsum is indubitable in a normative sense. 16
If I understand Frankfurt's explanation, the descriptive
sense of 'indubitable' can be defined as follows:
£ is indubitable =df for any person, S, £
cannot be doubted by s.
Unfortunately, Frankfurt does not explain in what sense a
proposition cannot be doubted, nor does he provide any
examples of propositions that are indubitable in the
descriptive sense. 17
Frankfurt elucidates the peculiar certainty of sum by
contrasting it with the indubitability (presumably norma-
tive) of various other types of statements. He describes
three.. The first consists of logically contingent state-
ments which, when they are true, may be known with certain-
ty. As examples he suggests statements about the sensory
content of experience such as 'S feels a pain'. The belief
that a pain is occuring may be regarded as beyond S's
doubt. But in instances when S does not feel a pain, it is
quite reasonable for S to doubt 'S feels a pain'. Frank-
1
6
Ibid .
, p. 103.
Given the comparison he makes between the indubitability
of sum and that of necessary truths shortly thereafter,
there is some reason to believe that he had the latter' in
mind as examples of statements which are descriptively
indubitable
.
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furt concludes that statements about the sensory content of
experience can be indubitable on some occasions and dubi-
table on others.
The second type consists of empirical statements for
Which a person may have sufficient evidence on a given
occasion to render such a statement indubitable, while the
absence of such evidence on other occasions would make it
reasonable for the statement to be doubted.
The third type consists of statements that are rend-
ered true by the act of asserting them. As an example
Frankfurt suggests 'I am making a statement'. He argues:
Because of their self-confirming charac-
ter, statements of this sort cannot be
falsely. Nevertheless there are
occasions when they can reasonably bedoubted or when they can be known to befalse. When I am not making a statement,
I may know that I am not. There may be
circumstances in which I am simply not
sure whether what I am doing constitu-
tes making a statement, and in those
circumstances I can reasonably doubt
whether I am doing so. 18
Frankfurt's conclusion is that in each of the three types
of statements just considered there are certain conditions
under which such statements can be considered indubitable.
There are also certain conditions under which such state-
ments can be considered dubitable. But such is not the
18
Ibid
.
,
p. 104
.
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case for sum. Frankfurt's contention is that for Descartes
it is logicaily impossible for there to be an occasion on
Which a person considers the statement sum and on which the
statement is false. The indubitability of sum is thereby
different from that of the types of statements just con-
sidered. Frankfurt summarizes the distinction as follows:
The certainty of beliefs concerning the
content of consciousness is, as it were
contingent upon the occurrence of those*
contents. But the certainty of sum is
not contingent in this way, sinceT
person can never be aware that he does
not exist. 19
There is an additional achievement of the Cogito
.
While the uniqueness of the indubitability of sum distin-
guishes it from the other contingent statements discussed
above, that uniqueness does not distinguish it from certain
other statements such as logically necessary truths. They
share this uniqueness in that it is contradictory to
suppose that someone considers them while they are false or
that someone believes them falsely. What distinguishes sum
from logically necessary truths is that the latter are:
. . . entirely formal in content and
involve no assertion of existence;
sum, on the other hand, is a synthetic
and logically contingent statement in
which the existence of something is
19
Ibid
.
,
p . 107.
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asserted. This renders it of greaterrelevance to Descartes's inquiry. 20
Thus, on Frankfurt's account the Cpgito has no epistemic
status above that of other first principles, its unique-
ness lies both in its demonstration of at least one exis-
tent entity and in its role in establishing a rule of
evidence for Descartes more reliable than those of sensory
evidence which were rendered dubious in Meditation T
. The
rule of evidence that Descartes develops is, of course, the
principle of clarity and distinctness.
Turning to question (3), it is important to understand
that on Frankfurt's account the principle of clarity and
distinctness is not derived from the paradigmatic indubi-
tability of sum. According to Frankfurt it is the move
from sum to sum res cogitans that provides Descartes with
the principle. It is as a result of this move that
Descartes states, ''From this time I begin to know what I
am with a little more clearness and distinctness than
before
. . .
maintains
:
How is this increase achieved? Frankfurt
Descartes achieves it by arranging a
precise coincidence between what he
ascribes to himself and the character
that he recognizes as necessarily
20
Ibid.
,
p. 105
.
21
HR I, p. 153.
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belonging to an object whose existence
can be rendered indubitable by the
cogito argument. 22
Frankfurt suggests that perceiving a proposition clearly
and distinctly is a matter of recognizing it as 'neces-
sarily true', not in the sense that its denial would be
self-contradictory, but in the sense that no coherent
grounds for denying the proposition are consistent with the
perceiver's basis for believing it. And Frankfurt con-
cludes :
When a person perceives something
clearly and distinctly, his basis forbelieving it is so complete that no
additional evidence could strengthen
it. Since there is nothing further
that he must consider, there is no
reasonable basis for him to withhold
assent or to doubt. His clear and dis-
tinct perception consists in the recog-
nition that this is the case.
We are now in a position to suggest a response to
question (3). The principle of clarity and distinctness
provides Descartes with a rule of evidence for determining
which propositions are indubitable. But is the principle
Frankfurt, Demons
,
Dreamers and Madmen
, p. 123. Frank-
furt develops this part of his thesis far more extensive-
ly than my brief account of him would indicate. But the
important question for our purposes is not how or
whether Descartes succeeds in achieving the principle of
clarity and distinctness, it is how that principle (pre-
sumed achieved) assists him in achieving metaphysical
certainty
.
2
2
Ibid.
,
p. 124
.
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itself an acceptable rule of evidence, that is, is it true?
This question brings us to the Circle Passage and the meta-
physical doubt raised within.
Frankfurt's position on question ( 4 ) is that the doubt
raised in the Circle Passage is doubt about whether a prop-
osition's indubitability
, established by the clarity and
distinctness with which it was perceived, is compatible
with its being false. To put it another way, the doubt is
about whether what is clearly and distinctly perceived is
true
.
. . . Descartes' metaphysical doubt is
precisely a doubt whether being false
is compatible with being indubitable.
His position is that as long as the
demon remains a possibility, we must
acknowledge that what we intuit may be
false. But he also holds that we can-
not doubt the truth of what we intuit
while we are perceiving it clearly and
distinctly. 24
Frankfurt points to a number of passages to provide textual
evidence for his interpretation. With respect to clear and
distinct perceptions Descartes asserts in a letter to
Regius
:
[That the truth of axioms which are
clearly and distinctly conceived is
self-evident] is true, during the
time they are clearly and distinctly
24
Frankfurt, American Philosophical Quarterly, p. 150. A
similar distinction is made by Kenny wtiose account I
discuss in the following chapter.
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conceived; because our mind is of
such a nature that it cannot help
assenting to what it clearly con-
ceives But.
.
. if we lack knQW_ledge of God, we can pretend thatthey are uncertain even though we
remember that they were deduced from
clear principles; because perhaps
our nature is such that we go wrong
g-ven ln the most evident matters. 25
Elsewhere Descartes warns:
• . . before a man knows that God
exists, he has an opportunity of doubt-ing everything (viz. everything of whichhe does not have a clear perception
present in his mind, as I have a number
of times set forth)
. . .
26
These passages together with the Circle Passage, Frankfurt
claims, seem to be clear enough statements that Descartes
is concerned with the possibility that even what is indubi-
table may be false. Although nowhere does Frankfurt
explicitly state it in such terms, it appears that he is
attributing to Descartes the need to demonstrate, that is,
to remove the slightest doubt about, the veracity of the
following principle:
(FI) For any proposition p, that p is
indubitable for S at t entails
that jd is true.
Frankfurt's position on question (5) is that the role
25
Letter to Regius, May 24, 1640. (cf. Kenny, op. cit
pp. 73, 7 4 .) -*
26HR II, p. 333.
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Of the arguments for God's existence and non-deceiving
nature is to remove once and for all any remaining reason
for doubting the relationship between the indubitability
and the truth of all clear and distinct perceptions. But
precisely how is this to be achieved? We may recall that
Arnauld's point was:
. . . the only secure reason we havefor believing that what we clearly anddistinctly perceive is true, is thefact that God exists.
But we can be sure that God
exists, only because we clearly and
evidently perceive that; therefore
prior to being certain that God exists
we should be certain that whatever we
clearly and evidently perceive is true.^
Frankfurt's contention is that if to be certain of some-
thing is to be unable to doubt it, then on his account God's
existence can be certain for Descartes without his knowing
yet whether his clear and distinct perceptions are true.
Frankfurt argues:
For if we perceive that God's existence
follows from premises that are at the
same time also clearly and distinctly
perceived
,
then while these perceptions
occur we will be unable to doubt that
God exists even if we do not know that
whatever is clearly and distinctly
perceived is true. 28
27
Ibid
.
,
p. 92
.
28
Frankfurt, Demons
,
Dreamers and Madmen
, p. 171.
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But what about situations in which someone is not
attending to such arguments? At first glance it would
seem that God's existence and the veracity of clear and
distinct perceptions are no longer certain. Frankfurt
acknowledges that Descartes wants to maintain that once it
has been demonstrated that God exists. He is no deceiver,
and all clear and distinct perceptions are true, one need
not continue to clearly and distinctly attend to such
demonstrations in order to retain the divine guarantee that
indubitability entails truth. Frankfurt suggests a close
examination of Descartes' position on this matter reveals
what has been achieved. in Meditation V Descartes asserts:
But after I have recognized that
there is a God.
. . and that He is not
a deceiver, and from that have inferred
that what I perceive clearly and dis-
tinctly cannot fail to be true- although
I no longer pay attention to the reasons
for which I have judged this to be true,
provided that I recollect having clearly
and distinctly perceived it, no contrary
reason can be brought forward which could
ever cause me to doubt of its truth; and
thus I have a true and certain knowledge „
of it. 29
And Frankfurt argues;
Notice what he [Descartes] claims to
be the case when he recollects having
perceived that God guarantees the truth
of what is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived. He claims that then "no con-
trary reason can be brought forward
29
HR I, p. 184.
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that could drive me to doubt." Hedoes not assert that when he recollectsaving perceived that his principle ofevidence is true he cannot then experi-
g££ doubts as to its truth. NofUHhe deny what is in any case surely not
^eniable that he can always state thathe doubts it. His point is rather thatany such statement will be logically
capricious: he cannot, Descartes claims,
^ave 3 reason for the doubt. 30
But the question still remains: why is it unreasonable to
doubt God’s existence and all that follows from it when
someone is no longer attending to the arguments that demon-
strate it, while such doubt is not unreasonable in previous
instances of clear and distinct perceptions?
Frankfurt's response is that with respect to all other
clear and distinct perceptions there exists one and only
one reason for ever doubting them and even that reason is
only a slight one, a mere possibility. Once that reason
has been removed, Descartes no longer has any reason to
doubt. in other words, Descartes has demonstrated that
reason provides no basis for suspecting that what is
perceived by means of reason may be false. Frankfurt's
contention is that:
When reason is used in the most impec-
cable manner, the conclusion to which
it leads excludes the possibility that
there is an omnipotent demon; indeed,
it excludes the possibility that man's
30
Frankfurt, Demons
,
Dreamers and Madmen
, pp. 172-173.
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being derives from a source that is inany way defective in power or in per-
fhow
X
tb^ Descartes undertaken tohat reason provides no basis for
pgsfMdr^ - snd distinctly 31
Once the sole remaining reason for metaphysical doubt has
been removed, any remaining doubt is without basis, or in
Frankfurt's words "utterly capricious."
This interpretation enables Frankfurt to put Descartes'
entire enterprise into a particular perspective. As we
have seen in discussions of other interpretations, Descar-
tes is concerned with the problem of skepticism. m Frank-
furt's view the classical gambit of the skeptic is to
demonstrate that the use of reason leads inevitably to the
conclusion that reason is unreliable. In other words, the
skeptic offers a reductio ad absurdum by assuming the
reliability of reason and using this assumption to demon-
strate that there are very good, strong reasons to doubt
that reliability. Descartes' task is to demonstrate that
the use of reason can provide us with a demonstration that
no reason exists for us to doubt that reliability. For
Frankfurt what is essential in Meditation III is not just
the demonstration that a benign God exists, but, more
importantly, the demonstration that reason gives us such
results. Frankfurt concludes:
31
Ibid .
, p. 173.
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It is evident that Descartes's
argument does not suffer from the
commonly charged circularity. Meta-physical doubt concerns the truth of
what is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived, and the removal of this doubtis effected without assuming that
what is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived is true. it is removed simply
oy the knowledge that a certain demon-
stration has been successfully accom-plished. This knowledge is, of course,that certain things have been clearly
and distinctly perceived. But that thetruth of these things be supposed is
not required, and so the question is
not begged. All that is relevant to
the removal of metaphysical doubt is
that the skeptic's reductio be dis-
covered not to materialize and thisdiscovery can be made and recalled
without anything clearly and distinctly
perceived being supposed to be true. 32
If we return to principle (FI), on Frankfurt's inter-
pretation Descartes has succeeded, not in proving the truth *
of (FI)
,
but in removing all grounds for doubting (FI)
. As
Frankfurt points out, Descartes admits:
What is it to us, though perchance
some one feigns that that, of the
truth of which we are so firmly
persuaded, appears false to God or
to an Angel, and hence is, absolutely
speaking, false? What heed do we pay
to that absolute falsity, when we by
no means believe that it exists or
even suspect its existence? We have
assumed a conviction so strong that
nothing can remove it, and this
32
Ibid
.
,
p. 177.
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persuasion is clearly the sameperfect certitude.
One point should be made before turning to an assess-
ment of Frankfurt's account. Frankfurt mentions that a
distinction exists between two senses of indubitability
,
a
descriptive and a normative sense. There is another dis-
tinction implicit in his account. And this distinction ha
a corresponding one with respect to doubt. The doubt of
Meditation I is doubt about whether one's beliefs are
certain. The doubt of Meditation III is doubt about the
relationship between certainty and truth. Thus, the indub
itability achieved in Meditation II with the Cogito
,
sum,
sum res cogitans, and other first principles is distinct
from the certainty achieved by the demonstration that a
non-deceiving God exists. Part of the distinction, which
I am suggesting is implicit in Frankfurt's account, is
accurate, as I hope to demonstrate in discussing Feldman's
account later in Chapter IV. Part of the distinction is
inaccurate, as I hope to show in discussing the accounts
of Gewirth and Kenny shortly. I mention the distinction
because it has a bearing on a criticism of Frankfurt's
account offered by Nakhnikian in his article that I dis-
cussed in the preceeding chapter. 34 Nakhnikian contends
33
HR II, p. 41.
34
Cf. Chapter II, particularly note 37.
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that Frankfurt is mistaken in assuming, that in success-
fully demonstrating the removal of reasons to doubt the
veracity of clear and distinct perceptions, Descartes has
avoided circular reasoning. Nakhnikian claims that there
are two necessary conditions for a successful demonstra-
tion
:
(i) There exists a relevant valid deductive
argument and
(ii) The premises of this argument are true.
Nakhnikian' s contention is that one knows with metaphysical
certainty that a demonstration exists only if he knows with
metaphysical certainty that conditions (i) and (ii) are
satisfied
.
If Frankfurt's position is that the normative indubi-
tability of the premises of the argument for God's
existence provides Descartes with metaphysical certainty of
the conclusion, then Nakhnikian's criticism is a valid one.
And, in fact, there is some reason to believe that this is
a position which Frankfurt holds. If metaphysical doubt is
doubt about the veracity of clear and distinct perceptions
and the normative indubitability of the conclusion that God
exists removes that doubt, thereby providing us with meta-
physical certainty that He exists and that all one's clear
and distinct perceptions are true, then Frankfurt's inter-
pretation is open to Nakhnikian's criticism.
102
But Frankfurt
' s position need not be interpreted in
this way. Consistent with his account, metaphysical doubt
could be defined in terms of the existence of one proposi-
tion, that a malevolent omnipotent deity exists, the
possibility of which casts doubt on the veracity of all
clear and distinct perceptions. Metaphysical certainty,
in turn, could be defined in terms of the normative indubi-
tabllity that such a proposition is false. Thus, the
normative indubitability that God exists and is no deceiver
makes it indubitable, in the appropriate normative sense,
for Descartes that the proposition, a malevolent omnipotent
deity exists, is false. As a result all normatively
indubitable propositions, that is, all clearly and distinct
ly perceived propositions, become metaphysically certain.
None of this is worked out by Frankfurt, nor do I intend to
do so at this point. Interpretations yet to be considered,
particularly Feldman's, examine this kind of an approach in
considerable detail. My point is simply that Frankfurt’s
account need not fail in allowing Descartes to avoid circu-
lar reasoning for the reasons Nakhnikian suggests. There
is, however, one presupposition of Nakhnikian' s criticism
which does bear on Frankfurt's account, an evaluation of
which I shall now consider.
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As I indicated prior to considering Nakhnikian's
criticism, Frankfurt ends his account by suggesting that
Descartes was less concerned with whether clear and dis-
tinct perceptions are true than with whether any reasons
exist for believing otherwise. The last passage I quoted
from Descartes' replies to the second set of objections is
interpreted by Frankfurt as committing Descartes to a
coherence, rather than a correspondence, theory of truth.
With respect to that passage Frankfurt contends:
Descartes evidently recognizes that hisposition entails that from our knowing
something with perfect certitude itdoes not follow that it is, "speaking
absolutely," true.
. .
What he suggests is that if some-
thing that is perfectly certain may be
absolutely false, then the notions of
absolute truth and absolute falsity areirrelevant to the purposes of inquiry.
His account makes it clear that the
notion of truth that is relevant is a
notion of coherence. 35
But Frankfurt is mistaken in attributing a coherence theory
of truth to Descartes. Ignoring for the moment the passage
Frankfurt, Demons
, Dreamers and Madmen, p. 179. When
Nakhnikian argues that conditions (i) and (ii) must beknown with metaphysical certainty, I take him to be using
'know' m the sense that 'S knows that p' entails that pis true. Frankfurt may have been of the opinion that hispostscript attributing a coherence theory of truth to
Descartes circumvents Nakhnikian's criticism, although hedoes not explicitly say so. But he would be mistaken.
Nakhnikian is correct even on a coherence theory of
truth
.
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he cites, there is at least one statement made by Descartes
elsewhere that appears to contradict explicitly Frankfurt's
interpretation. As was pointed out in the discussion of
Morris' account in the preceeding chapter, Descartes states
in a letter to Mersenne:
• . . the word truth
, in the strict
sense, denotes the conformity of thoughtWi th its object and that when it is
attributed to things outside thought,
it means only that they can be the
objects of true thoughts.
. .
36
It seems quite evident that in this passage Descartes is
committed to a correspondence, rather than a coherence,
theory of truth.
The textual evidence just cited indicates that Frank-
furt's explanation of the passage from the replies is
incorrect. But then, what might Descartes be suggesting?
One possible explanation is that Descartes is considering
the position of someone who, for the purposes of dis-
cussion, pretends that clear and distinct perceptions are
false. And Descartes' response is that one need not pay
any attention to such pretension since we have no reason to
even suspect it to be the case.
There is one additional criticism I wish to make of
Frankfurt's account. He defines the normative indubita-
Letter to Mersenne, October 16, 1639. (cf. Kenny, op .
cit
.
,
pp. 65-66 .
)
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bility achieved in MeditationJI in terms of ’'what there is
no reason to doubt or what there can be no reason to
doubt." 37 He claims later that to perceive a proposition
clearly and distinctly is to perceive that "there is no
reasonable basis for him to withhold assent or to doubt." 38
But metaphysical certainty is also explicated in terms of
such a basis. The argument for a benevolent God that
exists (which establishes metaphysical certainty) demon-
strates that "reason provides no basis for doubting." 39 i
agree with Frankfurt that the certainty achieved in Medita
—
°n 11 has an ePistemic component. But his failure to
distinguish adequately between the doubt achieved in Medi-
tation^ (which the certainty in Meditation II overcomes)
and the doubt raised in Meditation III makes the corres-
ponding distinction between normative indubitability and
metaphysical certainty unclear.
Consider a particular proposition that is clearly and
distinctly perceived by Descartes prior to his demonstra-
tion that a benevolent God exists. According to Frank-
furt's analysis, to perceive a proposition clearly and
distinctly is to perceive that there is no reasonable basis
37 ^Cf. page 87
3 8
Cf. page 92
39
Cf. page 98
this chapter,
this chapter,
this chapter.
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to doubt the proposition. if no reason exists to doubt
then the proposition is normatively indubitable for
Descartes. But the hypothesis of a deceitful deity does
provide a reason for doubting the proposition. why then
it.
does the proposition remain normatively indubitable while
metaphysically uncertain? On the other hand, if the
hypothesis of a deceitful deity does not provide a reason
to doubt the proposition in question, why isn't the propo-
sition metaphysically as well as normatively indubitable?
The lack of clarity concerning the distinction between
doubt removed by normative indubitability and that removed
by metaphysical certainty makes it appear that either some
clearly and distinctly perceived propositions are meta-
physically certain prior to the demonstration of God's
existence (since there exists no reason to doubt them) or,
even while attending to such propositions clearly and
distinctly, we can be aware of a reason to doubt them and,
hence, they are not indubitable even in the normative
sense
.
Either alternative is undesirable. The former would
commit Descartes to a partial autonomy of reason and as
such would be inconsistent with Frankfurt's overall inter-
pretation. And, as I demonstrated in Chapter II, it is
inconsistent with the textual evidence. The latter alter-
native would prevent Frankfurt's interpretation from
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allowing Descartes out of the circle.
For the reasons I have just given I do not believe
Frankfurt has provided a satisfactory interpretation of
Descartes. However, the distinction that he argues for
between the indubitability achieved in Meditation IT and
the certainty achieved in Meditation III is instructive.
It points to an approach to Descartes that, I shall argue
later, succeeds in freeing him from apparent circular
reasoning. I would now like to turn to a consideration of
another account of Descartes that makes explicit a distinc
tion between two types of certainty in the Meditations
.
Perhaps the first Cartesian commentator to make an
explicit distinction between two types of certainty in the
Meditations is Alan Gewirth. in "The Cartesian Circle" 40
and "The Cartesian Circle Revisited" 41 Gewirth develops an
account of Descartes' enterprise in terms of this distinc-
tion which he claims allows Descartes to avoid the accusa-
tion of circular reasoning. And in order to understand
Gewirth's position with respect to questions (1), (2), and
40Alan Gewirth, "The Cartesian Circle," Philosophical
Review Vo 1. 4 (1941), pp. 368-395.
41
Alan Gewirth, "The Cartesian Circle Revisited,"
of Philosophy Vol. 67 (1970), pp. 668-685.
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(3), it is necessary to begin with an explanation of what
Gewirth means with respect to one type of certainty.
Gewirth sometimes terms one type of certainty 'intui-
tional' certainty, other times
'psychological' certainty. 42
I shall use the latter. About this type of certainty
Gewirth has the following to say:
Intuitional certainty consists in themmd s immediate and unfailing assentto, or the belief in the truth of,
whatever it intuits or directly per-
ceives clearly and distinctly:
"I am
of such a nature that so long as I
very clearly and distinctly perceive
something I cannot refrain from believ-ing it to be true" (HR I, p. 183).
Descartes emphasizes, however, that
this intuitional certainty is a fact
only about the mind's reaction to aperception
,
and is not of itself a
sufficient guarantee of the perception's
truth; hence he insists that even
intuitional certainties are not the
same as metaphysical certainty, since
they leave open a possible reason for
metaphysical doubt and hence reguire
guarantee by God. 43
Since the notion of psychological certainty appears to be
intimately
.connected with the notions of clarity and dis-
tinctness, in order to determine precisely what Gewirth
In his initial article, Gewirth uses the term 'psycho-logical'. in his later article he uses 'intuitional'.
In a response to certain criticism made by Kenny, Gewirth
again uses the term 'psychological'. Thus, all textual
evidence points to the two terms as being interchangeable
for Gewirth.
Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy
, p. 672.
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means by psychological certainty
on what he takes the notions of
be. About the latter he says:
, some light should be shed
clarity and distinctness to
Clearness and distinctness are internalqualities, m that they characterize
p rceptive acts and ideas in relationto one another. To put it briefly, anidea and a perceptive act are clear anddistinct when the mind in perceiving
^
ea aware of the idea's contentsnd logical relations, and when it attri-butes to the idea that and only that whichis justified by those contents and
relations. 44
Gewirth appears to be suggesting, among other things, that
the relationship between psychological certainty and
c -*-arity and distinctness is this:
(Gl) A proposition £ is psychologically certain
for S at t if and only if s clearly and
distinctly perceives that £ at t.
But what then is the relationship, if any, between either
clarity and distinctness or psychological certainty and
truth? Gewirth continues:
Truth, on the other hand, is an external
quality, since it consists in a relation
of "conformity" between an idea or
thought and an extra-ideational thing or
object. From this it follows not only
that clearness and distinctness are not
the same as truth but also that the mind
can ascertain whether its perceptions are
clear and distinct without ascertaining
whether they are true. 45
44
Ibid
.
,
45
Ibid.
p. 680.
110
Given that the mind can ascertain whether its percep-
tions are clear and distinct without ascertaining whether
they are true, one might be led to believe that Gewirth is
claiming that the psychological certainty of a proposition
doesn't involve
sition. This is
his criticism of
any certainty of the truth of that propo-
precisely the point that Kenny makes in
Gewirth 's account. 46 But to do so would
be wrong. Gewirth wishes to make a distinction between the
certainty of the truth of a proposition and the truth of
that proposition. Psychological certainty involves the
former but not the latter. Gewirth, in a rejoinder to
Kenny, asserts, "Kenny is right in pointing out that psycho
logical certainty as well as metaphysical certainty con-
cerns truth.
.
,”
47
But this should not be construed as an
admission by Gewirth that Kenny is correct and he (Gewirth)
was wrong, for in his second article he asserts:
Moreover
. . . the mind cannot have
present clear and distinct perceptions,
or intuitions, without irresistibly
believing them to be true (intuitional
certainty) ... 48
46
*Anthony Kenny, "The Cartesian Circle and the Eternal
Truths," Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67 (1976) nn
700
. (cf. p. 6877. PP
*
47Alan Gewirth, "Descartes: Two Disputed Questions,"
Journal of Philosophy Vol. 68 (1971), pp. 288-298' (cf
P- 294).
48Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67, p. 680.
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Each of the passages from Gewirth's account concern-
ing psychological certainty and clarity and distinctness
respectively makes it quite clear that at the time of a
Clear and distinct perception it is impossible to doubt the
veracity of that perception. Indubitability then is a
crucial notion in Gewirth's interpretation of Descartes.
This notion has at least two possible interpretations, one
epistemic, the other psychological. As we saw in the
discussion of Frankfurt's account the epistemic notion
involves a lack of reasons for doubting.
This may be what Gewirth has in mind when he discusses
metaphysical certainty and doubt because, as we shall see
shortly, he continually stresses Descartes' reasons for
doubting. But I don't believe that this is what he had in .
mind for psychological certainty for two reasons. First,
he never mentions reasons when discussing psychological
certainty. Second, he clearly views Descartes as maintain-
ing that clarity and distinctness involves the inability to
refrain from believing. But an epistemic interpretation of
indubitability does not presuppose any such inability to
refrain from believing. One can withhold assent without
reasons being required. Furthermore, one might not be able
to bring oneself to doubt the truth of a proposition even
though there is sufficient evidence evident to him to
warrant his doubting the truth of said proposition.
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Psychological indubitability
, however, refers precisely to
the state of a person's mind in which no doubt can manifest
Itself, in other words, an inability to doubt. Hence,
psychological indubitability appears to be what Gewirth has
in mind.
What then of the relationship between indubitability
and clarity and distinctness? Quite clearly it cannot be
one of equivalence since there could be a number of propo-
sitions whose truth someone could be unable to doubt with-
out having the requisite clear and distinct percpetions.
For example, a parent might be unable to doubt a child's
honesty and yet have no clear and distinct perception that
the child is honest. In fact, there may even be evidence
to the contrary which is evident to the parent who is
unwilling to acknowledge that evidence. Clearly, however,
indubitability is a necessary condition for clarity and
distinctness. Gewirth argues:
When a clear and distinct perception,
in the sense thus far indicated, is
actually present to the mind, when, in
other words, an idea is being intuited,
and not merely remembered, such intui-
tion arouses in the mind an utter con-
viction that the idea is true.
This suggests that the relationship between clarity and
distinctness and indubitability is as follows:
49
Gewirth, Philosophical Review
, p. 371.
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(G2) A proposition E is clearly and distinctly
perceived by s at t only if R is indubi .
table for S at t (i.e., s is unable to
refrain from believing that £ at t)
.
Conditions (Gl) and (G2) by substitution give us:
(G3) A proposition £ is psychologically certain
for s at t only if £ i s indubitable for s
at t.
Is there a type of doubt in Gewirth's account which
corresponds to psychological certainty? The only mention
of doubt that is distinguished from his notion of meta-
physical doubt occurs within the context of a discussion
about other interpretations of Descartes. Gewirth states:
This kind of doubt, which Descartes
himself calls "metaphysical," is of adifferent order from the operational
and conceptual doubts discussed above.
Both these kinds of doubts are strictly
confined to internal considerations,
that is, to the mind's operations on
its own ideas or perceptions and to the
conceptual characteristics of the propo-
sitions that result from those operations.
But the metaphysical doubt, which bears
on truth, is concerned with external
considerations.
. .
50
According to Gewirth, operational doubt is directed toward
instances in which the mind performs operations that are
not intuitions, i.e., not genuine, immediate clear and
distinct perceptions. An example of one such operation
50Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67, pp. 675-676.
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would be memory. Conceptual doubt is directed toward those
necessary connections that the mind intuits as holding
between simple natures. Mathematical propositions are
examples of those things that are subject to conceptual
doubt.
At first glance either of these would seem to make an
ideal candidate for a type of doubt corresponding to psycho-
logical certainty. But to suggest this would be to misread
Gewirth entirely. First, both conceptual doubt and opera-
tional doubt are examples of interpretations of metaphysi-
cal doubt that Gewirth is explicitly rejecting. Second, a
notion of psychological doubt would have no role in his
interpretation of the Meditations
. To see why this is the
case we must now turn to a consideration of Gewirth 's
position on question (1)
.
In the earlier of his two articles Gewirth divides
Descartes' enterprise in the Meditations into four main
parts: (1) the universal doubt with which Descartes'
enterprise begins; (2) the intuition of the Cogito
, and the
inferring therefrom of the general rule of clarity and
distinctness; (3) the renewal of the universal doubt (in
the Circle Passage); and (4) the series of clear and dis-
tinct perceptions, the conclusion of which is the clear and
distinct perception of the existence and veracity of
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God. NOW the doubt which arises just prior to the argu-
ment for an existent veracious God is obviously metaphysi-
cal doubt. Since Gewirth states that the doubt raised
therein is a "renewal of the universal doubt," the 'univer
sal doubt' raised in Meditation I must be metaphysical in
nature. And from his statements it is apparent that this
doubt is intended to extend to all propositions including
mathematical ones. He contends, however, that the entire
procedure in Meditation I does not involve doubting any
clear and distinct perceptions. Were it otherwise, he
contends
:
• . . the mathematical propositions
impugned [later in Meditation III !
could not be doubted! for logically
they are clear and distinct, and were
the mind attending to them directly it
would be psychologically compelled to
assent to them as true. ^2
And in support of this Gewirth cites Descartes
' remarks in
his reply to the seventh set of objections. "in the first
Meditation I supposed that I was not attending to whatever
I clearly perceived." 53 Thus, Gewirth does not need to
establish a notion of psychological doubt. One and only
one doubt, the metaphysical one, suffices.
Gewirth, Philosophical Review
, p. 379.
52
Ibid
. ,
p . 380 .
53HR II, p. 266.
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Gewirth
' s position on question (2) is that the Coqito
is the initial first principle with which Descartes
achieves psychological certainty. He states:
• • • the cogito rests more exclusively
upon a psychological basis than does
any other intuition, since it expresses
simply that the thinker's thinkingimplies his existing. Hence,
.
. . the
cogito becomes the principle and the
most cogent proposition of metaphysics;in an exposition following the order ofintuitively perceived certainties, the
g-°9itQ is the presupposition of every
other cognition. Y 54
What the Cogito accomplishes is explained by Gewirth as
follows
:
The cogito is not the major premise of
an argument of which the general rule
is the conclusion, but it is simply
the instance which leads the mind
explicitly to hit upon or discover the
rule in that context. 55
The rule in question is, of course, the principle of
clarity and distinctness. And this brings us to question
(3) .
Gewirth' s response to question (3) is that:
The rule, then, is.
. . the general
expression of what has been experienced
in the particular instance of the
cogito : that clear and distinct per-
ceptions are so coercive in their effect
upon the mind that the mind cannot help
assenting to them as true at the time
Gewirth, Philosophical Review
,
p. 382.
55 T ,Ibid
.
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that it has such perceptions. The
metaphysical proof of the truth of
clear and distinct perceptions,
through the existence of God, still
remains to be attained. 56
For Gewirth, then, clarity and distinctness provides
Descartes with psychological certainty. But it does not
provide him with metaphysical certainty. That remains to
be achieved by demonstrating that God exists and is no
deceiver. And this, explains Gewirth, is why Descartes
claims not to have established the truth of that principle
until Meditation IV .
In order to determine Gewirth 's position with respect
to questions (4) and (5), we must now turn to his explica-
tion of metaphysical doubt and certainty. As we saw
earlier m his explication of psychological certainty, he
contrasted it with metaphysical certainty. To reiterate:
. . . intuitional certainty.
. . is
not of itself a sufficient guarantee
of a perception's truth; hence, he
[Descartes] insists that even intui-
tional certainties are not the same as
metaphysical certainty.
. .
57
About metaphysical doubt Gewirth asserts:
. . . metaphysical doubt concerns only
the truth of clear and distinct percep-
tions.
. .
56
, . ,Ibid
.
, pp. 382-383.
57Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67, p. 672.
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It must be emphasized that the
metaphysical doubt concerns only
whether clear and distinct perceptions
are true.
. .
* 58
One plausible interpretation of the distinction that
Gewirth is attempting to make between metaphysical cer-
tainty and psychological certainty is that while we are
clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular proposition
we are unable to doubt (in the psychological sense) the
truth of that proposition (given condition (G2) ) , we can
still doubt (in the epistemic sense, i.e., we can still
have reason for doubting) the truth of the proposition that
we clearly and distinctly perceived. in other words,
psychological certainty entails psychological indubita-
bility about a particular proposition, but it does not
entail epistemic indubitability about the relationship
between the clarity and distinctness of that proposition
and its truth. This distinction suggests that the follow-
ing conditions are implicit in Gewirth' s account:
(G5) A proposition £ is metaphysically doubtful
for S at t if and only if (i) jo is not
psychologically certain for S at t, or
(ii) it is possible that (p> is clearly
and distinctly perceived by S at t and
£ is false) .
58
Ibid
.
,
p . 6 80 .
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(G6) A proposition £ is metaphysically certain
for S at t if and only if (i) £ i s psycho-
logically certain for S at t, and (ii) it
is not possible that (£ is clearly and
distinctly perceived by S at t and £ is
false)
.
(I will comment on the notion of possibility in (ii) later.)
Gewirth's response to question (4) is now apparent.
The hypothesis of a deceiving God that is raised in the
Circle Passage casts doubt on the veracity of clear and
distinct perceptions. He argues:
Descartes s hypothesis of a deceiving
God, which.
. . is his only reason fordoubting that clear and distinct percep-
tions are true, is and is set forth as
a reason
.
59
At this point we might be tempted to conclude that
Gewirth's response to question (5) is that the psycho-
logical certainty of the premises and hence the conclu-
sions of the arguments demonstrating that God exists and is
no deceiver removes that reason for metaphysical doubt and
thus provides metaphysical certainty that all our clear and
distinct perceptions are true. But if we recall Nakhni—
kian's point with regard to Frankfurt's account discussed
earlier in this chapter, this response won't do. And
Gewirth is aware of this. He warns:
59
Ibid
.
,
p . 681
.
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. . . the very nature of Descartes's
metaphysical problem requires a passagefrom psychological to metaphysical
certainty; requires, that is to say,that the conclusion be more certainthan its premises, not in the sense ofhaving greater psychological certainty,but in the sense of having a metaphysi-
cal certainty which they initially lack.
• . . since in the course of the
metaphysical argument even intuitions
are declared subject to metaphysical
doubt, any conclusion achieved by
their means, even if its matter be
metaphysical certainty, will be
similarly dubitable. The mind will
s till, so to speak, be only psycho-
logically certain of its metaphysical
_
certainty.
. .
60
How then does Gewirth propose to circumvent this
problem? To determine that we must return to his response
to question (4). He contends that the hypothesis of a
deceiving God is Descartes' only reason for metaphysical
doubt. He argues further:
We must now ask about the status
of the reason on which Descartes's
metaphysical doubt rests. Obviously,
he does not set it forth as true, let
alone as necessarily true. He calls
it a "valid and meditated reason."
But what is the criterion of this
validity? It is that the hypothesis
of a deceiving God may be clear and
distinct. For there are no other
criteria of validity available to
Descartes.
6 0Gewirth
,
^Gewirth,
Philosophical Review
, pp. 378, 379.
Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67, p. 681.
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Based on this contention Gewirth’s response to question (5)
is as follows:
Descartes's metaphysical argumentproceeds to show, by the use of clear
and distinct perceptions, that thehypothesis of a deceiving God on whichthe metaphysical doubt rests is not
clear and distinct. The proposition
that is perceived to be clear and dis-tinct is rather that, since God is
supremely perfect, he is not a deceiver,
that is, he is veracious. 62
But how does this response get us to the truth of clear and
distinct perceptions? Gewirth acknowledges that his account
thus far leaves such a question unanswered. He admits:
But what has this to do with
truth? Are we to say that "God is not
a deceiver" is true? If we do say this,
then how can this truth be derived from*
the proposition's clearness and distinct-
ness without begging the question? if
we do not say that it is true, then how
does it help to prove that clear and
distinct perceptions are true? 63
His response is:
In answer to these questions, it
must be kept in mind that the proposi-
tion "God is a deceiver" (GD) is a
validating reason for "Clear and dis-
tinct perceptions are not true" (
—
(CT )
)
only insofar as GD purports to be clear
and distinct. Hence, if one can show
(by using clear and distinct perceptions)
that GD is not clear and distinct, but
that what is clear and distinct is
rather - (GD)
,
then one has removed the
62
Ibid
.
,
p. 682.
63 Ibid
.
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only validating reason for - (CT)
Thereby too one has validated~CT,
that is, that clear and distinct per-
ceptions are true, for since one has
removed the only reason for doubting
or rejecting it, it is now completely
indubitable. 7 64
This suggests that we can attribute the following definition
to Gewirth's account:
(G7) p is a validating reason for S at t to
doubt that cr is true ( i ) it is possible
that (jo is clearly and distinctly perceived
by S at t)
,
and ( i i ) £ provides S with
sufficient evidence to believe at t that
2 is false.
(I will comment on the notion of possibility in (i) later.)
The account given thus far indicates that while condi-
tions (G5 ) and (G6) are consistent with Gewirth's account,
they do not adequately capture his intentions. Neither
incorporates the notion of a validating reason which,
according to Gewirth, Descartes employs in attempting to
achieve epistemic indubitability about the relationship
between the clear and distinct perception of a proposition
and its truth. But by employing definition (G7) I believe
I can provide a more accurate interpretation of what Gewirth
intends metaphysical doubt and certainty to mean. Consider
the following definition:
64 Ibid
.
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(G8) £ is metaphysically doubtful for S at
=
df (i) £ is not Psychologically certain
for S at t, or
(ii) £ is clearly and distinctly perceived
by S at t and (E£) (£ is a validating
reason for S at t to doubt that £ is true)
(G9) £ is metaphysically certain for S at t =
/ * \ * ci f
'
1
' £ 1S psychologically certain for S
at t, and
(ii)
-(E£) (£ is a validating reason for
S at t to doubt that £ is true)
.
Definitions (G8) and (G9) can be used to demonstrate how
Gewirth 's account avoids the difficulty suggested by
Nakhnikian and acknowledged by Gewirth. The psychological
certainty of the premises and hence the conclusions of the
arguments for God's existence and non-deceiving nature do
not give us metaphysical certainty of either the conclu-
sions or the veracity of clear and distinct perceptions
directly. Rather, the psychological certainty of the
conclusions removes the only validating reason for meta-
physical doubt. Thus, condition (ii) of definition (G9) is
fulfilled. As a result all psychologically certain proposi-
tions, that is, all propositions which are clearly and
distinctly perceived, become metaphysically certain.
Thus, Gewirth' s position on question (5) is not dis-
similar from that of Frankfurt. On Frankfurt's account
what Descartes has succeeded in demonstrating is that we
have no reason to doubt that our clear and distinct percep-
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tions are true. On Gewirth's account what Descartes has
succeeded in demonstrating is that we have no
-good reason to
doubt our clear and distinct perceptions. Does Gewirth's
account, therefore, fall prey to the same criticisms that I
offered against Frankfurt's account? To determine this I
shall now turn to an assessment of Gewirth's interpretation
of Descartes' enterprise in the Meditations
.
One criticism of Frankfurt was that he was mistaken in
attributing a coherence theory of truth to Descartes. Does
Gewirth's account succumb to the same criticism. I think
not. We may recall that Gewirth states:
Truth.
. . is an external quality,
since it consists in a relation of
"conformity" between an idea or
thought and an extra-ideational
thing or object. 65
Thus, Gewirth explicitly acknowledges that Descartes sub-
scribes to a correspondence theory of truth.
But there remains the question of how 'possibility' in
clause (i) of definition (G7) is to be interpreted. One
interpretation is logical possibility. On this interpreta-
tion the logical possibility of the proposition 'GD is
clearly and distinctly perceived' makes that proposition a
validating reason for Descartes to doubt the veracity of his
65
Ibid
.
,
p. 680
.
125
dear and distinct perceptions. ^ fay ^ ^
ar and (Jistinct perceptions are metaphysically doubtful
once he has demonstrated the logical impossibility of 'gd is
clearly and distinctly perceived', Descartes has removed the
one validating reason for metaphysical doubt and by defini-
tion (G9, he has achieved the metaphysical certainty that
his clear and distinct perceptions are true. But how is
Descartes to demonstrate the logical impossibility of 'GD is
clearly and distinctly perceived'. Gewirth would have to
maintain that it is entailed by the contingent proposition
'-(GD) is clearly and distinctly perceived'. This interpre-
tation would also give the contingent proposition 'GD is not
Clearly and distinctly perceived' the status of a necessary
truth. Thus, if possibility in clause (i) is interpreted as
logical possibility, (G7) is seriously flawed.
A second interpretation of possibility in clause (i) is
eprstemic. This is suggested by Gewirth 's emphasis on rea-
sons for doubting for Descartes. Since metaphysical doubt
is doubt with reasons, perhaps the possibility is meta-
physical in nature. Consider the following:
(G10) £ is a metaphysical possibility for S at
^ df £ not metaphysically certain
for S at t.
(Gil) £ is a metaphysical impossibility for S
at t =df is metaphysically certain for
S at t
.
On this interpretation the metaphysical possibility of 'GD
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15 ClSarly ^ diStlnct^ Perceived' makes that propositlon
a vaiidating reason for Descartes to doubt the veracity of
hlS ° lear and distinct Perceptions. And by definition (G8)
his clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically doubt-
ful. once Descartes has demonstrated the metaphysical
impossibility of ’GD is clearly and distinctly perceived’,
he has removed the one validating reason for metaphysical
doubt and by definition (G9) he has achieved the metaphysi-
cal certainty that his clear and distinct perceptions are
true. But how is Descartes to demonstrate the metaphysical
possibility of GD is clearly and distinctly perceived’?
According to definition (Gil) he must demonstrate the meta
physical certainty of 'GD is not clearly and distinctly
perceived'. But this puts Descartes in the position of
having to make a particular proposition metaphysically cer
tain by clearly and distinctly perceiving it in order to
make metaphysically certain that his clear and distinct
perceptions are true. This is clearly circular; metaphysi-
cal possibility will not provide a satisfactory interpreta-
tion of possibility in clause (i) of definition (G7)
.
A third alternative is to interpret the possibility as
psychological. This interpretation is suggested by Gewirth
himself when he asserts:
. . . the "valid and meditated reasons"
upon which the [metaphysical] doubt is
based are . . . regarded not as meta-
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physically certain or true, but aspsychologically cogent because
possibly clear and distinct.
. .
On the basis of this I suggest the following:
(G12) p is a psychological possibility for S
at =
df BE is not a psychological
impossibility for S at t
.
(G13) £ is a psychological impossibility for
s at =
£f i is a psychological
certainty for S at t.
On this interpretation the psychological possibility of 'GD
is clearly and distinctly perceived' makes that proposition
a validating reason for Descartes to doubt the veracity of
his clear and distinct perceptions. By definition (G8) his
clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically doubtful.
Once Descartes has demonstrated the psychological impossi-
bility of 'GD is clearly and distinctly perceived', he has
removed the one validating reason for metaphysical doubt
and by definition (G9) he has achieved the metaphysical
certainty that his clear and distinct perceptions are
veracious. How is the psychological impossibility of 'GD
is clearly and distinctly perceived' achieved? By demon-
strating that — (GD) i
s
clearly and distinctly perceived
Descartes has demonstrated that 'GD is not clearly and
distinctly perceived' is psychologically certain. And by
66Gewirth, Philosophical Review
, p. 392. (Italics mine)
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definition (G13) we obtain that 'GD is clearly and distinct-
ly perceived' is a psychological impossibility for Des-
cartes. The circularity encountered with a metaphysical
interpretation of possibility in definition (G7) is avoided
with a psychological interpretation.
But is definition (G7) thereby free of other problems?
I think not. Let us recall Gewirth's account of Descartes'
procedure (with the notion of psychological possibility in
mind)
:
GD is a validating reason for - (CT)
only if it's psychologically possible
that 'GD is clear and distinct'. Hence
^ one can show that GD is not clear
and distinct but that what is clear
and distinct is - (GD)
,
then GD is no
longer a validating reason for - (CT)
But how does Descartes show that GD is not clear and dis-
tinct? He cannot do so in a straightforward manner. if a
person S is not attending to a proposition £, then £ is
not clear and distinct. Descartes must demonstrate it by
proving that its negation is clear and distinct. What I am
suggesting is that the following condition can be attributed
to Descartes:
(G14 ) A proposition £ is clearly and distinctly
perceived by S at t only if
-£ is not
clearly and distinctly perceived by S
at t
.
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The latter part of Gewirth
' s explanation of Descartes' pro-
cedure is consistent with (G14). That is, we can interpret
. . one can show that GD is not clear and distinct but
that what is clear and distinct is - (GD)
. . as meaning
"one can show that GD is not clear and distinct by showing
that what is clear and distinct is - (GD) . " But Gewirth 1 s
notion of a validating reason unnecessarily complicates the
matter. By proving that - (GD) is clear and distinct,
Descartes is demonstrating that GD is not clear and distinct.
But given definition (G7) what Descartes ends up demonstrat-
ing is that 'GD is not clear and distinct' is psychologi-
cally certain. But given condition (Gl) Descartes can
succeed in demonstrating this if and only if he demonstrates
that 'GD is not clear and distinct' is perceived clearly and
distinctly. And the need to clearly and distinctly per-
ceive the lack of clarity and distinctness of a proposition
is an unnecessary complication.
Where did Gewirth go astray? Anthony Kenny in "The
Cartesian Circle and The Eternal Truths" 67 suggests that
Gewirth
' s notion of a validating reason is not supported by
textual evidence. Granted that Descartes does state near
the close of Meditation I that:
67
Kenny, o£. cit .
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1
‘ • there is nothing in all that Iormerly believed to be true, of whichi cannot m some measure doubt,for reasons which are very powerful
and maturely considered [validae
rationes l . — 68
Kenny contends that 'validae' does not mean 'valid' in any
technical sense but merely 'strong'. He points to Des-
cartes' comment in his replies to the seventh set of objec-
tions, "For we may well enough be compelled to doubt by
arguments that are in themselves doubtful.
.
.,"
69
to
support his contention that for Descartes a reason can be
—
-
lida While In the Circle Passage Descartes also
asserts, "... the reason for doubt.
. . is very slight,
and so to speak metaphysical." 70
In his rejoinder to Kenny, Gewirth cites two additional
passages m support of his interpretation of the notion of a
validating reason. In the first, a letter to Buitendijck,
Descartes asserts:
. . . one may pretend that God is a
deceiver - even the true God, but such
that he is not known sufficiently
clearly to oneself or to the other
persons for whose sake one forms this
hypothesis
.
68
HR I, pp. 147-148.
69HR II, p. 277.
70HR I, p. 159.
71Letter to Buitendijck, 1643. (cf. Kenny, op. cit.
,
p.
145.) The translation quoted is Gewirth's. It does not
differ appreciably from that provided by Kenny.
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Gewirth claims that Descartes is obviously suggesting that
the hypothesis is thought to be possibly clear and distinct
at this point. But the only way the passage can be inter-
preted consistent with Gewirth 's claim is to attribute the
clause "such that he is not known sufficiently clearly" as
referring to the pretension of God as a deceiver and to
translate "not known sufficiently clearly" as "possibly
clear and distinct." On the other hand, if we read the
passage as attributing the clause to the true God, all we
are committed to is the pretension of a deceiving God in
the absence of a clear and distinct perception to the
contrary. On this reading there is nothing to suggest that
the pretension must be possibly clear and distinct.
The second passage to which Gewirth points occurs in
discourse °n Method in which Descartes states:
• . . in trying to discover the error
or uncertainty of the propositions which
I examined, not by feeble conjectures,
but by clear and assured reasonings.
.
.
^
Gewirth maintains that by "clear and assured reasonings"
Descartes is referring to tentatively or possibly clear and
perceptions, the hypothesis of a deceiving God
being one such possibility. Now there are two ways to read
this passage. One is that by clear and assured reasoning
Descartes is not referring to clear and distinct percep-
72HR I, p. 99.
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tions. If so, then Gewirth is mistaken in suggesting that
this passage supports his interpretation of the notion of
a validating reason. On the other hand, if by clear and
assured reasoning Descartes does mean clear and distinct
perceptions, then it is not their possibility which makes
them validating reasons but their actuality. On this
interpretation Descartes is asserting that the reasons for
uncertainty are clear and distinct, not possibly clear and
distinct. This interpretation suggests that if Descartes
has the notion of a validating reason in mind, its explica-
tion is not captured by (G7), but by the following:
(G7) £ is a validating reason for S at t to
doubt that £ is true = (i) £ i s
clearly and distinctly perceived by S at
t, and (ii) £ provides S with sufficient
evidence to believe at t that £ is false.
On this interpretation of the notion of a validating reason
it is not the existence of such a reason which causes meta-
physical doubt, it is the possibility that such a reason
exists. How this possibility is to be explicated remains
to be seen. Feldman suggests one alternative which will be
examined in the next chapter. I will suggest another in
Chapter V. My point here is that such an interpretation is
consistent with Descartes' description of metaphysical
doubt in the Circle Passage. It may not be consistent with
his description of doubt near the close of Meditation I.
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AS we have seen, Gewirth interprets that doubt as meta-
Physical doubt. In this I believe he is mistaken. As I
intend to demonstrate in Chapter V, Descartes is not con-
cerned with metaphysical doubt until the Circle Passage in
Meditation III
, The doubt raised in Medltatlon T ^
something other than metaphysical doubt. Gewirth's failure
to realize that there exists a type of doubt corresponding
to psychological certainty leads him to conclude that meta-
physical doubt is raised in Meditation I
. And that con-
clusion, in turn, leads him to develop a notion of validat-
ing reason which, I have argued, is confused, unnecessarily
complicated, and lacking in textual support.
Would an account of Descartes' enterprise which
includes a notion of psychological doubt provide an inter-
pretation adequate to circumvent circular reasoning? To
determine this I will consider next one such account, that
offered by Anthony Kenny.
CHAPTER IV
The first Cartesian commentator to distinguish between
two types of doubt which correspond to two types of cer-
tainty in the Meditations is Anthony Kenny. These distinc-
tions are made in both the aforementioned article, "The
Cartesian Circle and Eternal Truths," in which he comments
on Gewirth's account, and in his earlier and more extensive
treatment of Descartes' philosophy in Descartes
: A study
of His Philosophy
.
1
Because the terms he employs to dis-
tinguish between the two types of doubt and certainty not
only differ from book to article but also are not at all
well defined, it will prove helpful to provide a more
explicit explication of the terms before attempting to
determine Kenny's position on the five questions that I
raise for each interpretation of Descartes.
In his commentary on Gewirth's account, Kenny distin-
guishes between psychological doubt and psychological cer-
tainty on the one hand and metaphysical doubt and meta-
physical certainty on the other. Interestingly enough he
attributes both distinctions to Gewirth. Kenny states:
1Anthony Kenny, Descartes : A Study of His PhilosoDhv.
Random House, New York (1968).
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He [Gewirth] distinguished between
h
?i°
gical doubt ^hich is contrastedith the certainty of clear and distinctperception) and metaphysical doubt(which concerns the truth of what isclearly and distinctly perceived)
.
:
But I have argued in the preceeding chapter that not only
does Gewirth fail to identify any type of doubt corres-
ponding to psychological certainty, such a doubt would play
no role in his explanation of Descartes' purpose in the
Meditations
,
for on Gewirth
' s account it is metaphysical
doubt that is raised from the very start in Meditation T .
Kenny is apparently reading something into Gewirth
'
s
account which is not there. Kenny goes on to say:
I agree with Gewirth that the
type of doubt that Descartes says ispossible concerning clear and distinct
perceptions is a different type ofdoubt from that which he says is
impossible.
. .
3
This suggests that principles (Gl), (G2)
,
and (G3) which I
attributed to Gewirth also hold for Kenny. They are:
(Kl) £ is psychologically certain for S at t
if and only if s clearly and distinctly
perceives that £ at t.
(K2) £ is clearly and distinctly perceived
by S at t only if £ is indubitable for
S at t (i.e., S is unable to refrain
from believing that £ at t)
.
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
, p. 686.
^Ibid
.
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(K3) E is psychologically certain for s at
t only if £ is indubitable for S at t
What then are we to suggest as sufficient and neces-
sary conditions for psychological doubt? Kenny's comments
are not altogether helpful, at one point in his article he
states
:
Psychological doubt and metaphysicaldoubt are not, strictly, doubt aboutthe same proposition. The propositionsDescartes is psychologically certain
about at the beginning of the Third
Meditation are the particular proposi-tions he clearly and distinctly per-
ceives.
. . What Descartes is meta-
physically doubtful about is the generalproposition, that whatever he intuits
most evidently is true. This generaldoubt may cast doubt on the particular
propositions; but the doubt it castsis only a second-order, implicit doubt. 4
This suggests that psychological doubt is doubt about
specific propositions. But it tells us little else. in
his more extensive treatment of Descartes Kenny mentions in
passing
:
Once something has been shown to me
by natural light, Descartes says, I
cannot doubt it; but another person
who sees less clearly may doubt the
very same proposition. 5
This suggests that we might interpret psychological doubt
in terms of the negation of psychological certainty:
4
Ibid., pp. 687-688.
~*Kenny, Descartes
, p. 179.
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(K4) £ is psychologically doubtful for S at
t if and only if R i s not clearly and
distinctly perceived by S at t.
Principle (K4) allows a proposition to be psychologically
doubtful for a person in two ways: one, when the proposi-
tion is not being attended to; and two, when it is being
attended to but not clearly and distinctly.
Turning to the notions of metaphysical doubt and cer-
tainty, one discovers that, aside from the quoted passage
referring to metaphysical doubt as a second-order doubt,
Kenny does not have anything more specific to say about
such doubt in his article. if we refer to his earlier work
we discover that there exists no mention of psychological
doubt or certainty, only metaphysical doubt, metaphysical
certainty, and something called Cartesian certainty. About
the first two, Kenny at one point asserts:
. . . notice that the [Circle] passage
suggests a distinction between a first-
order doubt and a second-order doubt.
* • • this second—order doubt is the meta-
physical doubt that cannot be removed
except by proving the existence of a
veracious God. 6
This passage makes it clear that the metaphysical doubt
discussed in his later article is precisely the metaphysi-
cal doubt being articulated here. About Cartesian cer-
tainty Kenny has this to say:
6
Ibid.
,
pp. 183, 184.
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It is not enough, for Cartesian cer-ainty, that I should here and now
th^h
11
^
111917 make a true judgment one best possible grounds. it isnecessary also that I should be in sucha possiticn that I will never hereafter
reason to withdraw that judgment. 7
At this point one might be tempted to conclude that Kenny
has three types of certainty in mind: psychological, meta-
physical, and Cartesian. But to do so would be to misin-
terpret Kenny entirely. m the passage just quoted
referring to Cartesian certainty, Kenny continues:
Whenever I clearly and distinctly per-
ceive something, I cannot help judgingthat it is so, and this will be a truejudgment made on the best possiblegrounds. But until I have proved the
r
er
u
C
^y
° f God
'
1 cannot be sure that
I shall not hereafter withdraw thisjudgment under the influence of the
metaphysical suspicion of the omnipotentdeceiver. if what I have clearly anddistinctly perceived was a demonstrated
conclusion, I may later doubt it while
explicitly thinking of it. if it was
not a conclusion but an [indubitable]
axiom, I shall never change my mind
about it while it is actually before
my mind, but I can doubt it indirectly
by doubting whatever seems most evident
to me. While the possibility of even
this second-order doubt remains, I can-
not be said to be certain. ®
The latter part of this passage which stipulates what is
necessary for Cartesian certainty makes it quite clear that
7
Ibid .
,
p. 192
.
g Ibid
. (Italics mine)
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the certainty in question is being contrasted with the
second-order doubt which Kenny has repeatedly termed meta-
physical doubt. Thus, it is equally clear that Cartesian
certainty is nothing more and nothing less than metaphysi-
cal certainty.
Before attempting to provide any formal interpreta-
tions of what either metaphysical doubt or certainty mean
for Kenny, it will prove helpful to examine some of the
comments he provides to distinguish between metaphysical
certainty and psychological certainty. In contrasting the
lack of certainty raised in the Circle Passage in Medita -
—
-
on 111 with the indubitability achieved for certain
axioms in Meditation II
, Kenny asserts:
In the passages we considered
earlier in which Descartes spoke of
certain axioms as being indubitable,
we must take him to have been speaking
of the possibility of first-order doubt.
For his examples in the Third Medita-
tion make clear that no axioms are
immune to second-order doubt. First-
order indubitability is not considered
by Descartes as being, by itself, a
guarantee of truth; still less does he
use "indubitable" as equivalent to
"true." The second-order doubt is
precisely the question whe ther fTrst-
order indubitability is compatible
with falsehood
. God's truthfulness
resolves the second-order doubt by
showing that what is indubitable is
true. 9
9
Ibid
.
,
p. 184
.
(Italics mine)
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Now if we take the notion of first-order doubt and corres-
ponding indubitability to be referring to psychological
doubt and certainty respectively, and second-order doubt
and corresponding certainty to be referring to metaphysical
doubt and certainty respectively, then Kenny's account thus
far sounds very much like Gewirth's. That is, we might be
tempted to suggest that principles (G5) and <G6> hold for
Kenny's account as well as for Gewirth's:
(K5) £ is metaphysically doubtful for S at t
if and only if ( i ) £ is not psychologically
certain for S at t, or (ii) it is possible
that (£ is clearly and distinctly perceived
by S at t and £ is false)
.
(K6) £ is metaphysically certain for S at t if
and only if (i) £ i s psychologically
certain for S at t, and (ii) it is not
possible that (£ is clearly and distinctly
perceived by S at t and £ is false).
But Kenny argues otherwise. "I think, however, that
Gewirth's account of the contrast between psychological and
metaphysical certainty is misleading." 10 How is it mis-
leading? Kenny suggests:
But it is misleading to contrast meta-
physical certainty with psychological
certainty by saying that metaphysical
certainty concerns truth . For psycho-
logical certainty also concerns truth:
10
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
,
p. 686.
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certain
e
^
a
i
n
-° f soraetfling is to be
,that it is true. 11
Now I have already argued in the previous chapter that
Kenny is mistaken in attributing such a position to Gewirth.
However, the distinction between psychological certainty
and metaphysical doubt, i.e., between first-order indubita-
bility and second-order doubt, which Kenny offers in con-
trast to Gewirth, suggests that principles (K5) and (K6)
fail to capture Kenny's intentions.
In a passage quoted earlier Kenny suggests that "What
Descartes is metaphysically doubtful about is the general
proposition, that whatever he intuits most evidently is
true. This suggestion is also made in Kenny's earlier
work
.
. . . notice that the [Circle] passage
suggests a distinction between a first-
order doubt and a second-order doubtTake the proposition "What's done can-
not be undone." if i explicitly think
of this proposition, Descartes says,
I cannot at that moment doubt it, thatis, I cannot help judging that it is
true. However, though I cannot doubt
this proposition while my mind's eyeis on it, I can, as it were, turn awayfrom it and doubt it in a roundabout
manner. I can refer to it under some
general heading, such as "what seems to
me most obvious"; and I can raise the
whole question whether everything that
seems to me most obvious may not in
fact be false. I cannot, while
®^plicitly thinking of it, believe
11
Ibid .
, p. 687
.
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it to be false or even suspendjudgment about its truth. But untilI know that I was made by a veracious
^od, I can wonder whether my whole
r tUal . faCUltY may not be radi-cally deceptive - including thatfeature of it that is its inabilityto entertain first-order doubt aboutaxioms of this kind. The axioms are thus’genericany doubtful while severallyindubitable. While in doubt about the
the ^
nature
'
1 do know whetherlight of nature is a true light or aaise light. This second-order doubt isthe metaphysical doubt that cannot beremoved except by proving the existence
of a veracious God. 12
On the basis of this passage I suggest the following inter
pretation of metaphysical doubt for Kenny:
(K8) p is metaphysically doubtful for S at t
if and only if (i) £ i s psychologically
doubtful for S at t, or (ii) £ is clearly
and distinctly perceived by s at t and S
is not psychologically certain that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are
true
.
Is principle (K8) consistent with other textual evi-
dence in Kenny's account? In his later article Kenny
asserts
:
Descartes can entertain the thought
(1) For some jd, I clearly and distinctly
perceive that £, but not £.but he cannot entertain any thought that
would be an existential instantiation of
(1)
. He can also entertain the thought
(2) For some jd, I clearly and distinctly
12
Kenny, Descartes
, pp. 183-184.
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anf,
Perceived that £, but not p.
instantiationro^U) ?
Srtain existent ial
13
in order to determine how Kenny's comments here apply to
Principle <K8) I must introduce the notions of psychologi-
cal possibility and impossibility in precisely the same
manner as I did for my explication of Gewirth's account.
(K12) £ is a psychological possibility for s
at =
df '£ is not a Psychological
impossibility for S at t.
(K13) £ is a psychological impossibility for
S at 11 =
df “E a Psychological
certainty for S at t.
If Descartes can entertain the propositions expressed by
(1) and (2) in the passage just quoted, then each is a
psychological possibility for him. Thus, their negations,
i . e
. ,
U') For all £, if i clearly and distinctly
perceive that £ , then £.
(2') For all £ , if i clearly and distinctly
perceived that £, then p.
are psychologically doubtful for Descartes. And this is
precisely the state of affairs expressed by condition (ii)
of principle (K8). Thus, I contend that principle (K8)
captures Kenny's concept of what metaphysical doubt means
for Descartes.
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
, p. 689.
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Given our success with metaphysical doubt for Kenny,
we might be tempted to propose that metaphysical certainty
be interpreted in terms of the negation of metaphysical
doubt, that is,
(K9
) £ ls metaphysically certain for S at t
if and only if (i) £ is psychologically
certain for S at t, and (ii ) s is psycho-
logically certain that all his clear and
distinct perceptions are true.
In essence then, principle (K9) states that a person is
metaphysically certain about a particular proposition pro-
vided that he is psychologically certain about both the
proposition and the veracity of all his clear and distinct
perceptions
.
Does (K9 ) meet Kenny's needs? Unfortunately, it does
not. The metaphysical certainty achieved at a given time
is dependent upon the psychological certainty at that time
that all one's clear and distinct perceptions are true.
But suppose one is not attending to the general proposi-
tion. According to principle (K4) the general proposition
is, therefore, psychologically doubtful, that is, it is not
psychologically certain. Hence, by principle (K8) one no
longer has metaphysical certainty. And we may recall that
to support my argument for equating metaphysical certainty
with Cartesian certainty, I noted that Kenny maintains:
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It is not enough, for Cartesian cer-tainty
, that I should here and now
unhesitatingly make a true judgment
on the best possible grounds. it is
necessary also that I should be in
such a position that I will never
hereafter have a reason to withdraw
that judgment.
. .
What Descartes seeks, then, is
a state of mind that is in a certain
sense immutable. 14
This suggests Kenny is maintaining that the following con-
dition must hold for metaphysical certainty:
(K14
) £ is metaphysically certain for S at
t only if
-(Et 1 ) ( t * is later than t
and £ is psychologically doubtful for
S at t' )
.
But according to principle (K4) a proposition is psycho-
logically doubtful when it is not being attended to.
Principles (K4) and (K14) do not give us that immutable
state which Kenny contends Descartes is seeking.
Kenny himself does not provide a clue as to how this
immutable state is to be achieved. Having made the claim,
he proceeds with an analysis of Descartes' task which we
shall examine when discussing question (5)
.
But nothing in
the analysis or in the textual evidence he provides points
to how the immutable state is to be achieved.
14
Kenny, Descartes
,
p. 192.
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In "Anthony Kenny and the Cartesian Circle" 15 pred
Feldman and Arnold Levison take Kenny to task on this
point. They contend:
If this interpretation of Kenny'sis correct, then according to him thegoal of Descartes' speculation concern-ing the veracity of God was solely to
make it the case that he should never
again have reason to change his mind
about what he had once intuited.
Feldman and Levison argue that it is implausible to attri-
bute such an unrealistic goal to Descartes. They offer
three reasons why the proof of a veracious deity will fail
to provide the immutable state stipulated by Kenny. The
first involves a situation in which Descartes intuits that
two and three are five after proving God's existence.
Later he forgets the proof but recalls the intuition.
Doubts that he now has about God's nature should defeat the
metaphysical certainty of his intuition. The second in-
volves a situation in which Descartes intuits a complex
mathematical proposition after proving God's existence.
Later he forgets that he had the intuition but he correctly
recalls the proof. On the basis of other evidence he may
very well come to doubt the truth of the mathematical
Fred Feldman and Arnold Levison, "Anthony Kenny and the
Cartesian Circle," Journal of the History of Philosophy
Vol
. 9 (1971), pp. 491-496.
16
Ibid.
,
p. 496
.
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proposition. Thus, he should no longer be metaphysically
certain about it. The third involves a situation in which
he comes to doubt one of the premises in the first argument
for God's existence and he decides to use the ontological
argument in its place. Feldman and Levison conclude:
Possibilities such as these are
so obvious that Descartes could hardly
,f
v<
7
™lssed them. So it seems unlikelythat he brought in the veracious deityto show that he will never have reasonto change his mind about what he has
once intuited." 17
In a rejoinder, Kenny acknowledges the points raised
by Feldman and Levison.
Feldman and Levison are correct
in thinking that on my view the goal
of Descartes' speculation about God's
truthfulness is to make it the case
that he should never again have reason
to change his mind about what he has onceintuited.
. .
I think that Feldman and Levison
are correct in saying that even the
proof of a veracious deity is not suffi-
cient to establish an immutable state
of certainty. 18
But, Kenny argues.
It does not seem to me to follow that
Descartes was not trying to do so. As
he says in both the Second and Sixth
replies (HR II, pp. 39, 245) no one
can have ' immutable and certain knowledge
'
17
Ibid.
18Anthony Kenny, "A Reply by Anthony Kenny," Journal of the
History of Philosophy Vol
. 9 (1971), pp. 497-498, p. 497.
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unless he first acknowledges that hehas been created by a God who has nointention to deceive. 19
Kenny suggests that to such objections Descartes could have
responded that either the proof of a veracious deity was a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for immutable cer-
tainty or the situations in question are not aood reasons
to doubt because they rely to some extent on forgetfulness.
Kenny maintains that neither response will suffice to make
Descartes
' epistemology an adequate response to skepticism.
However, it is not, he contends, a circular account.
But Kenny need not commit himself or Descartes to the
position he does. There exists an interpretation of what
Descartes intends by an immutable state of mind that is
consistent with the rest of Kenny's account. The two tex-
tual references made by Kenny both concern the atheistic
geometer. in the latter Descartes asserts:
As to the Atheist's knowledge,
it is easy to prove that it is not
immutable and certain. For, as I have
already in a former place said, in
proportion to the impotence assigned
to the author of his being, the greater
be hl s reason for doubting whether
he may not be of such an imperfect
nature as to be deceived in matters
which appear most evident to him.
. .
20
The former place referred to is the other textual reference
19
Ibid.
,
pp. 497-498
.
20hr II, P- 245. (Italics mine)
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made by Kenny where Descarte s asserts:
that tho^H atheist can know clearlye three angles of a triangleare equal to two right angles, I do
Sne hand'
1 affirm that
' on theo , such knowledge on his partcannot constitute true science, becauseno knowiedge that can be rendered doubt-ful should be called science. 21
And here there is no mention of immutable states of mind.
However, there does exist at the beginning of his remarks
on this point certain comments about memory. Descartes
states
:
inirciy, when I said that we couldknow nothing with certainty unless we
were first aware that God existed, I
announced in express terms that i' re-ferred only to the science apprehending
such conclusions as can recur in memory
without attending further to the proofs
which led me to make them. 22
We may recall that there is textual evidence to sug-
gest that Descartes' responses to his critics' charges of
circularity, particularly Arnauld
' s , have something to do
with memory, which led some Cartesian commentators to con-
clude that Descartes was defending the veracity of memory.
We have seen in Chapter I that the memory thesis fails both
as an adequately full account of Descartes' enterprise and
as a means of allowing him to escape circular reasoning.
21
Ibid., p. 39.
22 Ibid
.
,
p . 38
.
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Nonetheless, his responses point to something going on
which involves memory. if in the above passage we inter-
pret Descartes to be maintaining that the reason the
atheist does not have true knowledge is that he has no
guarantee that his recollections of clear and distinct per-
ceptions are certain, we might reasonably conclude that
Descartes is suggesting that metaphysical certainty also
guarantees the veracity of correctly remembered clear and
distinct perceptions. This in turn suggests, consistent
with Descartes' remarks on the matter and with the remain-
der of Kenny's account, that the demonstration that a
veracious God exists provides us not only with metaphysical
certainty that all our clear and distinct perceptions are
true when we are attending to them, but also with meta-
physical certainty that they are psychologically certain
even when we are only (correctly) remembering that they
were clearly and distinctly perceived. Thus, metaphysical
certainty entails that all our clear and distinct percep-
tions are veracious. It also entails that correctly
remembered clear and distinct perceptions are not psycho-
logically doubtful even though they are no longer being
attended to clearly and distinctly. This, I contend, is
how Kenny should have interpreted Descartes ' notion of an
immutable state of mind. Consistent with my explication
of the rest of Kenny's account, I offer the following in an
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attempt to draw out a feature of Kenny's notion of
Cartesian certainty:
(K15) £ is metaphysically certain for S at t
* (Et') ( t
'
is later than t, and s
correctly remembers at t' that £ was
clearly and distinctly perceived by s
at t, and £ is not psychologically
doubtful for S at t '
.
)
None of the three situations described by Feldman and
Levison cause problems for Kenny's account as I have sug-
gested it can be explicated. In the first situation condi-
tion (ii) of principle (K9) is not met and hence Descartes
is no longer metaphysically certain. in the second situa-
tion condition (i) in (K9) is falsified and hence Descartes
is no longer metaphysically certain. in the third, the
first argument for God's existence no longer provides the
necessary psychological certainty required by condition
(ii) of (K9). Descartes is therefore no longer meta-
physically certain on the basis of that argument.
We are now in a position to apply the distinctions
outline(3 thus far for Kenny's account to the questions that
I have raised for each interpretation of Descartes being
considered
.
We saw in considering Gewirth's account that he has no
reason to develop a notion of psychological doubt since, on
his account, it is metaphysical doubt that is raised from
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the very start in Meditation,!
. As we have also seen
Kenny explicitly acknowledges a notion of psychological
doubt in his account, although he mistakenly attributes a
similar notion to Gewirth. We might conclude from this
that the type of doubt being raised in Meditation t is
primarily psychological rather than strictly metaphysical
on Kenny’s view. 2 3 Unfortunately
,
we^ ^
Kenny's response to question ( 1 ) i S;
. ^ ,
So far
'
1 have followed Gewirthin taking Descartes to be expressingfundamentally the same doubt in theThird Meditation as in the First. 24
Since the doubt raised in Meditation III is quite obviously
metaphysical, according to Kenny, Descartes is raising
metaphysical doubt in Meditation I .
In his earlier work Kenny outlines several steps in
Descartes' program of doubt. First, Descartes casts doubt
on the veracity of the senses initially by demonstrating
that they sometimes mislead us. But since we cannot con-
clude that it is possible that they always do so from the
23
24
It is important to note that in any account in which onetype of certainty is employed to achieve a second, thedoubt which corresponds to the first entails the doubtwhich corresponds to the second but not vice-versa Thusif in Meditation I a proposition, £ , is psychologically
'
doubtful, it is also metaphysically doubtful. The ques-tion is, therefore, is the doubt in Meditation I pri-
marily psychological or solely metaphysical in nature?
Kenny, Journa 1 of Philosophy
, p. 6 91.
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area™ ardent which
, according to Kenny> leads ^ #
skepticism.
an
C
n^^
dre
?
m ar9ument l calls in doubtll particular sense beliefs and the
b^
S
it
n
?o
° f COmposite tangible objects,ut leaves intact the claim. thatthere are some other objects more
simple and more universal which are
real and true." 25
It is the hypothesis of an omnipotent deceiver which
completes the attack on the senses. But what additional
beliefs does the hypothesis cast doubt upon? Kenny men-
tions in passing the possible deception involved in under-
standing simple natures of extension, size, and place and
in the performance of the simplest arithmetical operations.
But he does not elaborate further. To determine the range
of beliefs over which the omnipotent deceiver hypothesis
casts doubt we must refer to his later article in which he
contrasts his view with that of Frankfurt.
We may recall that Frankfurt argues that the mathe-
matical propositions upon which doubt is cast in Medita-
Paon 1 are not clearly and distinctly perceived. He offers
three reasons in support of his view. First, Haldane and
Ross provide a very misleading translation by combining the
clear truths of the Latin edition with the 'apparent'
25
Kenny, Descartes
, p. 32.
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truths of the French translation to reach 'clear and
apparent' truths. Second, in his Conversation with Burman
Descartes remarks that in Meditation I he was considering
someone who was just beginning to philosophize. Third, in
his replies to the seventh set of objections Descartes
states that at the end of Meditation I he had said that
everything could be doubted which had not been perceived
with sufficient clearness.
Kenny does not respond to the first point. with
regard to the second, he claims that Descartes was refer-
ring to philosophical axioms rather than to simple truths of
arithmetic. In response to the third, Kenny claims that
Descartes' remarks do not refer to the entire First Medita-
tion, only to a specific passage within Meditation T
. He
contends that there are several passages that explicitly
contradict Frankfurt's contention and he quotes two. The
first is in Meditation V where Descartes asserts:
. . . the nature of my mind is such that
I could not prevent myself from holding
them [certain geometric truths] to be
true so long as I conceive them clearly;
and I recollect that even when I was
still strongly attached to the objects
of sense, I counted as the most certain
those truths which I conceived clearly
as regards figures, numbers, and the
other matters which pertain to arithmetic
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and geometry, and, in general, topure and abstract mathematics. 26
The second is at the end of the repl
of objections where Descartes says:
res to the sixth set
. . . before I had liberated myself
ro
- the prejudices of the senses, Irightly perceived that two and three
make five, that if equals be takenfrom equals the remainders are equal
and many similar things.
.
'27
Kenny argues:
We know from the Second Replies that
some truths are so simple that they
cannot be thought of without beingdoubted [sic]
. . . Since these are so
simple that they cannot be thought of
without being clearly and distinctly
perceived.
.
. ,
it follows that they
are perceived clearly and distinctlyby all normal adults. 28
Thus, if the mathematical propositions doubted in Medita-
tion^ are of the sort that are so simple that they cannot
be thought of without being clearly and distinctly per-
ceived, then the doubt that is raised against them can be
nothing less than metaphysical doubt, given principles (K4)
and (K8) which I have attributed to Kenny.
Turning to question (2), Kenny's position is that the
indubitability of the Cogito is achieved in the following
HR I, p. 180. Kenny offers his own translation. It does
not differ appreciably from that of Haldane and Ross.
27
HR II, p. 257.
2 8
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
, p. 692.
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manner
:
Doubtjng is one kind of thought; andhought is defined precisely as "what-ever takes place within ourselves so
“at we are conscious of it, in so faras it is an object of our consciousness "Therefore, "if i doubt I know that I
°abt
.
follows
, for Descartes, from the
S
1
?
1
^
1°n he has 9iven °f thought, ofwhich doubting is a species or mode.Descartes therefore makes it true bydefinition that if i think, I knowthat I think. it is here that theindubitability of the premise of
" cogito ergo sum " is to be found. 29
The structure of the Cogito is as follows;
At any moment when Descartes is engagedin a conscious activity - say, when heis thinking, doubting, willing, or sens-ing - the proposition " cogito " is true.
Because thought is by definition known
to its agent, the proposition is not
true, but also indubitable to
Descartes; for what is known cannot
be doubted (HR II, p. 276). The premise
cogito " in conjunction with the pre-
supposition that it is impossible for
that which is thinking to be nonexistent
the conclusion "sum". Since the
premise is indubitable and the conclu-
sion follows by the light of nature,
the conclusion too is indubitable. # 30
But we might ask of Kenny, "in what sense is the Cogito
indubitable, psychologically or metaphysically?" Although
the textual evidence offered thus far points to the former,
surprisingly enough it is the latter which Kenny has in
29
Kenny
,
Descartes
,
30
P- 49.
Ibid
.
,
p . 51
.
157
mind. He argues:
The propositions never called into
?hofhh in Descartes' system aret ose that report the contents ofthe mmd, those that express themind s consciousness of its ownthoughts and ideas. Thus, thepremise "co^j^" and the presenceof the idea of God are not challengedby the second-order doubt. ^ 31
Thus, coaito is the first proposition for which Descartes
achieves metaphysical certainty. Sum, on the other hand,
is only psychologically certain because it is derived by
using the axiom 'to think, one must exist’ which on Kenny's
view is open to second-order doubt.
What else does the Cogito achieve for Descartes?
Kenny suggests three things:
The cogito provided Descartes with
three things. First, it established
as certain his own existence.
Second, it suggested to him ageneral criterion for truth and
certainty.
. .
Third, it enabled Descartes todiscover his own nature. I think,
therefore I am. But what am I? a
thinking thing. 32
The second achievement of the Cogito leads us to
question (3). Kenny's position with respect to the role
which the principle of clarity and distinctness plays in
Descartes' enterprise is ambiguous. There is textual
31 T . • ^Ibid
.
, pp. 185-186.
32 Ibid
.
,
p . 63 .
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evidence that points to the principle as establishing the
psychological certainty of certain propositions, among
Which would be that God exists and is no deceiver. At
one point Kenny states:
Clear and distinct perception." anexpression he [Descartes] uses frequentlycannot be regarded as a synonym for Y
'
intuition" since the conclusions ofdeductions may be clearly and distinctlyperceived no less than self-evident Y
truths. 33
And at other points Kenny asserts:
;
• • anything can be doubted unless itis clearly and distinctly perceived.
. .
34
. all clear and distinct perception
not lust intuition, leads to a certaintythat excludes simultaneous doubt.
. .
Presumably the doubt being referred to is psychological
doubt and the certainty, metaphysical certainty.
But there is also textual evidence that suggests that
the principle of clarity and distinctness plays no role in
establishing the existence of God. in one passage, parts
of which have been quoted earlier, Kenny indicates that the
propositions never called into metaphysical doubt are those
that report the contents of the mind. Among those proposi-
33_,
. ^Ibid
.
,
p. 175.
34 Ibid
.
,
p . 181
.
35
Ibid
.
,
p. 187.
159
tions are coaito and the presence of the idea of God. And
it is the existence of the idea of God that establishes the
existence of God. This passage suggests that it is the
metaphysical certainty of certain propositions that enables
Descartes to be psychologically certain that God is no
deceiver
.
Additional textual evidence seems to support this in-
terpretation. Consider the following comments by Kenny in
various places:
* * * intuition is said to be produced
"by the light of reason alone." 37
Once something has been shown to me by
natural light, Descartes says, I cannotdoubt it; but another person who sees
less clearly may doubt the very same
proposition. 38
There are, however, some axioms that no
one can doubt at any stage of his life. 39
There is then, a class of specially
indubitable axioms.
. . smaller than the
class of axioms that can be shown by
natural light to anybody at any stage. 40
36
Ibid., PP . 185
37
Ibid.
,
P- 176 .
3 8 , . ,Ibid. P- 179.
39
Ibid.
4° tK .,Ibid
.
,
P- 180.
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These remarks suggest that one aspect of reason is not open
to even metaphysical doubt. One additional passage seems
to support this suggestion.
• • • Descartes does not offer the
In
a
a
^
tY
,
0f ?°d 35 a 9round for accept-i g the truth of an intuition. it isnot because even the veracity of Godwo.il not suffice to show that theintuition may not be, absolutely speakina
bv
becar e the sir"Ple intuition
9 '
y itseif provides both psychologicallyand logically the best grounds for
cilcl^V^ IrUth : Thus ' there is noircle. Deduction is called into ques-tion, and deduction is vindicated byintuition. The truth of particular
onlv
1^ 3 iS n0V?r Called in question,ythe universal trustworthiness ofintuition, and in vindicating this
universai trustworthiness only individualintuitions are utilized. There is nosing e faculty, or single exercise of aacuity, that is vindicated by its own
use. J 4i
Is Kenny, after all, a proponent of the partial auto-
nomy of reason for Descartes? in spite of the textual
evidence that suggests so, I don't believe that is what
Kenny has in mind. Rather, his response to question (3)
is that Descartes' efforts in Meditation II have provided
him with the basis for determining which of his perceptions
are indubitable. That basis is the clarity and distinct-
ness with which specific propositions are perceived. The
principle of clarity and distinctness then indicates which
41
Ibid
.
,
pp. 194-195.
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specific propositions are psychologically certain for
Descartes. We should recall that Kenny does not indicate
any place in the Meditations or elsewhere where Descartes
raises psychological doubt about specific propositions.
This is why he claims that the veracity of intuition is
never called into question. Thus, no single faculty or
exercise of faculty is called into question. That is not
to say that intuition is thereby in no need of any justifi-
cation. For it is the use of intuition with respect to
specific propositions such as the Cogito (and the existence
of the idea of God) that demonstrates, to use Kenny's
words, "that simple intuition by itself provides both
psychologically and logically the best grounds for accept-
ing its truth." But given that the principle of clarity
and distinctness extends to deduction, deduction and the
universal trustworthiness of intuition is what is called
into question. And this brings us to question (4).
In my explication of the distinction that Kenny makes
between psychological doubt and metaphysical doubt we
already saw his response to question (4). The doubt raised
in the Circle Passage is a first-order doubt about only the
general proposition that 'whatever I clearly and distinctly
perceive is true' and that first-order doubt casts second-
order doubt only on specific clearly and distinctly per-
ceived propositions. I suggested that principle (K8)
162
captures Kenny's intentions.
Kenny'S response to part of question (5) i s also
evident from my earlier discussion of hls distinction
between psychological certainty and metaphysical certainty.
The demonstration that a non-deceiving God exists removes
the only reason Descartes has for psychologically doubting
the general proposition that 'whatever I clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive is true'. The demonstration makes the
general proposition psychologically certain for Descartes.
All second-order doubt with respect to specific proposi-
tions clearly and distinctly perceived is removed. Condi-
tion (ii) of principle (K9) is met. Given principle (Kl)
,
any proposition that is clearly and distinctly perceived
by Descartes is psychologically certain for him. Thus,
whenever condition (i) of <K9) is met with respect to a
particular proposition, that proposition is metaphysically
certain for Descartes.
The demonstration that a non-deceiving God exists
also guarantees the psychological certainty of correctly
remembered clear and distinct perceptions. if, at a later
time, I correctly remember clearly and distinctly perceiv-
ing that p, given principle (K15)
, £ remains psychologi-
cally certain for me. Thus, situations in which Descartes
is not attending to propositions clearly and distinctly do
not defeat either the psychological or metaphysical
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certainty of those propositions for hi*. He has achieved
mmutable state of mind that I contend Kenny should
have attributed to Descartes.
But how is all Of this to be achieved? Quite simply/
each of the steps in the arguments for God's existence and
non-deceiving nature can be perceived clearly and distinct-
ly. Thus, given principle (Kl), each is psychologically
certain for Descartes. He also perceives clearly and dis-
tinctly the logical relationship between the premises and
their respective conclusions. The relationship in each
argument, then, is also psychologically certain for
Descartes. Thus, the conclusions that follow from their
respective premises are also psychologically certain for
Descartes. These conclusipns are employed, in turn, to
demonstrate that whatever he clearly and distinctly per-
ceives is true. And this general proposition is thereby
psychologically certain for him. Since it was the psycho-
logical dubitability of this general proposition which cast
second-order, metaphysical doubt on particular clearly and
distinctly perceived propositions, once it has been demon-
strated that this general proposition is psychologically
certain for Descartes, it is no longer psychologically
doubtful for him. Thus, it can no longer cast second-order
doubt on particular propositions. Thus, all propositions
which are psychologically certain for Descartes become
164
metaphysically certain for him. Kenny conclude s
:
It is by now clear why thereis no circle in Descartes's argumenthe clear and distinct perceptionsused m the proof of God's existenceare perceptions of particular proposi-tions, such as that ideas cannot beore ^r^ct than their archetypes
( R I, p. 163). The veracity of Godis used to establish not any particu-lar clear and distinct perception, Sutthe general proposition that whatever
true
Sarly and dlstinctly perceive is
42
Kenny also contends:
Provided that in the proofs for the
existence of God no appeal is made to
remembered perceptions, there is no
circularity in establishing the relia-bility of remembered perceptions by
appeal to the veracity of God, andDescartes is careful to insist thathis proofs of God's existence do notdepend on memory in this way. 43
In his earlier work Kenny proceeds to demonstrate that
although no circularity is involved with his interpretation
of Descartes' enterprise, there are other problems for
Descartes, among them the lack of a criterion for distin-
guishing genuinely clear and distinct perceptions from
apparent ones. I do not intend to discuss these problems.
My task here is to determine whether Kenny's account, as I
have presented it, is reasonably consistent with the text
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
, p. 690.
Kenny, Descartes, p. 189.
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and succeeds in allowing Descartes to avoid circular
reasoning as Kenny contends.
Before considering what x take to be a serious objec-
tion to Kenny's account I would like to raise three points.
The first is that Kenny argues that the doubt raised in
Meditation I is metaphysical in nature. m doing so he
places himself in opposition to Frankfurt, since his
position with respect to question (1) does not have any
bearing on the success or failure of his account in
enabling Descartes to avoid circular reasoning, I shall
reserve comment until chapter V where I present my own
interpretation of Descartes' enterprise. But it is worth
noting that Kenny's explicit mention of psychological doubt
is unnecessary. since such doubt does not play a pivotal
role in his interpretation of Descartes' enterprise, his
account, like Gewirth's, could have been explicated solely
in terms of psychological certainty, clarity and distinct-
ness, and metaphysical doubt and certainty.
The second is that Kenny does not provide a satisfac-
tory explanation of why certain propositions such as
cogito escape second-order, metaphysical doubt. Given the
nature of metaphysical doubt on Kenny's account, as I have
explicated it, every proposition that is clearly and dis-
tinctly perceived should be open to such doubt. If the
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proposition coaito is a mender of the set of all clearly
and distinctly perceived propositions, then according to
principle (K8) it should also be metaphysically doubtful
for Descartes until he is psychologically certain that God
exists and is no deceiver. Principle <K8] is not at fault.
Kenny s interpretation of metaphysical doubt is inconsis-
tent with his position on the epistemic status of the
Coqito
.
Finally, as I noted earlier in presenting the distinc-
tion between first-order and second-order doubt, Kenny
suggests that Descartes found certain propositions geneti-
cally doubtful while severally indubitable. The suggestion
is very misleading. Propositions may be severally indubi-
table in a first-order way, but they are also severally
dubitable in a second-order way. To see this we need only
to consider principle (K8)
.
It provides sufficient and
necessary conditions for second-order doubt; and those con-
ditions are articulated with respect to specific proposi-
tions
.
This last point is made by Fred Feldman and Arnold
Levison in the aforementioned article criticizing Kenny's
account as it is presented in his earlier work. it leads
them to suggest that Kenny, in response, might say that his
explanation of second-order doubt was defective. They
contend
:
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What he [Kenny] should have said ahonfsecond-order doubt was not that if°f
Lr°fffUt Way ° f doul=ting particu-lar intuitions, but that it is a sus-p--n that some intuition or othermight be false. Thus, to say thatDescartes had second-order doubt about
to sayf
nS
'
in this sense
' would be
(a) Descartes suspects (Ep) (he
_
intuits £ & £ is false)
.
Kenny might then claim that (a) is
consistent with:
(b)
-(E£) (Descartes intuits p
& he suspects that p is
false)
.
Then Kenny might claim that Descartes'0r
i
gi
i?f
1 PerPlexi ty was just that (a)and (b) were true of him. That is, hesuspected that some of his intuitions
might be false, but there wasn't any
one m particular, such that he sus-pected that it was false. 44
Although Kenny does not explicitly acknowledge this sugges
tion in his later article, there is some textual evidence
to suggest that he agrees with Feldman and Levison thus
far. Kenny asserts:
Consider the proposition "I can-
not doubt what I clearly and distinctly
perceive." On Descartes's view, thisis true if it means
(3) For all £, if i clearly and distinctly
perceive that £, then I cannot doubt
that £
.
It is false if it means
(4) I cannot doubt that (for all £, if
44
Feldman and Levison, o£. cit., p. 494.
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I c learly and distinctly perceivethat £ , then £ ) .
^
45
Substituting
'intuits £' for 'clearly and distinctly per-
ceive that £', notice the virtual equivalence of
, 3 ) and
(b) from the two passages just quoted on the one hand, and
(a) and the negation of (4) on the other.
Now Feldman and Levison argue that this interpretation
of Descartes is open to objection for at least two reasons.
First, it is not supported by textual evidence. In the
Circle Passage they claim that Descartes is explicitly
speaking of doubting the proposition that two and three
together make five. Thus, they conclude that (b) is not
true of Descartes. And if <b ) is not true, then neither is
Kenny's (3). Feldman and Levison also argue:
Secondly, if Descartes does sus-pect that some of his intuitions arefalse, then, even if there is none inparticular at which he can point hisfinger, still he cannot trust any ofthem. For on this interpretation he
suspects that some intuition or other
might be false, but he doesn't know
which ones. Therefore, each one ofhis intuitions is tainted by this
second-order doubt. 46
I take Feldman and Levison to be suggesting that although
Descartes is unable to entertain any instantiation of (a),
nevertheless each of his clear and distinct perceptions is
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
, p. 689.
Feldman and Levison, op>. cit., p. 494.
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open to doubt, albeit of a
conclude
:
second-order nature. They
-I -i
,
us i1: seems that Descartes did11 in question the truth of indivi-
eSL Slti0n ?' contrary to Kenny's
did S
en
?Y
1S ri<?ht that Descartesnot doubt them when he was expli-
lesi
Y
h
en
a
er
J
aining them
'
but neverthe-s e doubted them. if this is thponly way that metaphysical doubt isunderstood, Kenny's arguments fail 47
In "A Reply by Anthony Kenny" 48 Kenny acknowledges
their point that second-order doubt could be doubt about
specific propositions, but he claims that Descartes in fact
raises only the generic doubt. He contends that the Circle
Passage supports rather than refutes his claim, because
Descartes explicitly says he judged afterwards that it was
possible to doubt and the doubt is directed toward the
generic description of "what seemed most obvious."
Now even if we grant Kenny his interpretation of the
Circle Passage, he has not succeeded in demonstrating that
Feldman and Levison are wrong in contending that Kenny's
account is not supported by Cartesian text. We may recall
that Kenny contends that metaphysical doubt is raised in
Meditation I . And in arguing against Frankfurt's position,
he claims that clearly and distinctly perceived proposi-
47
48
Ibid .
Kenny
,
Journal of the History of Philosophy
, P- 495 .
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tions are called into doubt
reason for the claim is that
in that Meditation
some mathematical
One
proposition
are so simple that they
clearly and distinctly
tion that two and three
Descartes states:
cannot be thought of without being
perceived, among them the proposi-
make five. But in Meditation I
s
•
.
. how do I know that I am not
fnd
e
ih
SVery time that 1 add twoa t ree, or count the sides of asquare, or judge of things yet
imagined?
1 ^ Snythin9 simPldr can be
4J
Here Descartes is raising doubt about specific proposition.
Given that Kenny maintains that metaphysical doubt is
raised in Meditation I
,
he cannot consistently maintain
that such doubt is not raised by Descartes against specific
propositions.
With respect to Feldman and Levison's second reason
for rejecting (b)
,
and therefore Kenny's (3), Kenny gives
no direct response. However, in his later article he
addresses the issue tangentially. As we saw earlier, Kenny
contends
:
Descartes can entertain the thought
(1) For some p>, I clearly and distinctly
perceive that £, but not p.but he cannot entertain any thought
that would be an existential instan-
tiation of (1) . 50
49
HR I, p. 147.
50
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
, p. 689.
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Note the equivalence
With respect to (a) I
of (1) and Feldman and Levison's
( a ) .
interpreted Feldman and Levison to
be suggesting that although Descartes is unable to enter-
tain any existential instantiation of ,a)
, (and therefore
Kenny's ( 1 )), nevertheless each clearly and distinctly
perceived proposition is open to a second-order doubt
With regard to (1), (and therefore (a)), Kenny argues
Is there an inconsistency in
accepting ( 1 ) while rejecting everypossible instantiation of it? Perhapsthere is; but given the human condi-ion it is a harmless and necessaryinconsistency. Every one of us, Iimagine, would wish to subscribe to
(5) For some £, I believe that p, but
not jo. —
Yet ?
•
acceP t anY instantiation of this
would involve one in a version of Moore'sparadox. The inconsistency to which thedoubting Descartes is committed is no
worse than that of anyone who believesthat some of his beliefs are false.
I take Kenny to be suggesting that, in response to Feldman
and Levison's point, Descartes' inability to entertain
existential instantiations of (1) blocks doubt about speci-
fic propositions. His analogy to belief I take to be an
attempt to demonstrate the reasonableness of his inter-
pretation of Descartes. But the analogy is misleading.
Kenny himself admits to a distinction for Descartes between
beliefs and clear and distinct perceptions.
51
Ibid
.
,
pp. 689-690.
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JUO t;iLion tnat some of my
beliefs are false without that admission affecting my con-
viction with respect to specific beliefs is that ray belief
claims do not carry the force of conviction that clear and
distinct perceptions do. A more appropriate analogy would
be between clear and distinct perceptions and knowledge
claims. When Descartes entertains the proposition
expressed by Kenny's (1) it is tantamount to entertaining
the proposition that:
(5') (Ep>) (Descartes claims to know that p,
and
-£)
.
Now if i suspect that some of my knowledge claims are
false, even though I don’t know which ones, it puts all my
specific knowledge claims in doubt. Similarly with respect
to clear and distinct perceptions, if Descartes suspects
that some of his clear and distinct perceptions are faulty,
that suspicion makes each such perception questionable.
The impact of this on Kenny's account is serious. We
may recall that Kenny claims there is no circle in
Descartes' arguments because the clear and distinct per-
ceptions employed in the proofs of God's veracity are
52
Kenny, Descartes
, p. 181.
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perceptions of specific propositions and the veracity of
God is used to establish the veracity of not any specific
proposition but the general proposition that whatever is
clearly and distinctly perceived is true. But my conten-
tion is that the only coherent explication of Kenny's
interpretation that is consistent with the Cartesian text
commits Descartes to doubting specific clear and distinct
perceptions. And if I am correct, it is no longer clear
that on Kenny's account there is no circle in Descartes'
arguments
.
While I suggested earlier that Kenny's account could
be salvaged from the untenable position which he insists on
maintaining with respect to the immutability of Cartesian
certainty, I see no similar escape from the second predica-
ment which Feldman and Levison raise for his interpretation
of second-order, metaphysical doubt. Thus, I would now
like to turn to a more promising account which makes a much
different distinction between types of doubt and certainty
in Descartes' epistemology.
In Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian Circle"'^
Fred Feldman distinguishes between terms of 'practical'
Fred Feldman, "Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian
Circle," Philosophical Studies Vol. 27 (1975) pp. 37 - 55 .
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epistemic appraisal which include
’practical knowledge’
practical certainty’ and ’practical doubt’, and terms of
metaphysical’ epistemic appraisal which include 'meta-
physical knowledge’,
'metaphysical certainty’ and ’meta-
physical doubt’. m order to determine Feldman’s position
with respect to each of the five questions that I have
raised for each account of Descartes’ enterprise, it is
necessary to first provide a careful account of these dis-
tinctions which he makes.
Pointing to a passage in which Descartes asserts:
But we must note the distinction empha-sized by me in various passages, betweenthe practical activities of our life
and an enquiry into truth; for, when itis a case of regulating our life, it
would assuredly be stupid not to* trustthe senses, and those sceptics were
rid i culous who so neglected human
a fairs that they had to be preservedby their friends from tumbling down
precipices. it was for this reason that
somewhere I announced that no one in his
sound mind seriously doubted about such
matters; but when we raise an enquiryinto what is the surest knowledge which
the human mind can obtain, it is clearly
unreasonable to refuse to treat them asdoubtful, nay even to reject them as
false, so as to allow us to become aware
that certain other things, which cannot
be thus rejected, are for this very
reason more certain, and in actual
truth better known by us. 54
54
HR II, p. 206.
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Feldman contends that the distinction Descartes makes
between practical activities and an enquiry into truth
suggests that certain propositions are sufficiently cer-
tain for practical activities but insufficiently certain
for an enquiry into truth. The certainty in the former
case Feldman calls practical certainty:
certain^ ProPosition is sufficientlyrtain to be accepted for practical
do^^oth U iS " bey°n^ Practicaloubt
. Another way to put this would
tain".
Y that iS "Poetically cer-
55
But propositions that are practically certain may not be
sufficiently certain for the kind of enquiry which Des-
cartes is prepared to undertake in the Meditations
. Feld-
man suggests:
* ' * sucn propositions are open to
^metaphysical doubt". They are
metaphysically uncertain". Descartes
suggests
. that when we notice that somepropositions are thus open to metaphysi-
cal doubt, we may become aware that someothers are "more certain" and "betterknown". These propositions, I believe
may be described as being "metaphysically
doubt"?
' ThSY are "beyond metaphysical
56
ation
These distinctions allow Feldman to provide an explan-
of Descartes' response to his critics’ claim that an
55
56
Feldman, ojo. cit
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atheist can know that the three angles of a triangle are
equal to two right angles without knowing that God exists
We may recall that Descartes’ response was:
that
atheist can know clearlythe three angles of a trianqleequal to two right angles I dn nrn- a
S
I merely affirm that, on the other hand
7 '
stitute°t
led9e °n hlS Part cannot cSn-
'
?^d f
Ue sclence because no know-
c
f
n be rendered doubtful
should be called science. Since he is
sure
U
?b^
e
h'
an Atheist
'
he cannot be
'
that e is not deceived in thehings that seem most evident to himas has been sufficiently shown. 57
Equating true science with metaphysical knowledge, Feldman
contends
Descartes' view about the atheisticgeometer seems to be this. The atheis-tic geometer does have practical know-
f
nd hence the Practical certainty,
of the fact that the angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles. Perhapshis certainty derives from the fact thathe has intuited this fact about triangles
clearly and distinctly. However, the
atheistic geometer does not know very
much about God's nature. From his point
of view, though he doesn't believe it,
there might be a deceptive God. if he
should gain some reason to believe that
there is such a God, then the justifica-
tion for his belief in the geometric
fact would be undermined. Hence, althoughhis justification is not in fact under-
mined in this way, it is not as secure
as it might be. The atheistic geometer,
therefore, does not have metaphysical
certainty, or metaphysical knowledge,
57
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tfi^i fact that the angles of ariangle are equal to two right angles. 58
Feldman proceeds to offer an anaitt analysis of the terms of
practical epistemic appraisal.
‘
’ th? fundamental concept ofpractical epistemic appraisal is
A??ho
Pt practical cer?aSy
“
lt ugh ! will not offer a definitionterm
' 1 can say a few thingsthat may serve to make its meaningclearer. To say that a proposition
£/ is a practical certainty for aperson, S, at a time, t, is to savroughly, that S is justified in
£ at
u~'
°r that S has theepistemic right" to believe p at ttha t £ is either self-evidSnt o?'adequately evidenced for S at t. 59
Feldman makes three points about practical certainty.
First, it is a purely epistemic concept and not a psycho-
logical one. in this his account is clearly to be contras-
ted with those of Frankfurt, Gewirth, and Kenny. x have
some comments to make on this point later. The second
point is that practical certainty requires no greater
degree of certainty than does ordinary knowledge.
"Anyone
who knows anything (m the ordinary sense of 'knows') has
practical certainty with respect to whatever it is he
knows. Third, propositions that are practically certain
58
59
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for a person need have no practical value for that
person
.
Feldman then introduces some related concepts.
(1) £ is a practical possibility for S
at
-
=
df “£ is not a Practical cer-
tainty for S at t.
(2) £ is a practical impossibility for S
at
-
=
df ~£ is a Practical certainty
for S at t.
(3) £ is a practical uncertainty for s
at
—
=
,3 f £ as not a practical cer-
tainty for S at t.
Feldman also intends for the following entailments to hold
(1 ) £ is a practical certainty for S
at t only if £ is a practical possi-
bility for S at t.
(2') £ is a practical impossibility for S
at t only if £ is a practical uncer-
tainty for s at t.
Thus, these concepts fall into the traditional square of
opposition
:
Practical Practical
Certainty contraries Impossibility
c s
o
. e
n. i
t r
r
,
o
d lc
a t
,
r o
t r
.
i
o e
c s
Practical subcontraries Practical
Possibility Uncertainty
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Feldman contends:
The concept of practical doubtcan be related rather neatly to theconcept of practical certainty? ?o
dSubtfu?”
a
fn
r°P0Siti0n iS
"Practicallyo l or a person at a time is
certain or h iS then practically un-f im. To say that it is
say
Y
thft
P
yt
CtlCal doubt " for him is to
him
13 practlcally certain for
61
Feldman also puts special emphasis on definition (1
He asserts:
,
.
i .
The concept of practical possi-bility, defined in (1), will play animportant role in my argument. i be-lieve that this concept is a fairlyfamiliar one, often called "epistemicpossibility". we make use of this con-cept frequently. We might say, for ex-ample, of a suspect in an as yet un-
solved murder case, that he might beguilty This is not to say either thatit is logically possible, or that it iscausally possible that he is guiltyFo
J ?°
rmer is utterly uninteresting
,
and the latter is something that we maybe m no position to affirm. Ratherit is to say that "for all we know" heis guilty. We are not certain that heis not guilty. in my terminoloay, we
could say that it is a practical possi-bility for us that he is guilty. 62
Feldman concludes his analysis of the terms of practi-
cal epistemic appraisal by considering two principles:
^
Ibid
.
,
Ibid
.
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(4) If E is a practical certainty for S
at t, and E entails a , then a is a
practical certainty for s at t.
(5) If £ is a practical certainty'for s
at t, and the proposition that £
entails a is a practical certainty
for S at t, and S infers £ from £
at t, then £ is a practical certainty
for S at t.
He rejects (4 ) .
The problem with (4) is that it makes
a practical certainty of everything
entailed by a practical certainty, evenif S fails to see the entailment. Fromthis it follows that every necessary
truth is practically certain for anyone
who is practically certain of anything.This seems implausible. 63
Feldman contends that (5) captures Descartes’ intentions
contained m the following passages. in Rule III Descartes
asserts
:
. . . knowing by deduction, by which
we understand all necessary inferencefrom other facts that are known with
certainty. 64
In Rule VII he asserts:
• • . if I have first found out by
separate mental operations what the
relation is between the magnitudes A
and B, then what between B and C,
~
between £ and D, and finally between
63
Ibid.
64 HR I, p. 8. (Italics mine)
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—
an<3 E
, that does not en-b^-M
seeinq what ^
FiHd H between __
— 6 5
And in Rule XI
:
them, it is useful to run t-ho™
a continuous and uninterruptJS ac^of"
ST'USSf'r"
"S!
;
ce
f
rSin?9 .°“. kn°wied9e 66
Feldman argues:
Descartes apparently means to suggestthat a person gams "knowledge by
9
de-
arlfu^in^ “ SeVeral =onditlS„r
"cerfai'n i
1
a
°r °ne
'
he mu st havetai knowledge" of the premisesFor another, he must make a "necessaryinference" from these premises ?o?he
Y
conclusion. in this connection, Des-
he
r
cans
a
"a
S
co
S
t
eral references to whatll n inuous and uninterrunb^d
movement of thought” from the c^ar and
ft! ?
perception of the premises tothe Ciear and distinct perception ofthe conclusion. 67
And principle (5) is what Feldman proposes for the transfer
of practical certainty.
Feldman next provides an analysis of the terms of
metaphysical epistemic appraisal. He states:
65 xu . JIbid
.
,
p. 19 . (Italics mine)
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The fundamental concept here is "p is
a metaphysical certainty for S at t".
Roughly, to say that a proposition~is
a metaphysical certainty for a person
is to say that it is absolutely certain
for him - beyond even the most hyper-
bolic doubt. Not even the "very least
ground of suspicion" can be found
against it. A proposition is a meta-
physical certainty for a person at a
time only if he is then "maximally
justified" in believing it. The re-
quirements for metaphysical certainty
are thus of the same kind as, but con-
siderably more stringent than, the
requirements for practical certainty. 68
Feldman makes two points about metaphysical certainty.
First, it is a purely epistemic concept. Like practical
certainty it has no psychological component. Second,
propositions that are metaphysically certain for a person
need not have any metaphysical content. Provided that cer-
tain conditions are met, any proposition can be meta-
physically certain.
Feldman then introduces some additional terms of
metaphysical epistemic appraisal.
( 6 )
( 7 )
£ is a metaphysical
at t
-£ is not a
certainty for S at t
£ is a metaphysical
for S at t = _ -p is
certainty for S at t
possibility for
metaphysical
impossibility
a metaphysical
S
68 Ibid
.
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(8) £ is a metaphysical uncertainty for s
at
-
=
df £ ls not a metaphysical cer-
tainty for s at t.
These concepts also fall into the traditional square of
opposition and definition (6) captures a concept of epis
temic possibility for Feldman. There are also certain
connections between the concepts of practical epistemic
appraisal and those of metaphysical epistemic appraisal
that Feldman stipulates.
(10) £ is a metaphysical certainty for S
t
- > £ is a practical certainty
for S at t (but not vice versa)
.
(11) £ is a practical uncertainty for S
at i —* £ is a metaphysical uncertainty
for S at t.
2 is a practical possibility for S
at t —
>
£ is a metaphysical possi-
bility for s at t.
( 12 )
Feldman then proceeds to explain how, on his account,
Descartes intends for one proposition to cast doubt upon
another. He suggests:
Descartes holds that a given proposition
does not have to be certain in order to
make another uncertain. I take this to
mean that even if £ is only a practical
possibility, and not at all a practical
certainty, it can still suffice to make
2 a metaphysical uncertainty. An example
of this sort of case is given, once again,
by the atheistic geometer. Since he does
not have practical certainty that a
deceptive God does not exist, it is a
practical possibility for him that one
184
does Furthermore, if he did havepractrcai certainty of the existence
a deceptive God, then his clearand distinct perception that the
r?St
S ° f
,
a trlangle are equal to twoigh angles would be, from an epis-emic point of view, worthless. Forin that case, the practical certainty
of the proposition that God is a de-ceiver wouid "defeat" or "neutralize"the evidence for the proposition thatthe angles of a triangle are equal totwo right angles. He would no longerin that case
,
have practical certainty
of this latter proposition.
Perhaps we can understand this
relation better by reflecting on the
epistemic effect of adding the proposi-tion that God is a deceiver to the
evidence the geometer has for his beliefin the proposition, r, that the angles
a triangle are equal to two right
angles. There is a set of propositions,
_, that constitutes the evidence uoon
which the geometer bases his belief in
r. Every member of E is a practical
certainty for him, and their conjunction
is sufficient to justify his belief in
r, thus making r a practical certainty
for him, too. But if d, the proposi-
tion that God is a deceiver, were added
to E, then the conjunction of d and the
members of E would no longer be suffi-
cient to make r a practical certainty
for the geometer. This is so because
d says, in effect, that God is able and
willing to make propositions like r
false even when evidence like E is
-
true.
The more reason one has to believe in
yi, the less reason he has to believe
Feldman is now in a position to suggest the following
principle for how a given proposition is made meta-
69
Ibid
.
,
p. 45.
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physically uncertain by another proposition that is prac-
tically possible.
(9) £ is a metaphysical uncertainty for S
t if and only if there is a propo-
sition, £, such that (i) £ is a prac-
tical possibility for S at t; and (ii)
if
^ were a practical certainty for S
at t, that would defeat the practical
certainty of p for S at t, thus making
£ a practical uncertainty for S at t.
And he stipulates further:
(13) £ casts metaphysical doubt on £ for S
at t if and only if q is a practical
possibility for S at t, and is such
that if it were a practical certainty
for S at t, that would defeat the
practical certainty of £ for S at t,
thereby making £ a practical uncer-
tainty for S at t.
We are now in a position to determine Feldman's posi-
tion with respect to questions (1) through (5)
.
Although
Feldman does not specifically discuss the doubt raised in
Meditation I
,
it is fairly easy to determine his position
given his discussion of the distinctions between the terms
of practical epistemic appraisal and those of metaphysical
epistemic appraisal and the textual evidence he cites in
support of those distinctions.
In his replies to the fifth set of objections where,
on Feldman's view, Descartes is distinguishing practical
186
certainty from metaphysical certainty, he asserts, " It was
for this reason that somewhere 1 announced that no one in
his sound mind seriously doubted about such matters,
. .
.
.70
Descartes is referring to the closing remarks of his
Sffioesis preceding the Meditations. The indication is that
the entire Meditations is concerned, not with practical
doubt, but with metaphysical doubt.
m his replies to the seventh set of objections Des-
cartes asserts:
I said at the end of Meditation Ithat everything which I had not yet
comprehended with sufficient clearness
could be doubted by us
. . . But I did
so because there the question was about
only that supreme kind of doubt which,
I have insisted, is metaphysical,
hyperbolical and not to be transferred
to the sphere of the practical needs
° t life by any means. 71
Given Feldman's distinction between practical doubt and
metaphysical doubt, and given that the Meditations is con-
cerned with an "enquiry into truth," Feldman is committed
to maintaining that practical doubt is not what Descartes
is raising in Meditation I. Thus, Feldman is aligned with
Gewirth and Kenny and in opposition to Frankfurt with
respect to question (1)
.
?0
HR II, p. 206.
71
IbJ-d
.
,
p. 266
. (Italics mine)
Turning to question (2), Feldman's position is that
the coaito is metaphysically certain for Descartes. The
only proposition that has the potential to cast meta-
physical doubt on other propositions which are practically
certain is that 'God is a deceiver'. Yet, with respect to
the Cogito
, Descartes explicitly maintains that even the
practical possibility that God is a deceiver does not
defeat the certainty of the Cogito
.
But there is some deceiver or other,
very powerful and very cunning, who"
ever employs his ingenuity in
deceiving me
. Then without doubt I
exist also if he deceives me, and lethim deceive me as much as he will, he
can never cause me to be nothing so
long as I think that I am something. ^
In Feldman's terminology Descartes is saying that even if
the proposition that God is a deceiver were practically
certain for him, it would not defeat the practical cer-
tainty that he exists. According to the conditions that
Feldman has established for the concepts of metaphysical
epistemic appraisal, that he exists is not a metaphysical
uncertainty for Descartes whenever he entertains the propo
sition because the proposition that God is a deceiver does
not cast metaphysical doubt on the proposition that he
exists. Thus, given definition (8), that he exists is
metaphysically certain for Descartes.
188
Similarly, certain other propositions which, if
perceived at all, must be perceived clearly and distinctly,
escape metaphysical doubt. These include, not the first
principles which many Cartesian commentators view as
escaping the doubt raised in the Circle Passage, but propo-
sitions which express current mental acts such as "I am now
thinking." In this Feldman is in agreement with Kenny. We
may recall that Kenny also maintained that the propositions
never called into question by Descartes are those that
report the contents of the mind or those that express the
mind s consciousness of its own thoughts and ideas.
What the Cogito and other such metaphysically certain
propositions suggest is a rule of evidence for Descartes,
namely, that whatever he clearly and distinctly perceives
is true. But the rule, unlike the Cogito
, does succumb to
the doubt raised by the deceptive God hypothesis. Feldman
contends
:
He [Descartes] is right, I believe, to
say that the proposition that God is a
deceiver casts metaphysical doubt on
many of his clear and distinct percep-
tions. '3
Thus, Feldman's response to question (3) is that the prin-
ciple of clarity and distinctness does not play a role in
getting Descartes to the conclusions that God exists and is
73
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no deceiver.
Feldman's response to question (4) is explicit,
Referring to the Circle Passage, Feldman contends:
As I understand him, what Descartesis suggesting is that prior to thetime at which he comes to know of God'sexistence and nature, there is just onemam reason to doubt his clear and dis-tinct perceptions. That is the proposi-tion that God is a deceiver. in myterminology, Descartes' point can be putby saying that prior to the time at
which he comes to a satisfactory under-
standing of the arguments given in the
^-
hird and Fourth Meditation
, the propo-
sition that there is a deceptive God
casts metaphysical doubt for him on
the proposition that two plus three
equals five, as well as upon other
clearly and distinctly perceived
propositions. 74
Why the proposition that God is a deceiver should cast
doubt on some of Descartes' clear and distinct perceptions
Feldman explains as follows:
Since Descartes' understanding of
God's nature is, at the time in ques-
tion, still somewhat rudimentary, he
is not yet certain that God is not a
deceiver. Hence, the proposition that
God is a deceiver is then a practical
possibility for Descartes. Further-
more
'
if it were a practical certainty
for Descartes that God is a deceiver,
then it would not be a practical cer-
tainty for him that two plus three is
five. For no matter how clearly and
distinctly one may see this latter pro-
position to be true, such evidence is
74 Ibid
.
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surely worthless if he also has qood
reason to believe that there is an
omnipotent and deceptive God. 75
Thus, according to principle (13), prior to the demonstra-
tion that a non-deceiving God exists, the proposition that
God is a deceiver casts metaphysical doubt on a number of
propositions that are practically certain for Descartes.
Given principle (9), each of them is thereby metaphysically
uncertain for him.
Feldman's response to question (5) is, in part, this:
. . . once he [Descartes] has given
the Third Meditation argument for the
existence of God, it becomes a practical
certainty for Descartes that God exists.
For, we are assuming, the premises of
the argument are practical certainties
for him, it is a practical certainty
for him that they entail the conclu-
sion, and he infers the conclusion
from the premises. Hence, according
to principle (5), the conclusion is
then a practical certainty for him also. 76
Similarly
,
the proposition that God is not a deceiver
becomes a practical certainty for Descartes. The premises
are practically certain for him. The argument's validity
is also a practical certainty for him. He infers the
conclusion. Hence, again given principle (5), the con-
clusion is also a practical certainty for him.
75
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Once this conclusion is a practical certainty, its
negation, that God is a deceiver, is no longer a practical
possibility for Descartes. As such, the latter proposition
no longer casts metaphysical doubt on any of his clear and
distinct perceptions.
Does this mean that all Descartes' clear and distinct
perceptions are metaphysically certain for him given Feld-
man's definitions? Not quite; Feldman goes on to demon-
strate how Descartes can now be metaphysically certain that
all his clear and distinct perceptions are true. Feldman
contends
:
He [Descartes] attempts, on my view, to
deduce this conclusion from a set of
premises every one of which is now meta-
physically certain.
. . if these
premises are now metaphysically certain,
and it is also metaphysically certain
that they entail the conclusion, and
the conclusion is inferred from them,
then, it appears to me, the conclusion
becomes a metaphysical certainty.
Assuming that all this is the case, we
can agree with Descartes when he says
that "in the Fourth (Meditation ) it is
shown that all which we clearly and
distinctly perceive is true. . . " (HR I,
p. 142) And we can also agree that the 77
argument is non-circular.
Feldman goes on to reconstruct the specific arguments which
Descartes employs to demonstrate that God exists and is no
deceiver and that all his clear and distinct perceptions
77
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are true, but consideration of those arguments is beyond
the scope of this work. X have attempted to present the
overall structure of his argumentation; it is now necessary
to determine whether Feldman's account of Descartes' enter-
prise succeeds where previously considered accounts failed.
Although I find Feldman's account both ingenious and
plausible, there are certain difficulties which I believe
it encounters. Feldman admits the following:
In thus making practical certainty
a purely epistemic concept, I believe
I may be drawing out only one aspect
of Descartes' concept of certainty. in
his discussions of certainty he sometimes
suggests that this concept has a psycho-
logical component. For example, he some-
times writes as if a proposition is cer-
tain for S only if s is unable to doubt
it. But surely one may be psychologically
able to doubt a proposition even though
he has adequate evidence for it. It
appears, then, that the psychological
ability to doubt a proposition has little
bearing on the central question of
whether or not one is warranted in be-
lieving it. Thus, I think Descartes
would have done better if he had more
clearly separated the psychological from
the epistemic aspects of his concept of
certainty.
Feldman is correct in saying that one may be psychologi-
cally able to doubt a proposition even though he has
adequate evidence to warrant believing it. He could have
78
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said further that one may be psychologically unable to
doubt a proposition even though he has adequate evidence
to warrant doubting it. But the former case could also
indicate why, for Descartes, adequate evidence is not
strong enough for certainty, at least the kind that clarity
and distinctness provide. And the latter case simply
indicates that psychological indubitability is only a
necessary condition, and not a sufficient one, for some
type of certainty. That Descartes would have been better
served by distinguishing psychological certainty from
epistemic certainty and employing only the latter is true
only if Feldman's interpretation succeeds in avoiding cir-
cular reasoning and if no account which incorporates the
two succeeds.
The point which I have just made does not provide
sufficient grounds for rejecting Feldman's account.
Unfortunately, the following difficulty does.^^
In presenting principle (9) Feldman considers and
rejects the following principle:
I am indebted to Peter Markie for pointing out thisdifficulty for Feldman's account to me. His criticism
appears in his doctoral dissertation. The Cartesian
Circle
,
University of Massachusetts (1976) and in "Fred
Feldman and the Cartesian Circle," Philosophical Studies
Vol
. 31 (1977) pp. 429-432 .
194
(9 ) £ is a metaphysical uncertainty for S
at t if and only if there is a proposi-
tion, a , such that (i) a is a meta-
physical possibility for S at t; and
(ii) if £ were a practical certainty
for at t, that would defeat the
practical certainty of a for S at t,
thus making £ a practical uncertainty
for S at t.
Principle (9) requires a proposition to be a practical
possibility for someone in order for it to cast meta-
physical doubt on another proposition. (9') requires that
the defeater proposition be only a metaphysical possibility
Feldman offers three reasons for preferring (9) to
(9'). The first is that (9) is more in keeping with
Descartes' statements that reasons for doubt must be power-
ful and maturely considered , ^ and that doubt must be based
upon clear and assured reasonings.^ Feldman's contention
is that it seems unlikely that a proposition which is a
metaphysical possibility but a practical impossibility
would count as a powerful and maturely considered reason
for doubt or would be construed as a clear and assured
reason for doubt.
8 0Cf.HR I, p. 148 and HR II, p. 266.
O I0iHR I, p. 99.
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But Descartes also maintains in various places that
any proposition which provides us with even the very least
grounds for suspecting the veracity of another proposition
counts as a reason for metaphysical doubt. m his replies
to the seventh set of objections Descartes states:
It was of this [metaphysical] doubt
also that I said the very least groundof suspicion was a sufficient reasonfor causing it. 82
And m the Circle Passage Descartes says:
• * • the reason for doubt whichdepends on this opinion alone is very
slight, and so to speak metaphysical. ^
The reason for doubt is, of course, the hypothesis that a
deceiving God exists.
Now if we interpret "the very least grounds" and "the
reason.
. . is very slight" as referring to metaphysical
possibility rather than practical possibility, then there
exists equally strong textual evidence to support principle
(9') as there does to support (9) as an interpretation of
metaphysical uncertainty for Descartes. Feldman's first
reason for preferring principle (9) to (9') is not consis-
tently supported by textual evidence.
Feldman's second reason for preferring (9) is that
further textual evidence can be derived from a passage at
82
HR II, p. 266.
83HR I, p. 159.
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the close of Meditation V in which Descartes suggests,
according to Feldman, that when a proposition is no longer
a practical possibility, it is no longer able to cast meta-
physical doubt. But Feldman does not quote the passage in
question; he merely footnotes it. if we follow his
reference we find Descartes saying:
But after I have recognized that thereis a God.
. . and that He is not adeceiver,
. . . although I no longerpay attention to the reasons for which
I have judged this to be true, providedthat 1 recollect having clearly anddistinctly perceived it no contrary
reason can be brought forward which
could ever cause me to doubt of its
truth ; and thus I have a true and
certain knowledge of it. 84
Now Feldman could be suggesting that since the proposition
that God exists and is no deceiver is recognized or, in
Feldman's terms, practically certain, then no contrary
reason, i.e., that God is a deceiver, can be brought for-
ward to cause doubt or, again in Feldman's terms, to cast
doubt, because the contrary reason is no longer a practical
possibility
.
But if the arguments for the existence of a non-
deceiving God provide Descartes with metaphysical certainty
that God is no deceiver, then that God is a deceiver is no
longer a metaphysical possibility for him. The passage
84
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simply does not indicate whether in recognizing that there
is a God and that He is not a deceiver Descartes is
referring to the practical or metaphysical certainty of the
proposition in question. Hence, the passage can be inter-
preted as providing equally strong textual support for
principle (9').
In the passage Descartes goes on to say that this same
(certain) knowledge extends to other things which he
recollects having demonstrated. He then considers what
could be alleged against such knowledge claims. He con-
siders three possibilities:
Will It be said that my nature is such
as to cause me to be frequently deceived?
Will it be said that I formerly held
many things to be true and certain which
I have afterwards recognized to be false?
What further objection can then be raised?
That possibly I am dreaming.
. .? 85
Now Feldman could be suggesting that since Descartes has
acknowledged demonstrating that there is a non-deceiving
God, he is now considering other propositions to determine
if they cast metaphysical doubt on his clear and distinct
perceptions. Each of the propositions, particularly "That
possibly I am dreaming," is a practical possibility for
Descartes and he demonstrates by his responses that for
85
Ibid.
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each there is a contrary proposition which is a practical
certainty for him and which, thereby, blocks the ability of
the three propositions in question to cast metaphysical
doubt on other propositions. Thus, Feldman could intend
the passage to indicate that practical rather than meta-
physical possibility is what Descartes has in mind for one
proposition to cast metaphysical doubt on another.
But this won't do. Feldman acknowledges:
Descartes apparently assumes, priort°
, the proofs of the existence and ver-
G°d/ that no proposition otherthan the proposition that God is adeceiver cast metaphysical doubt on hisclear and distinct perceptions. 86
Furthermore, Feldman maintains that "it seems to me that
Descartes is not justified in making this rather large
8 7assumption." Thus, his footnoted reference notwith-
standing, the just quoted passages cannot be what Feldman
had in mind. The only remaining comment which Descartes
has to make at the end of Meditation V is as follows:
And so I very clearly recognize
that the certainty and truth of all
knowledge depends alone on the know-
ledge of the true God, in so much that,
before I knew Him, I could not have a
perfect knowledge of any other thing.
And now that I know Him I have the
means of acquiring a perfect knowledge
86
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of _not only
88
But nothing which Descartess asserts here provides us
With a clear indication that the practical rather than the
metaphysical impossibility of a proposition is what Des-
cartes has in mind to block that proposition 1 s ability to
cast metaphysical doubt on another proposition. in fact,
if the perfect knowledge being referred to in the passage
is, in Feldman's terminology, metaphysical knowledge, then
the passage could also be interpreted as providing textual
support of principle (9') rather than (9). Feldman has not
succeeded in demonstrating that there is strong textual
evidence to support his preference for (9).
Feldman's third reason for preferring (9) is that (9')
does not allow Descartes to escape circular reasoning.
A further reason for framing the
principle in this way is that, by so
doing, we help to provide a conceptual
framework within which a solution to
the problem at hand may be found.
The problem at hand is that of the Cartesian Circle. To
see why circularity is not avoided with ( 9
' ) we must recall
88HR I, p. 185.
89Feldman, ojd. cit
.
,
p. 46.
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that if it is the metaphysical possibility that God is a
deceiver which allows the proposition to cast metaphysical
doubt on other propositions, then Descartes is forced to
prove that God is no deceiver is a metaphysical certainty
m order for 'God is a deceiver' to become a metaphysical
impossibility. But then Descartes is required to achieve
the metaphysical certainty of a particular proposition
prior to defeating the metaphysical possibility of the only
proposition which casts metaphysical doubt on other propo-
sitions. Since the only propositions on Feldman's account
which escape the metaphysical doubt cast by the proposition
that God is a deceiver are propositions which express
current mental acts, and since the premises of the argu-
ments for God's existence and non-deceptive nature are not
such propositions, (9’) puts Descartes squarely back in the
circle
.
Given the ambiguity of the textual evidence, in the
absence of any reason to specifically reject (9) we might
Feldman his principle and simply acknowledge that
Descartes was sometimes confused on the matter. But there
exists, I believe, one very good reason for rejecting (9).
In Meditation I Descartes argues that the proposition
that he is sitting by the fire is uncertain for him. Given
Feldman's response to question (1), the proposition must be
metaphysically uncertain for Descartes. The proposition
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constituting his reason for doubt is that he is in bed
asleep and dreaming which, given principle (9), must be
practically possible for him. With definitions (1) and
(3) we obtain that the proposition that he is not in bed
asleep and dreaming is practically uncertain for Descartes.
But given Feldman's account of the notion of practical
certainty and Descartes' distinction between the practical
activities of one's life and an enquiry into truth, it
would appear that, for both, the proposition that I am not
in bed asleep and dreaming is practically certain for me.
With (9') this difficulty does not arise since the proposi-
tion that I am not in bed asleep and dreaming remains
practically certain but metaphysically uncertain for
Descartes
.
My contention is that Feldman has not provided us with
sufficient reason to ascribe (9) to Descartes. In fact,
textual evidence in Meditation I and Feldman's own account
of the concepts of practical epistemic appraisal in Des-
cartes' writings point to the ascription of (9') to Des-
cartes. But (9') does not allow Descartes to escape the
charge of circular reasoning.
For the reasons I have given, I find Feldman's inter-
pretation of Descartes' enterprise less than completely
satisfactory. But I find certain distinctions which he
makes useful in understanding Descartes and, as I intend to
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demonstrate in the next chapter, these distinctions provide
a basis upon which an interpretation of Descartes' enter-
prise can be made which, I argue, avoids the problems
raised for accounts discussed thus far.
CHAPTER v
In the preceeding chapter I discussed two accounts of
Descartes' enterprise which attempt to get him out of the
Cartesian Circle by distinguishing between two types of
doubt and, correspondingly, two types of certainty. One
account, Kenny’s, defines one type of doubt and certainty
m primarily psychological terms. in doing so Kenny acknow-
ledges that he is following the lead of Gewirth, whose
account of Descartes was examined in Chapter III. The
other account, Feldman's, defines both types of doubt and
certainty in purely epistemic terms. in doing so Feldman
explicitly acknowledges that he is ignoring one aspect of
Descartes explanation of doubt and certainty, the psycho-
logical aspect. I have argued that neither account suc-
ceeds in both being consistent with textual evidence and
getting Descartes out of the circle.
What I am about to suggest as a more satisfactory
Cartesian response to the charges of circularity is a dis-
tinction embedded in Descartes 1 writings between three
types of doubt and corresponding certainty. Following
Feldman's lead, I shall call the first 'practical doubt'
and 'practical certainty'. Following Gewirth's lead, I
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shall call the second
'intuitional certainty, (and its
converse I shall term 'intuitional doubt'). The third
type I shall of course call 'metaphysical doubt' and 'meta-
physical certainty'. Again following Feldman's lead, I
will offer an analysis of practical doubt and practical
certainty in purely epistemic terms. Dn l ike Gewirth, I
will not attempt to analyze intuitional certainty (and
intuitional doubt) in primarily psychological terms.
Rather, I will argue that each has both a psychological and
an epistemic component and that the latter component is
logically related to the practical epistemic concepts
developed by Feldman. Finally, I will draw upon the
concepts of intuitional doubt and certainty which I
develop to explain what Descartes intended metaphysical
doubt and certainty to mean. I will then use all three
^ stinctions to provide a solution to the problem of the
Cartesian Circle.
Feldman is undeniably correct in noting that Descartes
makes a distinction between the certainty which is satis-
factory for day-to-day matters and that which is required
an enquiry into truth. The passages in which Descartes
makes this distinction are quite explicit. As we have
already seen, in one such passage Descartes asserts:
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n°te thS dist^ction empha-sized by me in various passages, betweenthe practical activities of our life andan enquiry into truth. 1
Elsewhere in the Replies Descartes reminds the reader that;
I said at the end of Meditation I that
everything
. . . could be doubted
But I did so because there the Question
was about only that
. . . doubt which
... is metaphysical
... and not tobe transferred to the sphere of practical
,needs of life.
. .
2
Finally, in his closing remarks in the Synopsis to the
Meditations Descartes distinguishes between those things
which never have been doubted by anyone of sense" but
which "are neither so strong nor so evident" and those
things which are "most certain and most evident." 3
So there exists a distinction, for Descartes, between
doubt that attends to practical activities, human affairs,
matters involving trust in our physical senses, and the
like, and doubt that involves an enquiry into truth. Thus,
some propositions are sufficiently certain for Descartes to
overcome doubt of the first kind. Following Feldman, I
will suggest that
a proposition, £, is a practical certainty
for a person, S, at a time, t
1
HR II, p. 206.
2
Ibid
. ,
p . 266.
3KR I, p. 143.
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IS roughly synonymous with the following locutions:
—
ls i ustlfled in believing that £ at t
-
has the ePisteitic right to believe E~at t
E is either self-evident or adequately
evidenced for s at t.
we may recall that Feldman makes three points about
practical certainty. First, it is a purely epistemic con-
cept with no psychological component. Second, the degree
of certainty is no greater than that required for knowledge
in the traditional sense. Third, the use of the term
'practical' does not suggest that a proposition must have
practical value in order to be a practical certainty for
someone. In each of these points I am in agreement with
Feldman
.
Again following Feldman's lead, I shall suggest the
following definitions:
(1) £ is a practical possibility for S
a ^
—
=
cif “E is n°t a practical certainty
for S at t.
(2) £ is a practical impossibility for S
at t =df -£ is a practical certainty
for S at t.
(3) £ is a practical uncertainty for S
at i =df P is n°t a practical certainty
for S at t.
To say that a proposition is a practical uncertainty for a
person at a time is to say that the proposition is practi-
cally doubtful for the person at the time.
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I shall also propose the following entailments:
(1 ) E is a practical certainty for S at t
entails that £ is a practical possibility
for S at t.
(2') £ is a practical impossibility for S
at t entails that £ is a practical uncer-
tainty for S at t.
With the above definitions and entailments certain concepts
of practical epistemic appraisal fall into the traditional
square of opposition, i.e., practical certainty and practi-
cal impossibility are contraries; practical possibility and
practical uncertainty are subcontraries; and practical cer-
tainty and practical uncertainty are contradictories, as
are practical impossibility and practical possibility.
Finally, I shall also propose the following principle
for precisely the same reasons which Feldman does: 4
(4) If £ is a practical certainty for S at t,
and the proposition that £ entails q is
a practical certainty for S at t, and S
infers £ from £ at t, then q is a practical
certainty for S at t.
Given the distinction which Descartes makes between
the certainty which is satisfactory for practical matters
and that which is required for an "enquiry into truth," and
presuming that the Meditations are concerned solely with
4 Feldman, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
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(cf. Chapter IV, pp.
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the latter, we can conclude that the doubt raised in Medi -
—iQn 1 iS °ther than Poetical. Gewirth, Kenny and Feld-
man contend that it is metaphysical doubt that is raised
from the very start of Descartes' enterprise. We may
recall, however, that Frankfurt's position is a notable
exception in this matter.
In distinguishing between doubt about the truth of a
proposition and doubt about the relationship between a
proposition's indubitability and its truth, Frankfurt must
demonstrate that the objects of the doubt raised in Medita-
tion^ can be distinguished from the objects of the doubt
raised in the Circle Passage in Meditation III . The meta-
physical doubt raised in the Circle Passage is clearly
directed against propositions that are clearly and dis-
tinctly perceived. if propositions called into doubt in
Meditation I are also being clearly and distinctly per-
ceived, then Frankfurt cannot consistently contend that
the doubt raised in Meditation I is other than metaphysical.
We may recall that Frankfurt offers three reasons to
support his contention that no proposition that is doubted
i-n Meditation I is clearly and distinctly perceived. The
first involves the Haldane and Ross translation. Frankfurt
argues that the phrase 'clear and apparent' which is being
attributed to mathematical propositions in Meditation I is
misleading. His contention is that a careful analysis of
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both the Latin and French texts does not indicate that
Descartes was referring to propositions being clearly and
distinctly perceived. The second reason involves Des-
cartes ' remarks in his Conversation with Burman to the
effect that in Meditation 1 he was considering someone
was just beginning to philosophize and who attends only
who
to
those things with which he is acquainted, that is, through
the senses. The third reason involves Descartes’ replies
to the seventh set of objections in which he states that at
the end of Meditation I he has said that everything could
be doubted that had not been clearly and distinctly
perceived
.
We may also recall that Kenny responds to Frankfurt's
second and third reasons. With respect to the second
reason Kenny claims that Descartes was referring to philo-
sophical axioms rather than to simple truths of arithmetic.
In response to the third reason Kenny claims that Descartes'
remarks do not refer to the entire First Meditation
, only
to a specific passage within that Meditation
. But neither
of Kenny's replies proves his point. At best each indi-
cates that Frankfurt's second and third reasons are not
sufficient to establish his claim.
Kenny does offer two additional passages and refers to
a third to support his contention that certain mathematical
propositions being considered in Meditation I are clearly
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and distinctly perceived. The
tion V where Descartes asserts
first passage is in Medita-
I iouldnn?
atUre ° f mY mind is such tha tc ld not prevent myself from holdinathem [certain geometric truths] to be
9
true so long as I conceive them clearly;
n recollect that even when I wasstill strongly attached to the objectsof sense, I counted as the most certainthose truths which I conceived clearlv
as regards figuros, numbers, and other
matters which pertain to arithmetic andgeometry, and, m general, to pure and
abstract mathematics. -
The second is at the end of the replies to the sixth set of
objections where Descartes says:
• * • before I had liberated myself fromthe prejudices of the senses, I rightly
perceived that two and three make five,
that if equals be taken from equals the
remainders are equal, and many similar
things.
. .
6
And Kenny argues:
We know from the Second Replies that
some truths are so simple that they
cannot be thought of without being
doubted [sic]
.
. . Since these are
so simple that they cannot be thought
of without being clearly and distinctly
perceived.
.
. ,
it follows that they
are perceived clearly and distinctly by
all normal adults. 7
5
HR I, p. 180.
6 HR II, p. 257.
7Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
,
p. 692.
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Presumably the passage to which Kenny is referring is the
following
:
i
* * there are some [clear perceptionsof the intellect] so evident and at thesame time so simple, that in their casewe never doubt about believing them
£hat
!
wh;?'-
that
„
While 1 think
't at is once done cannot be undoneand other similar truths.
. . For we
'
cannot doubt them unless we think ofthem; ^but we cannot think of them with-
out at the same time believing them tobe true.
. . Hence we can never doubtthem without at the same time believingthem to be true; i.e. we can never doubtthem. 8
Now one can interpret each of the three preceeding
passages from Descartes in a manner consistent with Kenny's
position. But an interpretation of each can also be made
that fails to support his position. in the quotation from
Meditation V Descartes initially asserts that the clear
perception of a geometric truth is such that he cannot
refrain from assenting to its truth. He then asserts that
even when (early in Meditation I ) his basis for beliefs
was grounded in the senses, he noted that certain proposi-
tions were more certain than others. But from the fact
that such propositions were more certain than others it
does not follow that they had to be perceived clearly and
distinctly
. One could reasonably contend that Descartes
8HR II, p. 42.
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meant nothing more than that, even with sense perception
as one's sole criterion of evidence, some propositions seem
to be more certain than others.
In the passage from the Sixth Replies Kenny interprets
Descartes as asserting that if one rightly perceives that
two and three make five, then one does so only by perceiv-
ing it clearly and distinctly. And since such a perception
occurred prior to Descartes' liberation from the senses,
the perception was clear and distinct in Meditation I . But
the passage does not explicitly say this. if on the basis
of evidential criteria other than clarity and distinctness
Descartes makes a certain judgment and the judgment is
correct, then clarity and distinctness is not a necessary
condition for making a correct judgment. To suggest other-
wise is to confuse truth with certainty. To make the dis-
tinction clearer, consider the following example. I may
come to believe that a certain proposition is true on the
basis of reading tea leaves. If my belief coincidently
happens to be true, I have made a correct judgment even
though the evidence upon which I make the judgment is not
sufficient to justify my belief. Similarly, in Meditation
JC Descartes may correctly perceive that a particular propo-
sition is true even though the basis upon which he makes
his judgment is shown to be inadequate to justify his
judgment
.
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Finally, in the passage quoted from the Replies to
the second set of objections, Kenny is correct in attribut-
ing to Descartes the position that some truths are so
simple that they cannot be thought of without being
believed to be true. But Kenny moves Descartes from this
position to one that holds that some truths are so simple
that they cannot be thought of without being clearly and
distinctly perceived. And nothing in the Replies to the
second set of objections warrants the move that Kenny
makes. Furthermore, the examples which Descartes provides
of propositions which cannot be thought of without being
believed to be true are not the mathematical propositions
which Kenny is suggesting. Rather, they are the meta-
physical truths which Kenny admits may never have been
thought of by a normal adult. Nor is there any evidence
m the second replies to suggest that Descartes intended
fOi. mathematical truths to have this property. Since
Kenny does not provide any additional textual evidence to
support his position, I contend that he has failed to
demonstrate that Descartes was perceiving mathematical
propositions clearly and distinctly in Meditation I.
But if Frankfurt is correct in maintaining that the
doubt raised in Meditation I is other than metaphysical,
what then is the nature of that doubt? Feldman recognizes
one aspect of the doubt raised by the evil demon hypothesis
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in both Meditation I and III. In a footnote he says:
In the Meditations, the "EvilDemon Hypothesis" seems to play aprimarily psychological role. By
reflecting on that hypothesis
Descartes enables himself to Counter-
act his natural tendency to believe
practical certainties. 9
Unfortunately, the purely epistemic nature of Feldman's
interpretation makes an expanded account of the psychologi
cal role in the Cartesian doubt irrelevant to his purposes
There exists additional textual evidence to suggest
that the doubt raised in Meditation I is distinct from
that raised in the Circle Passage in Meditation III. in
Meditation I Descartes asserts:
. . . there is nothing in all that I
formerly believed to be true, of which
I cannot in some measure doubt, and
that not merely through want of thought
or through levity; but for reasons
which are very powerful and maturely
,
considered
.
t
0
In his Discourse on the Method Descartes states:
. . . in trying to discover the error
or uncertainty of the propositions
which I examined, not by feeble conjec-
tures, but by clear and assured
reasonings . . .
Feldman, op. cit
.
,
p. 54.
^HR I, pp. 147-148 . (Italics mine)
^ Ibid
.
,
p. 99. (Italics mine)
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In each instance Descartes emphasizes the weight of the
reasons brought to bear on the propositions being con-
sidered. m each I contend that Descartes is referring
specifically to the doubt raised in Meditation I.
In the Circle Passage, however, Descartes characterizes
his doubt in the following manner:
• • • reason for doubt which depends
upon this opinion alone [that there is
a God who is a deceiver] is very slight,
and so to speak metaphysical. 2— ' 12
Note that the weight of the reasons for doubt in Meditation
-
111 has been reduced significantly.
There is one passage which at first glance contradicts
my claim that the doubt raised in Meditation I is other
than metaphysical. in his replies to the seventh set of
objections Descartes reminds the reader:
I said at the end of Meditation I
that everything which I had not yet
comprehended with sufficient clearness
could be doubted by us, provided we
did so for 'reasons that were very
powerful and maturely considered.
'
But I did so because there the ques-
tion was about only that supreme kind
of doubt which, I have insisted, is
metaphysical, hyperbolical and not to
be transferred to the sphere of the
practical needs of life by any means. 13
These remarks would appear to acknowledge that metaphysical
12
Ibid
.
,
p. 159. (Italics mine)
13 HR II, p. 266.
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doubt is raised at least at the end of Meditation T
. How_
ever, Descartes goes on to say:
It was of this doubt also that Isaid the very least ground of
suspicion was a sufficient reasonfor causing it. 14
If we take the comment, "It was of this doubt that I also
said.
. to be referring to his characterization of the
doubt raised in Meditation III, we have Descartes maintain-
ing that, on the one hand metaphysical doubt requires very
strong reasons, while on the other hand admitting merely
slight reasons will suffice for such doubt.
It would appear that Descartes is being inconsistent
at this point. But if we keep in mind that Descartes does
not make explicit any distinction between the doubt raised
in imitation I and that which is raised in Meditation III
,
we can resolve the apparent inconsistency. My contention
is that Descartes refers to the doubt in each Meditation as
metaphysical because he wishes to avoid confusing either
doubt with practical doubt. If we view the above passage
in light of my contention, we can interpret Descartes'
initial remarks as confirming that the doubt raised in
Meditation I requires solid reasons. At the same time,
Descartes acknowledgement that the very least grounds of
14
Ibid.
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suspicion serve as a sufficient reason for causing doubt
can be interpreted as a direct reference to the doubt
raised in Meditation III
. In short, all the textual
evidence can be interpreted as indicating that the reasons
for doubt in Meditation I must be stronger than those
necessary for doubt in Meditation III
.
One might object at this point that, if the doubt
raised in Meditation I requires stronger reasons than does
the metaphysical doubt raised in Meditation III
, then
the degree of certainty needed to overcome the former must
correspondingly be stronger than that needed to overcome
the latter. This would suggest that, if intuitional rather
than metaphysical certainty is achieved in Meditation II
,
it must be stronger, not weaker than the metaphysical
certainty achieved in Meditation III . But such an objec-
tion would be based on a misperception of the relationship
between doubt and certainty. That relationship is an
inverse one. For example, one needs rather strong evidence
to the contrary to defeat one's practical certainty simply
because practical certainty is fairly easy to achieve (and
hence rather difficult to defeat) . In the case of intui-
tional certainty, because it is more difficult to achieve,
less evidence to the contrary is needed to block it.
Finally, metaphysical certainty is the most difficult to
attain, hence the slightest evidence to the contrary will
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suffice to prevent its attainment.. This, then, is why
the reasons for doubt in Medltation_I must be stronger
than those sufficient for doubt in Meditation ITT .
We have, then, two distinct reasons for suggesting
that the doubt raised in Meditation I is other than that
raised in Meditation III. The first is that some textual
evidence exists to support the contention that no clearly
and distinctly perceived propositions are doubted in
Meditation I and no textual evidence to suggest otherwise.
The second is that textual evidence indicates that the
reasons for doubt in Meditation I must be much stronger
than those for doubt in Meditation III
. Furthermore, if
we consider Feldman’s point that the evil demon hypothesis
plays a psychological role in enabling Descartes to
counteract his natural tendency to believe practical cer-
tainties, and keep in mind that such natural tendencies
occur in Meditation I
,
we have a third reason for suggest-
that the doubt in Meditation I plays a different role
than that in the Circle Passage.
Beyond this there is no textual evidence to suggest
what the sufficient and necessary conditions are for the
doubt raised in Meditation I . Thus, it may prove helpful
to examine the certainty achieved in Meditation II
,
a cer-
tainty which, I shall argue, is to be contrasted with the
doubt raised in Meditation I.
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There exists substantial textual evidence to suggest
that the certainty achieved in Meditation II by means of
clear and distinct perception is psychological in nature.
Ih Meditation V
, Descartes asserts:
• * • I am of such a nature that aslong as I understand anything very clearly
and distinctly, I am naturally impelled , _to believe it to be true.
. .
15
In his replies to the seventh set of objections, Descartes
maintains
:
So, for example, that as long as we
attend to some truth which we perceive
very clearly, we cannot indeed doubt it. 16
We may recall that Gewirth and Kenny conclude from
such evidence that the certainty achieved in Meditation II
with the Cogito and other first principles is primarily
psychological in nature. As a result, I suggested the
following principles for each.
(a) £ is psychologically certain for s
_t if and only if S clearly and
distinctly perceives that £ at t.
(b) £ is clearly and distinctly perceived
by _S at £ only if £ is indubitable for
S at t (i.e.
, £ is unable to refrain
from believing that £ at t )
.
(c) £ is psychologically certain for s
^HR I, p. 183. (Italics mine)
^HR II, p. 266. (Italics mine)
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at t only if £ is indubitable for
S at t.
I also suggested the following principle for Kenny.
(d) £ is psychologically doubtful for S
at t if and only if £ i s not clearly
and distinctly perceived by s at t.
But we have seen that such principles do not enable
Gewirth or Kenny to provide an interpretation of Descartes'
enterprise which succeeds in avoiding circular reasoning.
Furthermore, there is textual evidence to suggest that
something more than psychological is being achieved in
Meditation II. At one point in that Meditation Descartes
asserts
:
.
. . there is some deceiver or other,
very powerful and very cunning, who
ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving
me. Then without doubt I exist also if
he deceives me, and let him deceive me as
much as he will
,
he can never cause me to
be nothing so long as I think that I am
something. So that after hnving reflected
we ^-d and carefully examined all things
,
we must come to the definite conclusion
that this proposition: I am, I exist, is
necessarily true each time I pronounce it,-.-,
or that I mentally conceive it. ^
Here Descartes talks of having reflected well and carefully
examined all things. This suggests that the certainty
achieved in Meditation II involves reasons. If so, then
17HR I, p. 150. (Italics mine)
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such certainty must have an epistemic component as well as
a psychological one.
But what is the nature of this epistemic component?
If the doubt raised in Meditation I requires strong reasons,
then the certainty achieved in Meditation II
. which over-
comes that doubt, should presumably also require strong
reasons, that is, for a proposition to be what I am
calling an 'intuitional certainty’ for Descartes, not only
must there be an absence of strong reasons to justify
doubting that proposition, there must also exist strong
reasons to warrant believing it. This is what I take
Descartes to be suggesting when he asserts that the propo-
sition I exist" must be true "having reflected well and
carefully examined all things . " He considers all the
evidence in support of the Cogito and discounts the hypo-
thesis of an evil deceiver since it provides no strong
reason for believing otherwise. On the basis of all this
he concludes that he is certain of the Cogito ' s truth. It
is not the case that no reason exists to suspect otherwise.
In the Circle Passage just such a reason does arise. But
it is not a sufficiently strong reason to defeat Descartes'
intuitional certainty that the Cogito is true. The doubt
that the hypothesis of a deceiving deity casts is so slight
that it can only block the metaphysical certainty that
Descartes is attempting to ultimately attain.
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One mighc well ask at this point why the deceiver
hypothesis does not undermine the certainty of propositions
such as the C
.
ogito attained in Meditation II if it does so
in Meditation III , My response is that my vieB chere
exists two very different contexts within which the
deceiver hypothesis is raised by Descartes. In Meditation
II Descartes is searching for a certainty to overcome the
doubt supported by strong reasons raised in Meditation I .
His examination of his essential nature provides him with
certain propositions which possess for him that sought
after certainty. No such strong reasons exist to defeat
that certainty. He considers the demon hypothesis and
discounts it. In fact, he even contends that it provides
support for, rather than against, the certainty of the
C^g^i^to
. Descartes can maintain this position consistent
with his later position on the demon hypothesis in the
Circle Passage because at this point in his deliberations
he is not concerned with either metaphysical doubt or
certainty. Only when the epistemic ante has been raised in
Meditation III does Descartes step back and reconsider the
impact of the demon hypothesis. The hypothesis has not
gained any credence; it is still only the most remote of
possibilities. However, the requirements for certainty
have been raised. Thus, the hypothesis can now be cited as
a legitimate defeater which blocks the attainment of that
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certainty. The hypothesis does not block the certainty of
the Co^ito in Meditation II simply because it does not
constitute evidence sufficiently strong to defeat the
certainty achieved at the time. In short, the demon hypo-
thesis raised in the Circle Passage does not defeat the
intuitional certainty of the Cogito for Descartes. It
blocks only the metaphysical certainty of the Cogito for
him.
Intuitional certainty is stronger than practical cer-
tainty. Thus, the evidential requirements for intuitional
certainty are more stringent than those for practical cer-
tainty. But the evidential requirements for intuitional
certainty are less stringent than those for metaphysical
certainty since intuitional certainty is weaker than meta-
physical certainty. To say that a proposition is a meta-
physical certainty for a person is to say that he is
-^y justified in believing it. Not even the very
slightest doubt can be found against it. To say that a
proposition is a practical certainty for someone is to
say that he is justified in believing it. To say that a
proposition is an intuitional certainty for someone is to
say that he has no strong evidence to doubt it and over-
whelming evidence for believing it to the point where his
conviction, that is, the degree to which he is psychologi-
cally confident in his belief, could not be greater. This
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is not to suggest that evidence sufficient for a proposi-
tion to be an intuitional certainty for a person entails
that the proposition is psychologically indubitable for
the person. As I pointed out in the preceeding chapter,18
not only may an individual be psychologically able to
doubt a proposition even though he has sufficient evidence
to warrant believing it, he may be psychologically unable
to doubt a proposition even though he has sufficient evi-
dence to warrant doubting it.
Thus, my contention is that Descartes has introduced
a concept of certainty in Meditation II which has both a
psychological component and an epistemic component.
Gewirth and Kenny are correct in pointing to the psycho-
logical component of that certainty. Each makes a strong
case supported by textual evidence. Difficulties with each
account stem in part not from mistakenly attributing a
psychological component to the certainty achieved in Medi-
tation II
,
but from a failure to recognize that a psycho-
logical explication provides only a partial analysis of
that certainty
. Throughout Meditation II Descartes empha-
sizes the role of reasons in overcoming the doubt raised
i-n Meditation I . Following the achievement of the Cogito
Descartes immediately commits himself to discovering those
1
o
Cf. Chapter IV, pp . 192-193.
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aspects of his nature which can be determined with the
same degree of certainty as was the Cogito and rejecting
all former opinions which can be invalidated by reflecting
on the reasons which he brought forward in establishing
the certainty of the Cogito. In fact, the primary enter-
prise in which Descartes engages in Meditation II is not
merely to convince himself that certain propositions are
true, but to consider reasons why such propositions are
certain and reasons why other propositions are question-
able.
The intuitional certainty which Descartes first
achieves with the Cogito is then extended to other proposi
tions, among them, sum r^s cogitans
. And on the basis of
these achievements Descartes develops the principle of
clarity and distinctness. He begins:
But what then am I? A thing
which thinks.
. .
From this time I begin to know
what I am with a little more clear-
,
q
ness and distinction.
. .
A bit later he remarks:
. . . if the (notion or) perception
of wax has seemed clearer and more
distinct,
. . . with how much more
19HR I, p. 153.
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(evidence) and distinctness must
it be said that I now know myself
.
20
Finally, Descartes contends:
I am certain that I am a thing which
thinks; but do I not then likewise
know what is requisite to render me
certain of a truth? Certainly in
this first knowledge there is nothing
that assures me of its truth, except-
ing the clear and distinct perception 0 ,of that which I state ... 21
And he concludes
:
.
. . and accordingly it seems to me
that already I can establish as a
general rule that all things which I
perceive very clearly and very dis-
tinctly are true. 22
This last passage suggests that clarity and distinct-
ness is a sufficient condition for the certainty (which I
am calling intuitional certainty) achieved in Meditation
11 • Accordingly, I am proposing the following principle:
(5) £ is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived by £ at t only if £ is
an intuitional certainty for at _t.
Given the textual evidence already cited in support of
a psychological component of intuitional certainty, I also
want to maintain the following principle:
20
21
22
Ibid
.
,
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(6) £ is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived by s at t only if £ i s
indubitable for S at t (i.e., S
is unable to refrain from believing
that £ at t )
,
Now, if intuitional certainty were a purely psycho-
logical concept, clarity and distinctness could serve as a
necessary condition for intuitional certainty as well. But
this would mean that any proposition which is not being
clearly and distinctly perceived at a given time would not
be an intuitional certainty. My contention is that, once
a proposition has been clearly and distinctly perceived by
Descartes, that proposition becomes an intuitional cer-
tainty for him in the sense that it does not become uncer-
tain merely by virtue of no longer being attended to. Any
doubts which Descartes subsequently has in the Meditations
about that proposition are metaphysical ones. The follow-
ing principle is an attempt to capture this suggestion:
(7) £ is an intuitional certainty for S
at t only if S would perceive £ at
t clearly and distinctly if S were
to direct his attention to £ at t.
While much more needs to be said about intuitional
certainty and the role that clarity and distinctness plays,
we have reached a point where other concepts related to
intuitional certainty can be introduced. The first is
intuitional uncertainty. To say that a proposition is an
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intuitional uncertainty for a person at a time is to say
that the proposition is not an intuitional certainty for
the person at the time. To say that a proposition is an
intuitional impossibility for a person at a time is to say
that its negation is an intuitional certainty for the per-
son at the time. To say that a proposition is an intui-
tional possibility for a person at a time is to say that
its negation is an intuitional uncertainty for the person
at the time. The concept of intuitional certainty, uncer-
tainty, possibility and impossibility fall into the tradi-
tional square of opposition: Intuitional certainty entails
intuitional possibility; intuitional impossibility entails
intuitional uncertainty
; intuitional certainty and intui-
tional impossibility are contraries; intuitional possibil-
ity and intuitional uncertainty are subcontraries; and
intuitional certainty and intuitional uncertainty are con-
tradictories, as are intuitional impossibility and
intuitional possibility.
The concepts of clarity and distinctness play an
important role in my explication of intuitional certainty
and related concepts. Each deserves a fuller account than
I intend to give here. Descartes' comments are not alto-
gether helpful. In passages quoted earlier from Meditation
V and the replies to the seventh set of objections, the
indubitability of clearly and distinctly perceived propo-
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sitions is articulated. In his Principles of Philosophy
.
XLV, Descartes states:
I term that clear which is present and
apparent to an attentive mind, in the
same way as we assert that we see
objects clearly when, being present to
the regarding eye, they operate upon it
with sufficient strength. But the dis-
tinct is that which is so precise anddifferent from all other objects that
it contains within itself nothing but «
what is clear. 23
And in the following principle (XLVI) he adds:
• •
• perception may be clear without
being distinct, and cannot be distinct-,
without being also clear. 24
An epistemic aspect of clarity and distinctness is
suggested by the following comment from the replies to the
second set of objections:
There are other matters that are
indeed perceived very clearly by our
intellect, when we attend sufficiently
closely to the reasons on which our
knowledge of them depends, and hence 9S
we cannot then be in doubt about them.
Descartes' comments on the concepts of clarity, dis-
tinctness, and intuitional certainty do not indicate the
nature of the relationship between these concepts and
reasons or evidence. Thus, the epistemic component of
23
Ibid.
,
24 Ibid
.
25HR II,
p. 237.
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intuitional certainty and related concepts will remain
undefined. However, there are certain logical relation-
ships which I wish to propose between intuitional cer-
tainty (and related concepts) and the concepts of practi-
cal epistemic appraisal. They are as follows:
(8) £ is an intuitional certainty for S
at t only if £ is a practical
certainty for S at t.
(9) £ is a practical uncertainty for S
at t only if £ is an intuitional
uncertainty for S at t.
(10) £ is a practical possibility for S
at t only if £ is an intuitional
possibility for S at t.
(11) £ is an intuitional impossibility
for S at t only if £ is a practical
impossibility for S at t.
Having provided an explication both of the concepts of
practical epistemic appraisal and those related to intui-
tional certainty, and having suggested some logical rela-
tionships which hold between them, I am now in a position
to turn to a consideration of the concepts related to meta-
physical doubt and certainty.
To say that a proposition is a metaphysical certainty
for a person, S, at a time, t, is to say that not even the
"very least grounds of suspicion" exist to cast doubt upon
its truth. in characterizing metaphysical certainty in
this way I am following Feldman's lead. But unlike Feld-
231
man, I do not wish to maintain that metaphysical certainty
is a purely epistemic notion. Because I intend to analyze
it m terms both of concepts related to intuitional cer-
tainty and concepts of practical epistemic appraisal, meta
physical certainty and concepts related to it will have a
psychological component as well as an epistemic one.
Since on my account thus far one cannot attain the intui-
tional certainty of a particular proposition without having
clearly and distinctly perceived it, the metaphysical cer-
tainty of a proposition (which entails intuitional cer-
tainty of that proposition) involves not only being maxi-
mally justified in believing it, but also having unshake-
able conviction of its truth whenever entertaining the
proposition.
On the basis of this brief account of metaphysical
certainty, I can now introduce some related concepts:
(12) £ is a metaphysical uncertainty
for S_ at t £ is not a meta-
physical certainty for S_ at t.
(13) £ is a metaphysical possibility
for S_ at £ -£ is not a meta-
physical certainty for S at t.
(14) £ is a metaphysical impossibility
for S_ at £ -£ is a metaphysical
certainty for £ at _t.
Leaving metaphysical doubt to be defined shortly, these
concepts fall into the traditional square of opposition.
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Metaphysical certainty entarls metaphysical possibility.
Metaphysical impossibility entails metaphysical uncer-
tainty. Metaphysical certainty is the contradictory of
metaphysical uncertainty. Metaphysical impossibility is
tne contradictory of metaphysical possibility. Metaphysi-
cal certainty and metaphysical impossibility are contraries.
And finally, metaphysical possibility and metaphysical un-
certainty are subccntraries
.
There are also logical relations which hold between
the concepts related to metaphysical certainty and those
1
6
lat6 (i to intuitional certainty. They arc:
' 15 ) £ IS a metaphysical certainty tor
S at t only if £ is an intuitional
certainty for S at t.
(16) £ is an intuitional uncertainty for
S at t only if £ is a metaphysical
uncertainty for S at t.
(17) £ is an intuitional possibility for
S at t only if £ is a metaphysical
possibility for S at t.
(18) £ is a metaphysical impossibility
for S at t only if £ is an intui-
tional impossibility for S at t.
Principles (8) through (11), together with principles
(15) through (18), give us corresponding logical relations
between the concepts related to metaphysical certainty and
those of practical epistemic appraisal.
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Before defining metaphysical doubt, we must introduce
one additional concept - the concept of one proposition
casting doubt upon, or defeating the certainty of, another
proposition. I have argued earlier that instances where
Descartes talks of reasons that are 'very powerful and
maturely considered' or 'valid and well considered'
,
he is
referring to propositions that serve to cast intuitional
doubt on propositions that are practical certainties for
him. In the case of metaphysical doubt he suggests that
reasons for doubt may be very slight. He does so in the
Circle Passage and in his replies to the seventh set of
objections when he states:
For we may well enough be compelled
to doubt by arguments that are in
themselves doubtful and not to be
afterwards retained.
. .
The concept of an epistemic defeater is employed by
Feldman in his explication of metaphysical doubt. On his
account a proposition has to be a practical possibility in
order to defeat the practical certainty of another proposi-
tion. He specifically rejects the notion that the meta-
physical possibility of a proposition qualifies that
proposition as an epistemic defeater.
I contend that we can interpret the textual evidence
26
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,
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that describ
hyperbolic
,
es reasons for metaphysical doubt as slight,
and m themselves doubtful as supporting the
notion that a proposition must be only an intuitional
possibility m order for it to cast metaphysical doubt on
the practical certainty of another proposition. In effect,
I am proposing the following:
(19) £ is a metaphysical uncertainty
for S at t if and only if (E£) (£
is an intuitional possibility for s
at t and if £ were a practical
certainty for £ at _t then it would
defeat the practical certainty of
£ for £ at _t, thereby making £ a
practical uncertainty for S at t.
Take the case of the atheistic geometer. On Feldman's
view, the atheist can know, in the sense of obtaining
practical certainty, the proposition (£) that the three
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. But
Descartes acknowledges that the atheistic geometer can
also clearly and distinctly perceive that (£)
.
This alone
suggests that the degree of certainty is greater than that
provided by practical certainty. On my account the propo-
sition (£ ) is an intuitional certainty for him. But his
knowledge is not certain and immutable in the sense of
being metaphysically certain, since it is still an intui-
tional possibility for him that (£) God is a deceiver.
Proposition (£) is an intuitional possibility for him
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because its negation, <-a ) that God is no deceiver, is not
an intuitional certainty for him. Thus, if (a ) „er e a
practical certainty for him, that would defeat the practi-
cal certainty of (£ ) for him, thereby making (£ ) a practi-
cal uncertainty for him, i.e., his evidence would no longer
be sufficient to warrant his believing that (|5 )
Given the interpretation of Descartes which I am
suggesting, we are now in a position to review my responses
to questions (1) through (5).
First, in Meditation I Descartes is attempting to
determine if any of the propositions which are practical
certainties for him survive the rigors of an 'enquiry into
truth'. "In the first Meditation I set forth the reasons
for which we may, generally speaking, doubt about all
• • The first reason which Descartes considers
is the possibility that he is asleep and dreaming.
At this moment it does indeed seem to
me that it is with eyes awake that I
am looking at this paper; that this
head which I move is not asleep. . .;
what happens in sleep does not appear
so clear nor so distinct as does all
this. But in thinking over this I
remind myself that on many occasions
I have in sleep been deceived by
similar illusions, and in dwelling
carefully on this reflection I see
so manifestly that there are no certain
27HR I, p. 140.
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indications by which we may clearly
distinguish wakefulness from sleep
. .
This consideration is sufficient to warrant doubting
beliefs acquired through the senses.
Descartes then considers those propositions whose
practical certainty is not tainted by the dream argument.
For whether I am awake or asleep, two
and three together always form five,
and the square can never have more than
four sides, and it does not seem possible
that truths so clear and apparent can
be suspected of any falsity (or uncer-
tainty)
.
29
These propositions, including mathematical truths, are ones
which Descartes, in his naive philosophical posture, is
not perceiving clearly and distinctly.
I said at the end of Meditation I
that everything which I had not yet
comprehended with sufficient clearness
could be doubted by us, provided we
did so for 'reasons that were very
powerful and maturely considered. '
In Meditation I Descartes is a long way from recognizing
the principle of clarity and distinctness as a rule of
evidence. He then considers the possibility that an omni-
potent evil genius is deceiving him in all his remaining
beliefs, particularly those which are practical certainties
28
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p. 147.
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for him. This hypothesis, together with the dream argu-
ment, constitutes the 'very powerful and maturely con-
sidered reasons' required to bring about intuitional doubt.
Thus, all of Descartes' practical certainties are now
intuitional uncertainties for him. Thus, my response to
question (1) is that all of Descartes' beliefs are cast
into doubt. No distinction is made between doubts about
empirical beliefs and doubts about non-empirical ones.
The primary advantage of my account of Descartes'
enterprise as it relates to Meditation I is that
,
given
the notion of intuitional doubt for which 1 have argued, I
can consistently maintain that certain propositions such
as I am now sitting before the fire and I am not in bed,
asleep and dreaming, remain practical certainties for
Descartes. Such propositions become intuitional uncer-
tainties but their practical epistemic status remains
intact. The advantage of this to my interpretation of
Descartes will be explained in much more detail shortly.
With respect to question (2), Descartes discovers in
Meditation II that there is at least one proposition, the
Cogito
,
which is an intuitional certainty for him. He
examines a number of reasons justifying his belief that
he exists and concludes ". . . of a surety I myself did
exist since I persuaded myself of something (or merely
238
because I thought of something). 1 ’ 31 He then considers the
strongest reason he can imagine to defeat his belief.
But there is some deceiver or other,
very powerful and very cunning, who’
ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving
me. Then without doubt I exist also
if he deceives me
. . .
32
Having reflected well and carefully examined all the
relevant evidence, Descartes concludes, "I am, I exist, is
necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I
mentally conceive it." 33 The weight of the evidence is
^icient ly strong that Descartes' conviction is absolute.
Having achieved the intuitional certainty that he exists,
Descartes turns to a consideration of his nature and by
reflecting on the reasons which he brought forward in
establishing the certainty of the Cogito he eventually con-
cludes that sum res cogitans
. Again, given the weight of
evidence for this belief and the absence of any strong
reasons for its negation, Descartes achieves intuitional
certainty. Thus, my response to question (2) is that the
Cogito provides the initial intuitional certainty which
Descartes needs to overcome the intuitional doubt raised in
the preceeding Meditation . The Cogito also provides the
31
32
33
HR I,
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basis of determining the intuitional certainty of other
propositions including sum res cogitans
. But on my view
the Co_gi t o does not attain any special epistemic status
distinct from that of other first principles.
With respect to question (3), the intuitional cer-
tainties achieved in Meditation II provide the basis from
which Descartes develops the principle of clarity and
distinctness. To reiterate, he begins:
But what then am I? A thing
which thinks . . .
From this time I begin to know
what I am with a little more clear- ~
,
ness and distinction ...
A bit later he remarks:
. . . if the (notion or) perception
of wax has seemed to me clearer and
more distinct, . . . with how much
more (evidence) and distinctness must
^5it be said that I now know myself . . .
Finally, Descartes contends:
I am certain that I am a thing which
thinks; but do I not then likewise
know what is requisite to render me
certain of a truth? Certainly in
this first knowledge there is nothing
that assures me of its truth, except-
ing the clear and distinct perception ^
of that which I state . . .
^ Ibid
.
,
p . 153
.
~^ Ibid
.
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Thus, my response to question (3) is that by the opening
of Meditation III Descartes arrives at the conclusion that
clarity and distinctness are conditions sufficient for
intuitional certainty. And they will play a vital role in
establishing the intuitional certainty of the premises and
the conclusions in the arguments for God's existence and
benevolent nature.
With respect to question (4), in the Circle Passage
Descartes raises the hypothesis of the deceptive deity. in
the face of the intuitional certainty of his clear and dis-
tinct perceptions, the proposition that God is a deceiver
is only a very slight reason for doubting his clear and
distinct perceptions.
. . . since I have no reason to believe
that there is a God who is a deceiver,
and as I have not yet satisfied myself
that there is a God at all, the reason
for doubt which depends on this opinion
alone is very slight, and so to speak
metaphysical. But in order to be able
altogether to remove it, I must inquire
whether there is a God . . . and . . .
I must also inquire whether He may be a
deceiver; for without a knowledge of
these two truths I do not see that I can,
?
ever be certain of anything.
Since Descartes has not yet turned his attention to con-
sidering the existence and nature of God, the proposition
that God exists and is no deceiver is not an intuitional
37
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certainty for him. Hence, as I have argued, the proposi-
tion that God is a deceiver is an intuitional possibility
for him. That possibility makes all Descartes' intuitional
certainties metaphysically uncertain. Given principle ( 19 ),
if the proposition that God is a deceiver were a practical
certainty for Descartes, that would defeat the practical
certainty of all his remaining beliefs, thereby making
them practical uncertainties for him. Thus, my response to
question (4) is that the doubt raised in the Circle Passage
is metaphysical doubt and it is quite distinct from the
intuitional doubt raised in Meditation I . Metaphysical
doubt does not defeat the intuitional certainties achieved
in Meditation II
,
but the hypothesis of a deceptive God
does prevent Descartes from being metaphysically certain
that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.
With respect to question (5)
,
having raised meta-
physical doubt about his clear and distinct perceptions,
Descartes turns to a consideration of God's existence. He
follows a line of reasoning, the conclusion of which is
that God exists. The premises of this argument are not
metaphysically certain for Descartes. Neither is the con-
clusion. But Descartes does perceive the premises clearly
and distinctly. Hence, they are intuitional certainties
for him. He also clearly and distinctly perceives that
the conclusion follows from the premises and he clearly and
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distinctly perceives the conclusion. Hence, the conclusion
that God exists is an intuitional certainty for Descartes.
Once the proposition that God exists is an intuitional
certainty for him, Descartes turns his attention to con-
sidering the nature of that existent God. He follows a
line of reasoning, the conclusion of which is that God is
no deceiver.
For, first of all, I recognize it to be
impossible that He should ever deceive
me; for in all fraud and deception some
imperfection is to be found, and although
it may appear that the power of deception
is a mark of subtilty or power, yet the
desire to deceive without doubt testifies
to malice or feebleness, and accordingly
cannot be found in God. 88
Once again the premises of this argument are not metaphysi-
cally certain for Descartes. However, he does oerceive
them clearly and distinctly, thereby making them intuitional
certainties. Inferring the conclusion, that God is no
deceiver, from these premises in a continuous and unin-
terrupted thought results in the conclusion being perceived
clearly and distinctly. Thus, it too is an intuitional cer-
tainty for Descartes.
But if the proposition that God is no deceiver is an
intuitional certainty, then its negation, the proposition
that God is a deceiver, is an intuitional impossibility.
38 Ibid
.
,
p . 172
.
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It is, therefore, no longer an intuitional possibility.
Hence, it can no longer qualify as an epistemic defeater.
And since, for Descartes, the proposition that God is a
deceiver is the only proposition which can cause meta-
physical doubt, all of Descartes' intuitional certainties
become metaphysical certainties.
Descartes is now in a position to demonstrate the
metaphysical certainty of all his clear and distinct per-
ceptions. In an abbreviated form39 Descartes’ argument is
roughly the following:
(1) Every clear and distinct perception
is something.
(2) Whatever is something is caused by God.
(3) Whatever is caused by God is true.
(4) Therefore, every clear and distinct per-
ception is true.
Each of the premises, and therefore the conclusion, is per-
ceived clearly and distinctly by Descartes. Each is, there-
fore, an intuitional certainty. But since there is no
longer any proposition that is an intuitional possibility
for Descartes and that casts metaphysical doubt on proposi-
tions which are intuitional certainties for him, each of
the premises, and therefore the conclusion, is a metaphysi-
cal certainty for him. Thus, Descartes has succeeded in
This form of the argument is to be found in Feldman, op .
cit
.
,
p . 52
.
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demonstrating the metaphysical certainty that all his
clear and distinct perceptions are true.
The interpretation of Descartes' enterprise that I
have just presented leaves a number of questions unanswered.
One involves how the epistemic component of intuitional
certainty and intuitional doubt is to be explicated. other
than suggesting certain logical relationships between
each and between the concepts of practical epistemic
appraisal, I have refrained from suggesting any sufficient
or necessary epistemic conditions. And I do not have any
clear intuitions on how this question might be answered.
A second question concerns how clarity and distinct-
ness are to be fully explicated. Descartes' comments are
not altogether helpful; and I have refrained from anything
more than suggesting a few logical relationships between
d^^ity and distinctness and intuitional certainty.
A third question concerns the arguments for God's
existence and non—deceiving nature and for the veracity
of clear and distinct perceptions. I have refrained from
developing adequate accounts of these three arguments.
Each obviously requires more attention than I have devoted
to it in my thesis.
Finally, there is the question of whether my account
is, in fact, what Descartes had in mind. I confess that in
developing three types of doubt and certainty, the resulting
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complexity flies in the face of Ockham's razor. My res-
ponse is that there exists some textual evidence to support
my thesis. I have found none either inconsistent with it
or that cannot be interpreted in a manner consistent with
it. And more importantly, my interpretation allows an
escape from the Cartesian Circle.
There are two additional advantages which I contend my
interpretation provides. The first concerns the doubt
raised in Meditation I
. Those who contend both that meta-
physical doubt is raised from the very start of Descartes'
enterprise and that the evil demon/deceiving God hypothesis
is the only proposition which casts such metaphysical doubt,
provide no satisfactory explanation of how the dream argu-
ment functions. It clearly functions for Descartes in
causing doubt about beliefs based on sense perception.
Yet, it doesn't qualify as a cause for metaphysical doubt.
On my account, no such problem occurs. The dream hypothesis
causes intuitional doubt only. The evil demon/deceiving
God initially causes intuitional doubt and later causes
metaphysical doubt.
Second, among the interpretations which maintain what
I have characterized as the non-autonomy of reason thesis,
only Feldman's is clearly non-circular. However, I have
argued that among other things it encounters textual
difficulties, particularly in Meditation I . More specif i-
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cally, I have suggested that the proposition that he is
sitting by the fire is uncertain for Descartes. The
proposition constituting his reason for doubt is that he
is in bed asleep and dreaming. But given Feldman's expli-
cation of the concepts of practical epistemic appraisal,
the proposition that he is not in bed asleep and dreaming
is a practical uncertainty for Descartes. But both Feld-
man s explication and Descartes' distinction between the
practical activities of life and an 'enquiry into truth'
indicate that the proposition that I am not in bed asleep
and dreaming is a practical certainty for Descartes.
Feldman's only alternative would be to redefine meta-
physical doubt in such a way that a proposition which is
only a metaphysical possibility (rather than a practical
possibility) would qualify to cast such doubt. Unfortun-
ately, this alternative would put Descartes back into the
circle
.
The account I have presented overcomes this difficulty.
The proposition that I am not in bed asleep and dreaming is
a practical certainty for Descartes, as is the proposition
that I am sitting by the fire. The proposition that I am
in bed asleep and dreaming is, on my account, only an
intuitional possibility. It can function as a reason for
intuitional doubt without affecting either its practical
epistemic status or that of its contradiction. Thus, the
247
account I have presented can provide an explanation of
metaphysical doubt without encountering the difficulties
which I have suggested for Feldman's account.
For the reasons I have just given, I believe that the
interpretation of Descartes' enterprise which I have pro-
vided, m spite of its unavoidable complexity, points to
a satisfactory solution to the problems of the Cartesian
Circle
.
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